Religious diversity and religious involvement: A study of religious markets in Western societies at the end of the twentieth century by Aarts, O.A.J.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The version of the following full text has not yet been defined or was untraceable and may
differ from the publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/77570
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Religious diversity and religious involvement 
 
A study of religious markets in Western societies  
at the end of the twentieth century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover design  Marije Beugelink and Olav Aarts 
Interior design Olav Aarts 
Printing   PrintPartners Ipskamp Nijmegen 
 
ISBN   978-90-9025439-5    
 
 © Olav Aarts, Nijmegen 2010. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
Religious diversity and religious involvement 
 
A study of religious markets in Western societies  
at the end of the twentieth century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied 
van de Sociale Wetenschappen 
 
 
 
Proefschrift 
 
 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen  
op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. mr. S.C.J.J. Kortmann, 
volgens besluit van het college van decanen 
in het openbaar te verdedigen op 1 juli 2010 
om 10.30 uur precies 
 
 
 
door 
 
 
 
Olav Agatha Joka Aarts 
Geboren op 24 februari 1980 
te Geldrop
4 
Promotores:        Prof. dr. N.D. de Graaf (Nuffield College, Oxford) 
Prof. dr. A. Need (Universiteit Twente)  
 
Copromotor:      Dr. M. te Grotenhuis  
 
Manuscriptcommissie: Prof. dr. R. Eisinga 
    Prof. dr. J.J.G. Schmeets (Universiteit Maastricht) 
    Dr. L. Halman (Universiteit van Tilburg) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
Voorwoord 
 
 
 
 
 
De afgelopen vijf jaar heb ik met interesse de omslagen van de proefschriften van 
collega’s bekeken. Vervolgens las ik het voorwoord met zeer veel belangstelling. Nu is 
het zo ver dat ik mijn eigen voorwoord schrijf waarin ik mijn dank kan uiten aan zo 
velen die me geholpen en gesteund hebben. 
 
Allereerst wil ik mijn promotoren en copromotor bedanken. De samenwerking in de 
afgelopen jaren is erg aangenaam geweest. Ik dank jullie voor de tijd en energie die 
jullie in mijn onderzoek hebben gestoken.  
Ariana, ik leerde je pas kennen vlak voor ik met mijn promotie begon. Je directe 
aanpak en positiviteit spraken me gelijk aan. Je toegankelijkheid zorgde ervoor dat ik 
met alle hindernissen en obstakels die komen met het schrijven van een proefschrift bij 
je terecht kon. Meerdere keren heb je me weer op weg geholpen en vertrouwen 
gegeven als ik dacht vast gelopen te zijn. Ook ben ik je dankbaar voor het opbouwend 
commentaar waarmee je alle stukken rijkelijk voorzag. Onze samenwerking met het 
opzetten en doceren van de cursus Sociologen en Antropologen over religie was 
leerzaam. 
 Manfred, je kennis van methoden en statistiek lijkt onuitputtelijk. Zonder jouw 
inzet om mij in te wijden in die wondere wereld, zou dit proefschrift er anders hebben 
uitgezien. Een Iranese mysticus vertelde me dat de wiskunde evenals religie gebaseerd 
is op geloof. Maar jij hebt het handen en voeten weten te geven.  
 Nan Dirk, jouw betrokkenheid en krachtige meningen in het bediscussiëren van 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek hebben me scherp gehouden.  
Ook andere mensen die bij mijn proefschrift betrokken zijn geweest wil ik 
bedanken. Wout, als eerste jaarsstudent motiveerde jij mij om vragen te stellen en dat 
ben ik de afgelopen 10 jaar blijven doen. Onze samenwerking was altijd zeer prettig, 
zowel in het geven van de cursus Hedendaagse Sociologie als in het schrijven van ons 
artikel. Ben Pelzer wil ik bedanken voor zijn interesse in dit onderzoek en methodische 
bijstand. En natuurlijk de aio’s. Nicole, Marieke, Tom, Nienke, Rianne, Wouter, Ellen, 
Eva, Jan, Jannes, Stijn, Roderik, Fransje, Mark, Tim, Giedo, Natascha, Jochem en 
Marloes bedankt voor de gesprekken, discussies, de etentjes en de uitjes. Jullie hebben 
voor een stimulerende en uitdagende werkomgeving gezorgd.  
  6 
De leden van het ICS bedank ik voor de vruchtbare forumdagen en het nuttige 
commentaar op de eerdere versies van de hoofdstukken in dit boek. De leden van de 
leescommissie Rob Eisinga, Hans Schmeets en Loek Halman bedank ik voor de tijd 
die ze genomen hebben voor het lezen van mijn proefschrift.  
 
Buiten de academische wereld heb ik  veel steun gekregen om dit proefschrift tot een 
goed einde te brengen. Aloys, onze lunches en etentjes zijn altijd een genot voor 
lichaam en geest. Tjeerd, onze uren ‘zitten’ brengen rust en je frisse, humoristische 
kijk op dingen is aanstekelijk. Ik ben blij dat jullie mij als paranimfen ter zijde willen 
staan. De steun en warmte van vrienden en vriendinnen is indrukwekkend. Bedankt 
voor jullie uithoudingsvermogen, nu ben ik eindelijk klaar.  
Herman, mijn ontwikkeling in de yoga heb ik te danken aan jouw onderricht. Je 
yogalessen waren tijdens deze periode een verademing. Ook mijn medestudenten en 
docenten van de Yoga & Vedanta opleiding dank ik voor de inspiratie die ze mij 
gaven.  
Tot slot. Marije, je liefde is ontzettend. Bij je zijn is als poëzie.  
 
 
Olav Aarts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND REASEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.1 The influence of religious diversity on religious involvement 11 
1.2 Variations in religious involvement 13 
1.3 The relationship between religious diversity and religious involvement 16 
1.3.1 Secularisation theory 16 
1.3.2 Religious market theory 18 
1.4 Detailed research questions and outline of this book 19 
1.4.1 Religious deregulation 20 
1.4.2 Believing and belonging 23 
1.4.3 Diversity and membership in the US 25 
1.4.4 Catholics in the Netherlands 26 
1.5. Data used 28 
1.5.1 The European Value Studies 28 
1.5.2 The World Value Studies 29 
1.5.3 The Glenmarry Data 29 
1.5.4 KASKI Data 29 
 
CHAPTER 2: DOES DURATION OF DEREGULATED RELIGIOUS  
MARKETS AFFECT CHURCH ATTENDANE? 
2.1 Introduction 33 
2.2 Previous research 35 
2.3 Hypotheses on religious regulation 37 
2.3.1 General patterns of religious deregulation 37 
2.3.2 A more stringent examination: Modernity and religion  39 
2.4 Data and operationalization 40 
2.4.1 Data 40 
2.4.2 Measuring religious involvement 42 
2.4.3 Measuring religious deregulation: degree and duration  42 
2.4.4 The Human Development Index  43 
2.4.5 Compositional influences: individual level variables 44 
2.5 Analysis 44 
2.5.1 General patterns of religious deregulation 44 
            2.5.2 A more stringent test: modernity and post-communism 46 
2.6 Conclusion  50 
 
CHAPTER 3: DOES BELONGING ACCOMPANY BELIEVING 
3.1 Introduction and research questions 55 
3.2 Theory and hypotheses 58 
3.3 Data and operationalisation 60 
3.3.1 Categories of religious diversity 60 
  8 
3.3.2 Variables measuring Christian beliefs and  62 
3.4 Analyses  63 
3.5 Conclusion 69 
 
CHAPTER 4: LOCAL RELIGIOUS MARKETS AND RELIGIOUS 
INVOLVEMENT 
4.1 Introduction and question  73 
4.1.1 Associations between religious diversity, denominations and   
         involvement 
75 
4.1.2 Two forms of religious diversity 75 
4.2 Hypotheses and the causality issue 78 
4.2.1 Diversity and secularity 79 
4.2.2 Diverse markets, blossoming religiosity 81 
4.3 Measuring religious diversity: deficiencies and solutions 82 
4.4 Data 84 
4.4.1 Data 84 
4.4.2 Religious membership 84 
4.4.3 Religious diversity 85 
4.4.4 Modernity and median household income per county 85 
4.5 Analysis 86 
4.6 Conclusion 98 
 
CHAPTER 5: ROMAN CATHOLICS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
5.1 Introduction 103 
5.2 Theoretical background 105 
5.2.1 The Catholic anomaly and the Dutch case 105 
5.2.2 Recent Dutch religious history 106 
5.2.3 Three amendments to religious market theory 107 
    5.2.4 More elaborations  109 
5.3 One general proposition, seven hypotheses 111 
5.3.1 Two hypotheses on external diversity 111 
5.3.2 Three hypotheses on internal diversity 113 
5.3.3 Two hypotheses on secular surroundings 114 
5.4 Data and measurements 115 
5.4.1 Multiple-source data 115 
5.4.2 Percentage of Catholics attending 116 
5.4.3 External religious diversity 117 
5.4.4 Internal religious diversity 118 
5.4.5 Secular surroundings and urbanization 118 
5.5 Analyses 119 
5.6 Conclusion 123 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 127 
6.2 Answers to research questions 127 
6.2.1 Religious freedom, deregulation the economy 128 
 9 
6.2.2 Declining belonging and shrinking beliefs 129 
6.2.3 Diversity and membership 135 
6.2.4 Anomalies and amendments for Catholicism’s internal diversity 137 
6.3 General conclusions and discussion 139 
6.4 Evaluating religious markets, diversity and involvement 143 
 
APPENDIX 
Appendix A 146 
Appendix B 147 
Appendix C 155 
Appendix D 158 
  
SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 159 
REFERENCES 170 
  
Curriculum Vitae 176 
ICS Dissertation series 177 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction and research questions 
 
 
 
1.1 The influence of religious diversity on religious involvement  
The rise of new religious and secular ideas in the West from 1500 AD onwards, posed 
a challenge for religious traditions. The Reformation led to numerous new 
denominations, now known as Protestantism. The various versions of Protestantism 
had in common that they were sober, book bound, devotional, and dogmatic in their 
outlook (Smart 1998). The Contra-Reformation reshaped Catholicism and interestingly 
science, partially brought about by Protestantism, developed towards a rational-
empirical approach of reality (Smart 1998; Stark 2003). 
From the 16th century onwards, technological and economical advances, rising 
levels of education, and philosophical developments have had a major impact on 
Christianity and other religions around the globe. These developments gave shape to 
more secular ideas and forced existing religious traditions to reformulate or even 
abandon some of their doctrines. This contributed to the ongoing fragmentation of 
Christianity in the West (Smart 1998). In addition to this, the successes of technology 
improved means of communication between people and cultures. The consequence of 
this was that ideas and religions were exchanged on a far greater scale than before. 
This unprecedented trafficking of ideas and on such a massive scale was, and still is, 
contributing to religious diversity. In sum, as Western societies and their populations 
made the transition into the modern era, they became more religiously diverse.  
It has been is argued that the emergence of religiously diverse markets have as a 
consequence that religious influences in the public sphere have largely been replaced 
by more secular ideas. Religion has become above all a private matter. For many 
people, the emergence of coexisting religious traditions in the same region made 
membership to one particular church no longer a taken-for-granted matter (Berger 
1967; Bruce 2002; Stark and Finke 2000). Besides, the privatisation of religion in most 
Western societies gave people freedom not to adhere to any church. In such 
circumstances, one can argue that religion has to be marketed, whereas previously 
religious membership could be authoritatively imposed and it’s continuity safeguarded 
by custom (Berger 1967). Presumably, the market situation, which has emerged is 
forcing denominations to compete more and to make harder effort to attract and bind 
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possible adherents to their faith (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Finke and Stark1988; Stark 
and Iannaccone 1996).  
One of the theories examined in this study that focuses on the emerged market 
situation of religion, is secularisation theory. Secularisation theory predicts that due to 
religious diversity, societies and their inhabitants will become increasingly secular 
(Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Martin 1978; Wilson 1966). Secularisation theory 
presumes that the coexistence of different religious traditions decreases the plausibility 
of religions. This presumed decline in religious plausibility is what eventually causes 
secularisation. In a religiously diverse setting, it is far more difficult for any 
denomination or religious tradition in general, to claim exclusivity and absolute truth 
of their doctrines. In addition to this, when autonomous people are exposed to a range 
of sometimes conflicting ideas about reality they are also free to choose no religion at 
all and opt to be secular. However, secularisation theory faces some difficulties. In 
some Western societies, especially in the United States, overall religious involvement 
is still strong and some scholars observe a revival of religiosity in the growth of strict 
denominations (Davie 2002; Finke 1992; Iannaccone 1994). 
To account for these discrepancies religious market theory has been developed. 
Religious market theory draws from economic principles and focuses on the religious 
market, where denominations sell their ‘products’. An important difference with 
secularisation theory is that religious market theory centres on the supply of religious 
products rather than the demand-side. The core of the theory is the assumption that 
people are religious by nature but that there are distinct religious consumer segments 
(Finke and Stark 1988; Stark 1997; Stark and Finke 2000). These consumer segments 
reflect the different religious needs people have (Finke 1997). When a variety of 
religious creeds are on offer, individuals will choose a church that suits their religious 
needs best. In such a market, religious firms will compete and specialise to meet the 
demands of a specific segment (Stark and Finke 2000). Therefore, religious market 
theory asserts that religious diversity fosters religious involvement through choice and 
competition.  
In sum, secularisation and religious market theory have completely opposite 
predictions about the influence of religious diversity on religious involvement. 
Secularisation theory states that religious diversity is corrosive to religiosity. On the 
contrary, religious market theory claims that religious diversity will revitalise 
religiosity. Secularisation theory concentrates on the individual, who supposedly is 
less and less inclined to demand religious products and services. Religious market 
theory draws attention to the capacity of religious firms to stimulate and satisfy 
demand for their faith. Despite an impressive amount of studies testing these two 
rivalling hypotheses, it is still unclear whether religious diversity affects religious 
involvement negatively or positively  (Chaves and Gorski 2001). This study aims to 
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provide insights in the religious fluctuations of North America and Europe over time, 
taking individual, denominational, and society characteristics into account. Therefore 
the overarching research question of this study is:   
To what extent does religious diversity leads to lower or higher levels of 
religious involvement? 
 
In this study, we examine to what extent both secularisation theory and religious 
market theory are able to explain the relationship between religious diversity and 
religious involvement. In the remainder of this introductory chapter we show that 
levels of religious involvement vary between and within societies. Next to this, we 
elaborate on both secularisation theory and religious market theory and test their 
hypotheses in the subsequent empirical chapters 2 - 5. Finally, we give an outline of 
the book in which the relationship between the overarching research question and the 
chapters is unfolded.  
 
1.2 Variations in religious involvement 
Since the various post-war economic revivals, Western Europe and Northern America 
have been transformed into consumerist entities. Choices have never been so abundant 
as today, and something similar has been happening in religion (Smart 1998). In the 
consumer-oriented markets of Western Europe and the United States, religion is 
presumed to be largely subject to individual choice (Aldridge 2000). Both 
secularisation theory and religious market theory state that religions have to sell their 
‘products’ to religious consumers. The religiously diverse situation becomes more and 
more a market situation, dominated by the logic of market economics (Berger 1967; 
Bruce 2002; Finke and Stark 1988; Stark and Finke 2000). In the religious market, 
many new varieties of religion are added as religious traditions cross and merge. 
 Given these changes in the religious market, where denominations have to 
market their faith and where uniformity with regard to a religious worldview no longer 
exists, it is important to examine what this means for individuals. When the logic of 
market economics spread into the realm of religion, did people become more (or less) 
religiously involved or did everything stay the same?  
 To examine developments in religious involvement in the past two decades we 
combined the 1981, 1990, and 2000 sweeps of the European and World Value 
Survey’s. These surveys hold information of individuals with regard to religious 
involvement: their religious beliefs, religious membership, and attendance of religious 
services. Table 1 presents the findings for these forms of religious involvement for 13 
European and North American societies in the 1981 to 2000 period. 
INTRODUCTION AND QUESTIONS 
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  We start of with a rather broad indication of religious involvement, that is 
whether people regard themselves as a religious person or not. Findings show that 
societies differ in the percentage of people who regard themselves as religious. For 
example, in 1981 about 55 percent of the people in the United Kingdom regarded 
themselves as being religious. In contrast to this is the United States with 83 percent of 
its population regarding themselves being religious in that year. Next to differences 
between societies with regard to the percentage of religious people, there are 
differences in trends within societies.1 In Belgium, France, Spain, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom the percentage of religious people significantly 
declined in the past two decades. Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden 
however had a significant increase in the percentage of people who regard themselves 
as being religious. Even with such a rough indicator of religiosity it is striking to find 
such variety between societies regarding the prevalence of self-proclaimed religiosity 
and trends thereof. Most research uses more specific indicators of religious 
involvement, like religious beliefs, membership of a denomination, and attendance of 
religious services. These more specific indicators of religious involvement are used 
because they do not only provide information about the religiosity of individuals but 
are linked to religious traditions as well. Therefore, they give us information about the 
vitality of both individuals and denominations.  
One of the most widely held beliefs when people adhere to whatever religious 
tradition is belief in God (Smart 1998). Table 1 shows that the prevalence of belief in 
God differs between societies. Likewise, trends in belief in God vary between 
societies. In some societies belief in God is more widespread than in others, though in 
general a decline has taken place in most European and North American societies. 
Only in Italy, Denmark, and Iceland belief in God increased and this happened at 
different speeds. For church membership all societies witnessed a decline, and again 
these declines are society-specific. Additionally, attendance in most societies declined. 
Only in Denmark and Iceland attendance increased slightly over the past two decades. 
Some may argue that these figures may be distorted by differences in fertility, as it is 
known that religious people have a higher fertility rate (De Graaf, Need, and Ultee 
2000; Hout, Greely, and Wilde 2001). However, what these figures are telling us then 
is not only that a more secular outlook appeared, but also that religious people are no 
longer compensating for their losses through their offspring. 
 
                                                
1 Since floor and ceiling effects are conceivable, we used logistic regression to estimate a trend 
parameter. At the individual level, we used the following logistic equation: log(p1/(1–p1) = a + 
b1*wave.  In this equation, p1 is the probability of scoring 1 on any of the items measuring religiosity, 
and b1 is the trend parameter indicating whether this particular item became more popular (positive b) 
or less popular (negative b) over the years. Note that the variable wave is a metric measure with three 
categories: 1981, 1990 and 2000. 
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Table 1: Religious persons, Belief in God, church membership, and attendance  
              in percentages per country per wave and estimated decennial, log linear trends (cf. note 1).  
 Religious persons Belief in God Church membership Attendance 
 1981 1990 2000 Trend 1981 1990 2000 Trend 1981 1990 2000 Trend 1981 1990 2000 Trend 
Traditionally Catholic 
societies 
                
    Belgium 80.7 69.3 65.1 -0.36** 85.9 71.2 71.9 -0.32** 82.7 70.4 64.6 -0.44** 54.2 51.6 50.0  -0.02 
    France 52.6 50.7 46.3 -0.14** 65.4 61.9 61.4 -0.12** 71.2 61.5 57.5 -0.31** 34.1 40.8 33.1  -0.04 
    Ireland 65.8 72.4 76.4  0.28** 96.9 97.6 96.8 -0.21** 98.7 96.1 93.1 -0.83** 92.8 95.2 89.2 -0.26** 
    Italy 83.6 84.5 85.8   0.09* 87.9 89.9 93.5  0.95** 92.9 84.6 82.2 -0.45** 73.8 79.9 83.0 0.29** 
    Spain 64.2 66.8 61.7  -0.07* 91.5 85.5 85.0 -0.17** 90.6 85.3 83.1 -0.33** 67.4 59.8 56.6 -0.24** 
                 
Traditionally Protestant 
societies        
         
    Canada 75.8 70.8 76.8   0.06 93.3 88.7 91.0 -0.11** 89.2 73.9 73.5 -0.45** 68.3 64.7 65.3 -0.06* 
    Denmark 68.7 72.5 76.5 0.21** 63.3 64.3 68.9 0.13** 94.2 91.6 90.0 -0.30** 42.8 42.5 50.0 0.15** 
    Iceland 66.4 74.7 73.9  0.19** 79.5 85.1 84.4 0.18** 98.9 97.9 95.7 -0.75** 52.0 55.0 57.1 0.10** 
    Sweden 34.2 31.3 38.8   0.11* 60.4 45.2 53.3  -0.13* 93.1 81.8 74.7 -0.71** 45.5 33.8 41.3  -0.08 
                 
Traditionally mixed 
societies        
         
    West Germany 64.9 64.6 46.0 -0.46** 79.6 77.6 54.0 -0.73** 90.7 89.0 60.4 -1.20** 58.3 51.7 47.6 -0.22** 
    Netherlands 69.2 60.8 61.4 -0.18** 70.9 64.6 59.5 -0.26** 61.9 50.7 45.9 -0.36** 54.0 52.7 45.6 -0.17** 
    United Kingdom 55.0 57.4 41.5 -0.28** 80.5 79.3 72.5 -0.24** 89.8 56.7 85.0 -0.16** 40.6 44.1 35.7 -0.11** 
                 
    United States  83.0 83.8 83.4   0.02 97.8 96.0 95.9 -0.32** 93.8 77.3 79.1 -0.67** 76.5 74.2 79.6   0.04 
** = sign p<0.05 (two-tailed).                       Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00. 
  * = sign p<0.10 (two-tailed).
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Another and even more important issue with regard to the overarching research 
question are the differences in religious involvement between societies with different 
religious heritages. For traditionally Catholic societies religious involvement in 
general is declining, but is also quite high. Just as in traditionally Catholic societies, 
church membership and attendance are dwindling in societies with religiously mixed 
heritages, including church membership in the United States. In those societies, all 
forms of religious involvement are declining. Additionally, in religiously mixed 
societies religious involvement is already less widespread compared to traditionally 
Catholic and Protestant societies. However, the one exception is the United States, 
which is a highly religiously diverse society with very high levels of religious 
involvement. This study aims to explain the variations and trends in religious 
involvement due to differences in religious diversity. Consequently, we seek to explain 
why religious involvement, despite the decline in recent decades, in the United States 
is still relatively high and why it is relatively low in the religiously diverse European 
societies. 
 
1.3 The relationship between religious diversity and religious involvement  
Religious involvement mostly declined in the 1981-2000 period in the 13 Western 
countries analysed, as Table 1 shows. However, levels of involvement and trends 
thereof differ form society to society. It seems that the marketing of religious 
‘products’ to potential consumers does have its complexities. This study makes use of 
secularisation theory and religious market theory to explain the variations in religious 
involvement in European and North American societies in late twentieth century.  
Both theories use the structure of the religious market to explain these variations.   
 
1.3.1 Secularisation theory  
Secularisation theory presumes that religion becomes a market situation when multiple 
denominations coexist in the same place. Levels of religious involvement in such 
circumstances will be lower than in a situation where there is a religious monopoly 
(Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Martin 1978; Wilson 1966). Hence, it is presumed that 
religious diversity lowers levels of religious involvement. A schematic overview of 
important relationships of the secularisation theory is shown in Figure 1.  In this 
figure, the relationship at the individual level provides the explanation for the 
association at the societal level. 
Modernity has deeply changed our outlook on life. Societies that have entered 
the modern era could no longer recognise claims of exclusive legitimacy by one 
particular set of ideas and had to open up their religious markets for other faiths (Bruce 
2002; Stark and Finke 2000). By means of mass education and communication, people 
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came in contact with a variety of ideas. This caused relativism and consequently a 
decline in the absolute status and plausibility of religious ideas (Berger 1967; Bruce 
2002). Additionally, the technological advances modernity has brought about, gave 
people a sense that they were able to shape their own fate, independent of God(s) 
(Lenski and Nolan 1998). It is presumed that due to a stronger sense of autonomy, 
which modernity brings about, religious involvement decreases (Berger 1967; Bruce 
2002; Martin 1978, 1991; Wilson 1966). In Figure 1, the arrows running form 
modernity to ‘more religious diversity’, ‘less plausibility’, and ‘religious decline’ 
indicate these relationships. 
In a monopolistic situation the plausibility of a religion is assumed to be 
massive and durable in consciousness; religion will be taken as self-evident reality. 
When people are exposed to a range of ideas about reality, some of which are 
conflicting, effective religious socialization is no longer possible. Diversity is thought 
to foster relativism, scepticism and renewing and is therefore inherently corrosive for 
the religious ‘taken-for-granted’ reality (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002). Consequently, 
religious beliefs and rituals cease to be upheld by a wider society. In Figure 1, the 
upper horizontal arrow indicates this relationship.  
 
Figure 1: Schematic overview of secularisation theory. 
Society level:  
  
                                                   Modernisation 
  
  
More religious diversity Religious decline 
  
  
Individual level:  
  
                      Less plausibility              Less religious  
             involvement 
  
 
For denominations in a diverse religious setting it is assumed to become difficult to 
claim the absolute truth of their doctrines. This diversity deprives all religions of their 
credibility among individuals, as plausibility structures are forced to compete and 
subsequently weaken (Berger 1967; Wilson 1966). The downward facing arrow from 
‘more religious diversity’ to ‘less plausibility’ indicates this mechanism in Figure 1. 
Secularisation theory presumes that religion is not primarily rooted in sensual 
consciousness but rather based on consensual consciousness, as it is assumed that 
reality is a social construction (Berger and Luckmann 1974). Therefore, weakened 
religious plausibility results in less individual religious involvement. The horizontal 
arrow at the bottom of Figure 1 indicates this relationship. This relationship is further 
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strengthened because in order to have ‘definite’ beliefs people are to some extent 
dependent on the surrounding social environment, that is socialisation (Berger and 
Luckmann 1974; Bruce 1999). Accordingly, plausibility of religious ideas is given by 
other people rather than by yourself (Berger and Luckmann 1974). Because religious 
involvement is decreasing at the individual level, this will consequently result in 
religious decline on a society level (see the diagonally upward facing arrow in the 
lower right corner of Figure 1).   
 
1.3.2 Religious market theory  
Where secularisation theory assumes that in former days religiosity was high, due to 
religious monopolies and low modernity, religious market theory states that religiosity 
in those days was overestimated. People had to adhere to the dominant faith, therefore 
the monopoly churches managed to appear more popular than they actually were 
(Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Beneath the apparently religious canopy, there 
supposedly was widespread religious apathy and heterodoxy. 
The theoretical expectation of religious market theory is that religious diversity 
brings about religious revival (Stark and Finke 2000). In a diverse religious market, 
denominations are competing with each other to attract and bind individuals. Thus, 
religious diversity will result in high levels of religious involvement. A schematic 
overview of important relationships of religious market theory is displayed in Figure 2, 
where the association at the societal level is explained by the relationship on the 
individual level.  
According to religious market theory, religious involvement will increase when 
the religious marked is developing towards its ‘natural state’. The natural state of the 
religious market is presumed to be diverse (Stark and Iannaccone 1994, 1996). When 
the religious economy implements free-market principles, other religious traditions 
will enter the religious market. This new influx will create a diverse supply where 
religions are engaged in fierce competition, resulting in religious revival. In Figure 2, 
the upper horizontal arrow indicates this relationship. The whole figure shows the 
explanation for this association at the individual level. 
Religious market theory presumes that people have different religious needs and 
thus no single religion alone is able to satisfy the demands of distinct religious 
consumer segments assumed to be present in the religious market (Finke and Stark 
1988; Stark and Finke 2000). In addition, in a monopolistic situation the clergy is 
presumed to be lax and indolent due to secure incomes and state support (Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994). When more and more denominations enter the religious market, the 
urge for these denominations to satisfy demands of individuals becomes stronger. 
Consequently, as the religious market becomes more diverse, various denominations 
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are competing and specialise, thereby leaving individuals more religious choice. The 
diagonally downward facing arrow indicates this mechanism in Figure 2.  
More religious choice will increase individual religious involvement. The lower 
horizontal arrow indicates this mechanism in Figure 2. To religious market theory, 
people have options and are autonomous and they are able to engage and end social 
bonds. According to Stark and Bainbridge (1989), identity and religion are open to 
choice. Religious market theory presumes that in modern times, religious affiliation is 
subject to individual preferences and not something that is ascribed by heritage 
(Aldridge 2000; Stark and Bainbridge 1989). The increase in religious choice makes 
that people can choose of a variety of religious options, and adhering to one which 
satisfies their religious needs (Finke and Stark 1988). Hence, a result of this increase in 
individual religiosity, the society as a whole will become more religious (see the 
diagonally upward facing arrow in Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Schematic overview of religious market theory. 
Society level  
  
More religious diversity Religious revival 
  
  
Individual level  
  
                      More religious  
                       choice 
              More religious  
              involvement 
  
 
In sum, secularisation theory predicts that religious diversity lowers religious 
involvement. Focussing on religious plausibility structures, this theory presumes that a 
variety of faiths lower individual religious demand. Religious market theory predicts 
the opposite. The theoretical expectation of religious market theory is that religious 
diversity heightens religious involvement, through religious choice.  This theory 
concentrates on the capability of the religious market to supply a range of religious 
doctrines.  
 
1.4 Detailed research questions and outline of this book 
Secularisation theory and religious market theory make opposite predictions about the 
direction of the relationship between religious diversity and religious involvement. To 
provide explanations for the variations in religious involvement over time and place, 
hypotheses of both theories are tested in this study. In the next paragraphs the 
overarching research question is split up into four specific research questions. This is 
done to obtain a more accurate picture of the relationship between religious diversity 
and religious involvement. These more specific questions pertain to religious 
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deregulation in 26 Western nations (chapter 2), believing and belonging in 13 Western 
societies (chapter 3), diversity and competition in the United States (chapter 4), and 
the Catholic anomaly in the Netherlands (chapter 5). An outline of this study along 
with the relationships between religious deregulation, diversity, competition, and 
involvement is presented in Figure 3. 
 
1.4.1 Religious deregulation 
In chapter 2, the relationship between religious deregulation and involvement is 
examined. It is important to examine religious deregulation as it is thought that it is a 
prerequisite for religious diversity. We agree with Finke (1997) that religious 
deregulation is twofold. First, for individuals it implies the freedom to adhere to 
whatever faith, if any. Second, for religious producers it is the freedom to have access 
to all possible incentives and opportunities to establish themselves in the religious 
market (Finke 1997:50). Both secularisation and religious market theory assume that 
religious involvement is affected by the structure of the religious market, with 
religious deregulation being the driving force (Bruce 1999; Stark and Iannaccone 
1996; Finke 1997). This is displayed in Figure 3, by the arrow connecting religious 
deregulation and religious involvement. 
Religious deregulation is presumed to influence religious involvement through 
religious diversity. However, measurements of religious diversity are still highly 
problematic because they are suffering from theoretical and methodological fallacies. 
Therefore this study sets off with an examination of the total effect of religious 
deregulation on religious involvement. In chapters 3, 4, and 5 alternative forms and 
measurements of religious diversity are developed and the influence of these forms of 
religious diversity on involvement is examined. 
In chapter 2, mainly religious market theory is examined. This has two important 
reasons. First, a key principle of free-market economics is deregulation. Consequently, 
one of the cardinal propositions of religious market theory states that the lower the 
level of regulation of the religious market, the higher the levels of religious 
involvement of individuals within that market will be (Chaves, Scheaeder and 
Sprindys 1994: 1088;  Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997). For religious market theory 
religious deregulation is the main force behind the positive relationship between 
religious diversity and religious involvement. It presumes that a revival in religious 
involvement would happen in Europe as well, if the state withdrew its subsidies, 
forcing denominations into competition for customers (Aldridge 2000). In contrast to 
this, secularisation theory presumes that other developments next to religious 
deregulation may cause religious downfall; one of them is modernity (Berger 1967; 
 21 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Outline of the study and the relationships between religious deregulation, diversity, competition and involvement, 
                along with various forms of deregulation, diversity, competition and involvement. 
 The numbers in parentheses correspond to the empirical chapters. 
Society level County & Denominational level Individual level 
    
Religious deregulation:   Religious involvement: 
   - Duration of deregulation between societies (2)      - Beliefs (3) 
   - Duration of deregulation within societies (2)     - Membership (3 & 4) 
   - Degree of deregulation (2)     - Attendance (2, 3 & 5) 
Modernity (2)    
    
    
   Religious diversity:  Religious competition:  
     - Religious heritages (3)   - Between different   
     - External diversity:      denominations  
          - Between similar religious      
            doctrines (4 & 5) 
  - Between similar    
    denominations 
 
 - Between different religious    
   doctrines (4 & 5) 
  - With secular alternatives  
     - Internal diversity:    
          - Variety of religious services (5)   
          - Quantity of religious services (5)   
     - Secular alternatives (4 & 5)   
    
An unbroken arrow indicates theoretically causal relationships, and is examined in this study, and a dotted arrow indicates underlying mechanisms.
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Bruce 2002; Martin 1978, 1991; Wilson 1966). For that reason, chapter 2 takes 
modernisation into account because it may have a confounding influence on the 
relationship between deregulation and involvement. Second, if empirical findings 
corroborate hypotheses of religious market theory it undermines the correctness of 
secularisation theory’s hypotheses, and vice versa. When no influence of religious 
deregulation on religious involvement is found, then of course both theories have to be 
refined on this point. 
In a religious market, the demands of consumers are said to be best met with the 
least possible amount of regulation. Religious market theory assumes that people have 
diverse religious needs and therefore the religious market is in its ‘natural state’ when 
it is diverse (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Accordingly, religious market theory 
presumes that religious involvement will increase in due time when the religious 
marked is deregulated and consequently, more diverse.  
The emergence of diverse religious markets has deeply changed the religious 
market in Western societies. However, religious market theory argues that even when 
religious deregulation has occurred, levels of religious involvement do not necessarily 
have to increase along with it. Deregulating the religious economy has its own 
setbacks and difficulties. Some religious market theorists therefore argue that it takes 
time to raise levels of religious involvement (Stark and Iannaccone 1994).   
Three shortcomings of previous research are tackled in chapter 2.  First, 
variations of involvement on the individual level are examined. Until now, most 
researchers analysed the influence of deregulation on aggregated levels only (Chaves 
and Cann 1992; Norris and Inglehart 2004). However, the deregulation hypothesis 
pertains primarily to shifts in religious involvement of individuals. Second, research 
has focussed on differences in the degree of religious deregulation between societies, 
neglecting differences in duration of deregulation between societies (Barro and Mc 
Cleary 2003; Chaves and Cann 1992; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Third, religious 
deregulation pertains foremost to religious markets within societies and on religious 
variation within societies. Therefore, the influence of deregulation within societies on 
religious involvement is examined, covering a 25-year period. Accordingly, the 
research question for chapter 2 reads:  
1. To what extent do the degree and the duration of a deregulated religious 
market positively affect individual religious involvement within and between 
European and Northern American societies between 1981 and 2006? 
 
By bringing comparative and trend questions together, advance in the field of the 
sociology of religion is made. The data used to test whether religious deregulation 
leads to a decline or increase of involvement, are the combined European and World 
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Value Surveys of 1981, 1990, 2000, and 2006. This dataset was combined with data 
collected from the Religious Freedom Archives and covers 26 societies.  
 
1.4.2 Believing and belonging 
In chapter 3, we investigate to what extent religious diversity affects religious 
involvement. We do this by examining the idea that religious believing is possible 
without belonging to a denomination and the role religious diversity plays therein. In 
Figure 3, the arrow running from religious diversity to religious involvement displays 
this.  
The slogan ‘believing without belonging’ stands for the shifts in religiosity 
throughout Western societies. It implies that people no longer belong to a certain 
denomination but continue to uphold religious beliefs (Davie 1990a, 1990b, 1994, 
2002). Religion has become more individual than in previous decades. This might 
have resulted in a noticeable gap between believing and belonging: in Western 
societies, a presumably growing number of people uphold religious beliefs without 
formal attachment to a church. 
Chapter 3 places this previously isolated slogan under an overarching problem, 
namely to what extent religious diversity affects religious involvement. The ‘believing 
without belonging’ slogan is therefore embedded in both secularisation and religious 
market theory. Then both theories are used to derive competing predictions about 
trends in the relationship between believing and belonging, and to what extent 
religious diversity affects this relationship.  
Not only do levels of religious involvement (i.e., believing and belonging) 
differ between societies, the strength of the relationship between believing and 
belonging is also likely to differ with various degrees of religious diversity. The degree 
of religious diversity in chapter 3 is measured with religious heritages of societies. It is 
presumed that societies with different heritages have different levels of religious 
involvement (Martin 1978). Although this is a relatively gross manner to indicate 
diversity, examining the influence of various forms of religious diversity gives a more 
accurate picture of the influence of diversity on involvement than just one form of 
religious diversity. Likely, any one indicator of diversity has its imperfections, but if 
all findings from independent indicators point in a generally consistent direction, then 
this lends greater support to the relationship between religious diversity and religious 
involvement. Moreover, both secularisation and religious market theory claim that 
religious heritages affect religious involvement (Martin 1978; Stark and Iannaccone 
1994; Wilson 1982).  
Following secularisation theory, religious belief and practice are closely 
interrelated. A decline in one of those will result in the decline of the other as well 
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(Berger 1967; Martin 1978; Wilson 1982; Bruce 2002). In addition, religious diversity 
is presumed to cause a decline in religious involvement. As a consequence, the 
relationship between belief and practice will be quite stable over time, because they 
will decline more or less at a similar pace. Then again, the relationship could also 
become stronger when people who stopped belonging also stopped believing (and thus 
a core of fervent adherents remain).  
In contrast to these presumptions of secularisation theory are predictions of 
religious market theory. This theory presumes that religious belief is an exogenous 
phenomenon, not affected by the extent to which individuals belong to a certain 
religious tradition. Subsequently, a decrease in religious belonging is not necessarily 
accompanied by a decline in religious belief (Iannaccone 1997; Stark 1997). Religious 
beliefs are presumed to be quite widespread and not homogeneous (Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000). Given the presumed decline in religious 
belonging in most Western nations, the relationship between believing and belonging 
should decline over time (Davie 1990a, 1990b, 1994, 2002). This supposedly growing 
imbalance between believing and belonging could be countered by religious diversity. 
To satisfy the different beliefs people have, the religious market should be diverse as 
well (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Only when the religious market is diverse, the 
variety of beliefs people hold will be accompanied by religious practice. Therefore, in 
societies with a higher degree of religious diversity religious involvement is higher as 
well. Consequently, the relationship between religious belief and practise is stronger in 
more diverse religious markets. Hence, the research questions of chapter 3 read:  
2a. What are the trends in religious belief (believing) and religious practice 
(belonging) in Western Europe and North America between 1981 and 2000? 
and 
2b. What is the trend in the relationship between believing and belonging in 
Western Europe and North America between 1981 and 2000? 
and 
2c. To what extent did religious diversity affect the relationship between 
believing and belonging in Western Europe and North America between 1981 
and 2000? 
 
Next to bringing the slogan ‘believing without belonging’ under an overarching 
problem three improvements on previous research are made. First, the relationship 
between ‘believing’ and ‘belonging’ of individuals in Western Europe and North 
America is examined. Using only aggregated data of religious involvement to compare 
differences between societies could create a relationship that is non-existent at the 
individual level. Previous research used aggregated data only (Davie 1990a; 1990b; 
1994; 2002; Voas and Crockett 2005). Second, comparing religious belonging with 
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whatever individuals express as their religious beliefs will always result in a noticeable 
gap between believing and belonging. To relate belonging to whatever form of 
believing makes the slogan ‘ believing without belonging’ rather difficult, if not 
impossible, to falsify. Therefore, only beliefs with their corresponding belonging are 
examined (e.g. Christian beliefs with church attendance). Lastly, we use a longer time 
period to obtain more accurate trend estimates of religious involvement. In order to do 
so, the European Value Surveys and World Value Surveys sweeps of 1981, 1990, and 
2000 are used covering 13 Western societies.  
 
1.4.3 Diversity and membership in the US 
In chapter 4, the influences of other, more refined forms of religious diversity on 
religious involvement are examined. We focus on one interesting case, namely the 
United States. To secularisation theory, the United States is a deviant case, with its 
high religious diversity while being religiously vibrant at the same time. Religious 
market theory has a quite opposite presumption: religious involvement is high in the 
United States because of a diverse religious market. So, to religious market theory the 
United States is not a deviant case but a classic example of the influence of a 
religiously diverse market.  
To both theories the degree of diversity in the religious market is crucial for 
explaining variations in religious involvement. The mechanism behind this 
relationship is religious competition. However, the mechanism of religious 
competition is still a ‘black box’. By describing how the various forms of religious 
diversity affect involvement, the underlying theoretical mechanism of competition 
becomes clearer. As a result, we gain more insight in the between religious diversity 
and involvement (again Figure 3 displays the relations and mechanisms examined in 
this chapter).  
These rivalling hypotheses of secularisation and religious market theory are 
tested in chapter 4. By doing so, we examine whether the United States really are an 
exception to secularisation theory or whether it fits presumptions of secularisation 
theory after all. The latter would be the case if religious vibrancy were due to various 
local religious monopolies in for instance US counties. Hence, the research question 
pertaining to chapter 4 reads: 
3. How and to what extent does religious diversity influence religious 
involvement in counties of the United States? 
 
Following secularisation and religious market theory, a distinction is made between 
two forms of religious diversity in chapter 4. The first form is diversity measured as 
the number of religions with different doctrines. Secularisation theory points at the 
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presence of multiple plausibility structures to explain (declining) levels of involvement 
(Berger 1967). If plausibility structures are supposed to weaken each other, they have 
to be different. Following this logic, a diverse religious market is a market consisting 
of religions with different doctrines. Hence, the first form of religious diversity 
distinguished pertains to diversity in religious doctrines. This form of religious 
diversity can also be derived from religious market theory. Religious market theory 
presumes that religious diversity can be regarded as the number of religions that differ 
in doctrine (Finke and Stark 1988; Stark and Bainbridge 1989). These doctrinally 
different religions supply distinct religious consumer segments in the market (Stark 
and Finke 2000). Hence, religious market theory assumes that a religious market is 
diverse when religious bodies aim at different consumer segments because different 
doctrines appeal to different consumer segments. 
The second form of diversity is the number of religious firms with similar 
doctrines. The distinction between different doctrines and different congregations with 
similar creeds is often hazy. If so, following secularisation theory, even with slight 
differences plausibility structures may crumble. Like the first form of diversity, this 
form of diversity could be derived from religious market theory as well. This theory 
presumes that individuals become religiously active by means of religious choice 
(Finke 1997; Stark and Finke 2000). When individuals have more choice, a religious 
market is regarded as diverse when numerous denominations having similar doctrines 
aim to serve the same consumer segment. Many denominations will result in more 
religious choice for a specific consumer segment in the religious market. 
These two indices of diversity are not affected by problems plaguing the index 
used by previous research; namely the Herfindahl index.  This index has a built in 
mathematical dependency between measures of religious involvement and religious 
diversity (Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002). This dependency causes the index to 
capture religious membership rather than the religions that offer their ‘products’ on the 
market. Thereby, the Herfindahl index used this way, cannot really test hypotheses of 
both secularisation and religious market theory. Both theories emphasise the supply-
side of the religious market, i.e. religious diversity (Berger 1967; Bruce 2000; Stark 
and Finke 2000). Religious diversity in its various forms should pertain to religions 
offering their ‘products’.  
 
1.4.4 Catholics in the Netherlands 
Chapter 4 examined the United States, a highly vibrant society when it comes to 
religion. In Chapter 5, we take a look at a society at the other end of the continuum: 
the Netherlands, a society with relatively low levels of religious involvement.  
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Initially, religious market theory set out to explain the religious situation in the 
United States (Stark and Bainbridge 1985). However, the theory was elaborated to 
explain differences amongst societies in the religious involvement of their populations 
(Stark and Finke 2000). In its effort to explain religious variations around the globe, 
religious market theory now faces several anomalies. Among these is a troublesome 
incongruity regarding Catholic monopolies, which also applies to the Dutch case. 
Therefore, the Netherlands presents an interesting case of how religious diversity 
affects religious involvement.  
The first anomaly is that, in societies with Catholic monopolies levels of 
religious involvement are higher than in the religiously mixed Netherlands. The 
second anomaly pertains to the relatively high levels of religious involvement in 
Catholic monopolies in general. According to religious market theory, societies with 
religious monopolies should have relatively low and uniform levels of religious 
involvement. However, research revealed that Catholic monopolies do not (Chaves 
and Cann 1992). This is troubling for religious market theory, because it is not in line 
with the presumption that religious diversity fosters religious involvement. Roman 
Catholic attendance levels in the Netherlands are lower than within the Belgian and 
Austrian Catholic monopolies. Another worrying finding for religious market theory 
pertains more specifically to the Netherlands. The Netherlands is religiously diverse, 
but nowadays shows a very high percentage of unaffiliated persons. 
To cope with these anomalies, religious market theory came with amendments. 
In chapter 5 these are examined to see whether they hold water. These amendments 
concern shifts in forms of religious involvement and a shift in the form of religious 
diversity. The first amendment states that religious monopolies always manage to 
appear vastly more popular and pervasive than they actually are. High levels of belief 
and membership do not adequately capture religiosity in such environments (Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994). The second amendment states that, the Roman Catholic Church’s 
internal diversity generates a relatively high degree of participation in monopoly 
situations (Diotallevi 2002: 149).  
In Chapter 5 these amendments are spelled out and tested against the Dutch 
case. Chapters 3 and 4 only examined the various forms of external religious diversity 
(i.e. religious heritages, different religions, and similar denominations). In this chapter, 
the various forms of internal diversity are taken into account as well (i.e. variety and 
quantity of divine services offered). The relationship examined between diversity and 
involvement and mechanisms of competition are displayed in Figure 3.  
Next to testing these amendments we continue what we have started in Chapter 
4 that is, to clarify and specify the underlying mechanism of religious competition. We 
examine to what extent denominations compete against secular options. Competition 
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may well not be confined to denominations only, in the Netherlands people may also 
choose to have no religion at all. Therefore our research question of chapter 5 reads:  
4. To what extent and under what conditions does religious diversity influence 
rates of religious involvement of Roman Catholics among parishes in 
contemporary Dutch society?  
 
Chapter 5 examines influences of religious diversity on churchgoing among Roman 
Catholics in the Netherlands at the level of parishes. Hypotheses are tested on this 
level because it is probable that an individual’s religious involvement is more likely to 
be influenced by the religious diversity of one’s local environment than by the overall 
diversity of the society. To examine religious diversity in a context that matters to the 
individual demands much of the data. Therefore, data originating from multiple 
sources are combined to properly test presumptions of religious market theory.  
 
In the concluding chapter of this book, we give an overview of the conclusions from 
the previous chapters and will reflect on the findings. We will formulate an answer to 
the overarching research question brought up in this introductory chapter and evaluate 
the findings and implications of the empirical chapters.  
 
1.5. Data used 
In every chapter we use specific data to test the research questions. In total 12 data 
sources are used, containing information about individuals, denominations, counties, 
and societies covering various point in time. In the respective empirical chapters more 
specific information about the data sources will be given. In this paragraph we briefly 
describe the most important data sources we use in this study. Table 2 presents an 
overview of all the empirical chapters; the questions asked, the theories used, and the 
data and methods. 
 
1.5.1 The European Value Studies 
The European Values Study (EVS) is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal 
survey research program on basic human values. It provides insights into the ideas, 
beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values, and opinions of citizens all over Europe. The 
first sweep of the European Values Study was conducted in 1981. This sweep included 
about ten European societies. Every nine to ten years, the survey is repeated and more 
countries are included. The second wave was launched in 1990 and all European 
countries were included. In 2000 the third sweep was initiated. Researches from the 
participating countries were responsible for the translation and distribution of the 
standardized questionnaires. Interviews were held face-to-face by trained interviewers.  
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1.5.2 The World Value Studies 
The World Values Surveys (WVS) grew out of a study launched by the European 
Values Survey group (EVS) in 1981. It evoked such widespread interest that it was 
replicated in Northern America. The World Values Survey was founded in 1993 and 
aimed at a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change. Interviews 
have been carried out with nationally representative samples of the publics. The first 
wave of the values survey was collected in 1981. This was mainly a European 
endeavour (see EVS). From the second wave onwards, the Western nation 
representation rose dramatically. This makes it possible to carry out reliable cross-
cultural analyses and analysis of changes over time for North America and European 
societies. The sweeps of the World Values Surveys are held simultaneously with the 
European Values Surveys sweeps, in 2000. In 2006 and independently form the EVS, 
the WVS carried out surveys in many Western nations. A short time ago the 2006 
wave became available for researchers worldwide. Due to the recent availability of this 
sweep, the 2006 wave was included for analyses in chapter 2 only. 
 
1.5.3 The Glenmarry Data 
The Glenmary data is one of the most complete data available on religious affiliation 
and the structure of the religious market in the United States. All the U.S. counties are 
represented in this dataset. Next to information about Christian bodies, the 2000 sweep 
also holds information about non-Christian bodies. The Glenmary survey contains 
statistics for 149 denominations, religious associations, and communions on the 
number of congregations and membership rates (as defined by the religious body) 
within each county of the United States.  
 
1.5.4 KASKI Data 
KASKI (Institute for Applied Research on Religion) is a social-research institute in the 
Netherlands, specialised in religion. The 2000 dataset holds information about the 
number and sort of divine services Roman Catholic parishes offer. Membership of 
these parishes is not provided by the parishes themselves but by the Roman Catholic 
Agency for Membership. KASKI distributed the questionnaires to all Roman Catholic 
parishes in the Netherlands. This resulted in statistics for about 70 percent of all 
parishes.
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Table 2: Outline of empirical chapters 
Chapter Questiona Theory Data Sources Method of analysis 
2 1. To what extent do the degree and the duration 
of a deregulated religious market positively affect 
individual religious involvement within and 
between societies? 
 
- Religious Market Theory - EVS 1981, 1990, 2000, 
2006 
- WVS 1981, 1990, 2000, 
2006 
- Own data collection using 
the Religious Freedom 
Archives 
 
- Hierarchical logistic regression 
3 2a.What are the trends in religious belief 
(believing) and religious practice (belonging)? 
 2b. What is the trend in the relationship between 
believing and belonging?  
- EVS 1981, 1990, 2000 
- WVS 1981, 1990, 2000 
 2c. To what extent did religious diversity affect 
the relationship between believing and belonging? 
 
- Secularisation Theory 
- Religious Market Theory 
 
- Logistic regression, with an 
outcome variable reflecting the 
relationship between beliefs and 
belonging  
- Ordinary least squares 
regression 
4 3. To what extent does religious diversity 
influence religious involvement in counties of the 
United States? 
 
- Secularisation Theory 
- Religious Market Theory 
- Glenmary 2000 
- US Census 2000 
 
- Ordinary least squares 
regression 
5 4. To what extent and under what conditions does 
religious diversity influence rate of religious 
involvement of Roman Catholics among parishes 
in contemporary Dutch society? 
- Religious Market Theory - EVS 2000 
- SCP 1958, 1970, 2004 
- GIN 1966, 1979, 1996  
- Dutch Family Survey 
1998, 2003 
- KASKI 2003, 2004 
- IKGN 2004 
- Census 1971 
- NIPO 2000 
- Hierarchical linear regression 
a = all questions pertain to Western Europe and North America, unless stated otherwise. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Does Duration of Deregulated Religious Markets 
affect Church Attendance? 
Evidence from 26 religious markets in Europe and North America  
between 1981 and 20062 
 
 
 
This chapter tests the deregulation hypothesis of religious market theory in 26 
European and Northern American societies by examining differences in 
religious involvement between and within societies. The deregulation 
hypothesis, which is assumed to be universally valid, predicts that religious 
involvement is higher in deregulated religious markets. Moreover, societies 
having deregulated religious markets for a longer period of time are supposed 
to have higher levels of involvement. Therefore, we test the duration 
hypothesis. This test is important, as it also has been argued that it may take 
time for deregulation to have an effect on religious involvement.  
Multi-level analysis on the stacked European and World Value Surveys 
of 1981, 1990, 2000, and 2006 show that deregulation fosters church 
attendance, but duration of deregulation does not increase church attendance. 
Although the deregulation hypothesis cannot be rejected, we find that 
modernization corrodes church attendance to a larger extent than deregulation 
can stimulate church attendance. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since Stark and Bainbridge (1985) introduced the religious market theory over 
two decades ago, much attention has been paid to the relationship between the 
supply of religious goods and religious vitality (Finke and Stark 1988; 
Iannaccone 1991; Stark 1997; Stark and Finke 2000). Religious market theory 
– sometimes labelled as a new paradigm (Warner 1993) – relates religious 
involvement to the structure of religious markets: in more free and diverse 
markets, religious life is expected to be more vibrant (Stark and Finke 2000). 
One of the core hypotheses in this respect is about state regulation. This 
                                                
2 This chapter is resubmitted to an international journal for the sociology of religion. 
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hypothesis states that the less a state regulates its religious market, the higher 
individual religious involvement will be within that market (Chaves, Scheaeder 
and Sprindys 1994: 1088; Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997:351). The 
mechanism through which this effect is said to work is that strict regulation of 
a religious market causes religious firms to be lax, indolent, and complacent 
since the clergy enjoy a secure income irrespective of performance. 
Consequently, the religious options for individuals to choose from are limited. 
Thus, religious involvement will be low in societies with a strong regulation of 
the religious market. Religious deregulation is therefore regarded as a major 
driving force to increase religious involvement (Stark and Iannaccone 1996; 
Finke 1997; Bruce 1999).  
The deregulation hypothesis has been tested in several ways but we 
signal two important shortcomings. First, tests so far have primarily focussed 
on the degree of religious deregulation, neglecting the duration of religious 
deregulation (Barro and Mc Cleary 2003; Chaves and Cann 1992; Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). Second, empirical research on religious regulation focussed on 
differences between societies (Barro and Mc Cleary 2003; Chaves and Cann 
1992; Iannaccone 1991; Norris and Inglehart 2004), whereas the deregulation 
hypothesis is foremost a hypothesis about the religious market and trends of 
religious variation within societies.  
When a state, for whatever reason, no longer supports claims of 
exclusive legitimacy made by the existing monopolistic religion, its religious 
congregations can no longer afford to be lax and take their clientele for granted 
(Stark and Iannaccone 1994). In this new situation the clergy have to work 
harder to attract and bind their clientele. As a presumed consequence, this 
investment will raise levels of involvement. Hence, the deregulation hypothesis 
is about changes in the structure of the religious market within a society. 
Although the deregulation hypothesis originated from a theory explaining 
trends within countries, it makes sense to compare various societies as well 
because the structure of religious markets differs between these societies. In 
this chapter, we will test the presumed positive effect of both the degree and 
duration of deregulation between societies as well as within societies. 
To test the deregulation hypothesis, we use the European and World 
Value Surveys held in 1981, 1990, 2000, and 2006. In total 26 societies were 
selected for analyses. To measure state regulation we also make use of data 
originating from the International Coalition for Religious Freedom archives. 
The main focus of this chapter is on the relationship between deregulation of 
the religious market and religious involvement. Furthermore, deregulation is 
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split into two distinct aspects: degree of deregulation, and the duration of 
deregulation. Accordingly, the research question reads:  
To what extent do the degree and the duration of a deregulated religious 
market positively affect individual religious involvement within and 
between European and Northern American societies between 1981 and 
2006? 
 
2.2 Previous research 
Empirical research testing the deregulation hypothesis shows inconclusive 
findings, as displayed in Table 1. This may be due to different sampling 
strategies and the use of different indicators for deregulation and religious 
involvement. This, of course, makes results of these studies difficult to 
compare. As Chaves and Cann (1992) already made clear, comparing different 
studies is complicated further because some researchers used the degree of 
religious diversity to test the impact of the market structure as a substitute of 
religious regulation. Religious diversity might be a consequence of 
deregulation and one may expect that diversity foster religious participation as 
well. Hence, although being different indicators of the market structure, both 
deregulation and religious diversity should have a positive impact on religious 
participation.  
Iannaccone (1991) used religious concentration, expressed in the 
Herfindahl index, as a measure for diversity in the market structure. He showed 
that church attendance is substantially higher in more diverse markets in 12 
Protestant nations. Chaves and Cann, also using the Herfindahl index and the 
same 12 Protestant nations while adding 6 Catholic nations, found no 
relationship between diversity and religious involvement (Chaves and Cann 
1992). Arguing that religious concentration is not a valid measure for religious 
regulation, they developed a six-point scale measuring the degree of religious 
regulation. This scale directly refers to state interferences of religious 
organizations and therefore is an appropriate measurement of religious 
regulation. Using this more adequate measure of religious regulation, Chaves 
and Cann (1992), showed that state regulation negatively influences religious 
involvement.  
Barro and Mc Cleary (2003) came to similar conclusions, when using 
the  Herfindahl index and the regulation measure developed by Chaves and 
Cann. They examined monthly religious attendance in 59 societies and found 
state religion (being a religious monopoly) to increase involvement, whereas 
religious regulation lowered involvement. This is a rather odd outcome as state 
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religion and regulation are quite strongly positively related in their study. 
However, their results indicate that there might be some truth in the 
deregulation hypothesis. 
Chaves, Schraeder and Sprindys (1994) examined 18 western countries 
to test whether religious regulation affected Muslims minorities. Their findings 
showed that when a religious market is more regulated, religious involvement 
is lower among Muslims, now expressed by the Hajj Rate for Muslims per 
100,000 of the total population. Thus, using yet another measure of state 
regulation, the deregulation hypothesis was again confirmed. 
Norris and Inglehart (2004) refined the regulation scale of Chaves and 
Cann (1992) by adding 14 new items. Examining 21 nations in 2004 – many of 
which were already in the 1992 sample of Chaves and Cann – they found no 
evidence to support the deregulation hypothesis. In their analysis they used no 
less than 4 different indicators of state regulation. Norris and Inglehart (2004) 
concluded that religious deregulation does not significantly increase a nation’s 
mean frequency of attendance at religious services. To conclude, the use of 
measures for religious regulation and measures for religious diversity provided 
mixed results. 
 
Table 1: Overview of research on the relations between (proxies of) religious regulation and  
 church attendance a.  
 Measure Effect Number 
of nations 
Religious background Regulation 
hypothesis 
Iannaccone Herfindahl 
index 
0.87***  12 Protestant confirmed 
Herfindahl 
index 
 -0.01  18 rejected Chaves &  
Cann 
 State regulation -0.61***   
Catholic & Protestant 
 
confirmed 
Herfindahl 
index 
1.35*** 59 confirmed 
State religion 0.87***  rejected 
Barro &  
McCleary 
 
 
 
State regulation -0.64***  
Christian, Islamic, 
Jewish, Hindu, 
Eastern & other 
religion confirmed 
Herfindahl 
index 
  0.02  21 Unknown rejected 
State regulation  -0.43  18 Catholic & Protestant rejected 
Religious 
freedom 
  0.37  21 Unknown rejected 
Norris &  
Inglehart 
 
 
 
 Freedom 
House 
 -0.31  13 Unknown rejected 
Chaves,  
Schraeder 
&  
Sprindys 
State regulation -0.33*** 18 Muslim minorities in 
Catholic & Protestant 
societies 
confirmed 
*** = sign. p<.01 (two-tailed).  
a = For further details see appendix A Table 1.  
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Still, findings not supporting the religious deregulation hypothesis may be 
explained by arguing that the onset of increased religious involvement due to 
deregulation takes some time (Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 
1994:236). An obvious next step then is to test this ‘time-lag’ auxiliary 
assumption. This can be done in two ways. First, differences in duration 
between societies might explain differences in religious involvement. Second, 
the duration of deregulation within societies might explain changes in religious 
involvement. The latter is of course a more stringent test of the deregulation 
hypothesis than the former, i.e. analysing differences between nations.  
Next to the duration of religious deregulation, the influence of the 
degree of deregulation on religious involvement is taken into account. Besides, 
we examine if there are non-linear effects of duration of religious deregulation 
and whether duration and the degree of deregulation interact with each other. 
Furthermore, possible confounding influences of modernization and 
communism are taken into account. Finally, we control for compositional 
effects. This is done at the end of the analyses to give the predictions of the 
religious market theory the best possible chance to prove their value.  
 Religious market theory in general asserts that changes in a religious 
economy affect the behaviour of individuals. Thus, changes on a higher level – 
the religious market – will result in changes in the behaviour of individuals 
(Finke 1997; Stark and Finke 2000). However, research testing the 
deregulation hypothesis quite often used aggregated data on religious 
involvement, assuming that all individuals within a higher level unit (such as 
countries or waves) are equally religiously involved (Barro and Mc Cleary 
2003; Chaves and Cann 1992; Finke, Guest, and Stark 1996; Finke and Stark 
1988; Iannaccone 1991; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Stark and Iannaccone 1994, 
1996). However, it is reasonable to assume that there is considerable individual 
variation in attending church. Thus, by aggregating this individual variation is 
by default lost. Therefore, we examine religious involvement on the individual 
level to investigate the relationship between religious deregulation and 
involvement. 
 
2.3 Hypotheses on religious regulation 
2.3.1 General patterns of religious deregulation 
According to religious market theory, in highly regulated religious markets the 
diversity in religious preferences cannot be satisfied adequately. As a result, 
levels of religious involvement will be relatively low. In a completely 
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deregulated religious economy, the market is free, open and religious firms are 
investing to attract and keep their adherents (Finke and Stark 1988; Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994). Since the clergy now cannot be sure that a vast number of 
clientele will always visit their church, they have to make a considerable effort 
to attract and bind their adherents. In the long run, these efforts are presumed to 
result in higher levels of religious involvement. Therefore, deregulated markets 
will have higher attendance rates than regulated markets.3 Correspondingly, the 
hypothesis on the degree of religious deregulation pertaining to differences 
between societies reads:  
1. Individuals in societies with a higher degree of deregulation of the 
religious market have higher levels of attendance than individuals in 
societies with lower levels of deregulation. 
 
As societies deregulate, religious markets open up and as a result levels of 
religious involvement will rise (Stark and Finke 2000). We thus argue that the 
longer a society has deregulated its religious market, the stronger individual 
religious involvement in that society will be. However, there is presumed to be 
a time-lag between religious deregulation and the onset of increased religious 
involvement (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Stability or any decline in religious 
involvement after religious deregulation can be temporary (Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994: 234) as it may take time for religious firms to get used to the 
principles of a free-market economy. Thus, it takes some time for the clergy to 
adapt and implement strategies to advertise their ‘products’ (Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994). So, it is most likely that religious deregulation has therefore 
no instant effect. In general, religious involvement within a society is presumed 
to increase in due time when religious deregulation takes place (Stark and 
Finke 2000). 
Although religious market theory does not specify the duration of this 
time-lag, we refine the deregulation hypothesis by incorporating the influence 
of duration of religious deregulation on religious involvement. To avoid the 
risk of refuting the deregulation hypothesis because of a too restricted time 
frame we do not specify the exact time before deregulation takes effect. 
Instead, we will test the religious deregulation hypothesis assuming that the 
adjustment process is gradual and allow for possible start-up processes before 
deregulation affects church attendance.  
                                                
3 In accordance with previous research religious attendance is used to measure religious 
involvement. In contrast to membership, attendance is a better indicator of devotion because 
it is less likely to be enforced or subject to national sentiments (Martin 1978). 
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Duration of religious deregulation differs from society to society, since 
it was not introduced in all societies at the same time. Some societies have a 
record of deregulation for well over 200 years while others have no or a very 
short history of deregulation. Following religious market theory, societies with 
religious markets that were deregulated many years ago should display higher 
levels of individual religious involvement than societies that deregulated only 
recently, or than societies still regulating their religious economy. Therefore, 
the religious market hypothesis concerning the history of religious deregulation 
pertaining to differences between societies reads:   
2a. Individuals living in societies with a longer history of religious 
deregulation attend religious services more often than individuals living 
in societies with a shorter history of deregulation. 
 
We already mentioned that the deregulation hypothesis is actually about the 
influence of religious deregulation within societies on individual religious 
involvement within those same societies. However, due to lack of data, in 
previous research the hypothesis on religious deregulation has often been tested 
on differences between societies (e.g. Chaves and Cann 1992; Iannaconne 
1992; Norris and Inglehart 2004). To make progress in this line of research, not 
only individuals from different societies, but also individuals within the same 
society but from different eras should be compared. Hence, the hypothesis 
about the duration of religious deregulation within a society reads:  
2b. The longer a society has deregulated its religious market, the more 
individuals in this society will attend religious services. 
 
2.3.2 A more stringent examination: Modernity and religion  
The effects of deregulation and duration on religious involvement as stated in 
hypotheses 1, 2a and 2b might be confounded by other factors. A more 
stringent test of religious market theory’s deregulation hypothesis therefore is 
to take plausible confounding factors into account. One obvious and plausible 
confounding factor is modernity.  
Modernity has profoundly changed our outlook on and ways of life. By 
means of mass education, people came in contact with a variety of ideas, and 
rising levels of income have given many people more opportunities to adopt a 
mode of life they choose to. These developments gave rise to a society where 
people adhere to different modes of life, socially, culturally, and religiously. To 
cope with the diverse ways of life of their inhabitants, the modern state could 
no longer recognise claims of exclusive legitimacy by one particular religion or 
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faith. Hence, as societies became more modern, these societies had to open up 
their religious markets. 
Not only did modernity give rise to religiously deregulated markets, 
modernity is also thought to be corrosive to religious life (Berger 1967; Bruce 
2002; Martin 1978, 1991; Wilson 1966). The technological advances 
modernity has brought about, gave people a sense that they were able to shape 
their own fate, independent of God. As a consequence,  this increased sense of 
autonomy  lowered religious involvement. By controlling for the degree of 
modernity we take into account possible confounding effects of modernization 
on the relationship between religious deregulation and religious involvement.  
 Additionally, to some extent the influence of modernity may in turn be 
confounded by post-communism since religion suffered greatly in former 
communist societies (Smart 1998). This results in relatively low levels of both 
modernity and attendance, thereby suppressing the often-found negative 
association between the Human Development Index and religious involvement 
(Norris and Inglehart 2004). To properly estimate the effect of modernity on 
church attendance, in our analyses we therefore will also control for a nation’s 
(non)communist regime. 
We will furthermore include age and social economic status into our 
models to account for possible compositional influences. These individual 
characteristics might influence the relationship between deregulation/duration 
and religious involvement as well. Elderly and people with a relatively low 
social economic status are stronger religiously involved (e.g. Inglehart and 
Baker 2000). As a result, societies with a relatively large proportion of elderly 
and/or a large proportion of individuals with a low social economic status have, 
on average, higher attendance rates. 
 
2.4 Data and operationalization 
2.4.1 Data 
To test the religious market theory hypotheses we constructed a repeated cross-
sectional data set from the European and World Value Surveys in 1981, 1990, 
2000, and 2006, covering 26 European societies and North America. These 
four waves include identical questions about religion. Only societies that were 
covered in at least two waves were selected.4 In addition, the respondents 
selected were between 18 and 90 years of age. After listwise deletion of 
                                                
4 Including Islamic, Asian, and Southern hemisphere societies was not feasible. Most of them 
were included in one wave only. Besides, we lack statistical power to differentiate between 
these rather heterogeneous types of societies. Therefore, we choose to exclude these countries 
and focus on a more or less homogeneous group of countries, i.e., North America and Europe.  
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missings on relevant variables, this resulted in a combined data set of 106,710 
individuals distributed over 26 societies in the period 1981-2006. The 
distribution of respondents over countries and waves is displayed in Table 2. 
Because we have hypotheses about the effect of religious markets 
characteristics on religious involvement of individuals covering multiple time 
points and nations, we apply multilevel analysis (Duncan, Jones, and Moon 
1996; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Three levels are distinguished. At the lowest 
and first level we have individuals (n=106,710), the second level comprises all 
surveys within all societies (n=80), and level three is composed of societies 
(n=26). 
 
Table 2: Respondents per country and wave 
 1981 1990 2000 2006 Total  
Traditionally Catholic societies (n=12)      
 Austria 0 1431 1515 0 2946 
 Belgium 1138 2780 1865 0 5783 
 France 1198 993 1606 995 4792 
 Hungary 0 998 992 0 1990 
 Ireland 1211 997 980 0 3188 
 Italy 1345 1996 1982 1000 6323 
 Malta 447 361 994 0 1802 
 Poland 0 980 1088 992 3060 
 Portugal 0 1185 996 0 2181 
 Slovakia 0 1585 1327 0 2912 
 Slovenia 0 1011 987 1007 3005 
 Spain 2297 4131 2385 1177 9990 
      
Traditionally Orthodox societies (n=4)      
 Bulgaria 0 1017 994 986 2997 
 Czech Republic 0 3024 1880 0 4904 
 Republic of Moldova 0 0 1008 1043 2051 
 Romania 0 1100 1135 1762 3997 
      
Traditionally Protestant societies (n=6)      
 Canada 1254 1723 1913 2109 6999 
 Denmark 1181 1028 1015 0 3224 
 Finland 0 584 1009 1008 2601 
 Iceland 927 699 965 0 2591 
 Latvia 0 436 981 0 1417 
 Sweden 914 981 1013 1002 3910 
      
Traditionally Mixed societies (n=4)      
 Germany 1301 3430 2023 2012 8766 
 Netherlands 1198 1012 999 942 4151 
 United Kingdom of Great Britain  1167 1474 962 1003 4606 
 United States of America 2310 1820 1198 1196 6524 
 17888 36776 33812 18234 106710 
                 Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00, ‘06. 
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2.4.2 Measuring religious involvement 
Religious involvement is measured by religious attendance. People were asked 
how often they attend religious services, apart from weddings, funerals, and 
festivities. Religious attendance is recoded into two categories, because of its 
skewed distribution. The category ‘does not attend’ is composed of people who 
never attend church or attend less than once a year. In total 59% of the sample 
falls into this category. Individuals who do attend (41% of the sample) vary 
considerably, ranging from holydays only to more than once a week; they all 
fall into the category ‘attend religious services at least once a year’.  
 
2.4.3 Measuring religious deregulation: degree and duration  
Like Norris and Inglehart (2004), we measure religious deregulation with the 
degree of religious freedom because deregulation implies that “the incentives 
and opportunities for religious producers and viable options for religious 
consumers” are not confined in any sense (Finke 1997: 50). In other words, 
deregulation is the freedom for individuals to adhere to whatever faith and the 
right not to do so, and for religious producers to have access to all possible 
incentives and opportunities to establish themselves in the religious market. 
The scale of Norris and Inglehart for the degree of deregulation ranges from 65 
to 95, averaging 80.9.5 For means of convenience and interpretation the degree 
of religious freedom is mean-centered in the analyses. 
Our time-scale measurement of religious deregulation is the number of 
years religious freedom exists in a society. These data were derived from the 
records of the International Coalition for Religious Freedom Archives 
(www.religiousfreedom.com). As constitutions are renewed every now and 
then, we calculated the number of years from the moment religious freedom 
came officially into practice. Examining the constitution or bill of rights 
provided the necessary data, if no year was available in the Religious Freedom 
records. For some countries there is no such written constitution or bill of 
rights – as for example in the United Kingdom. For these cases we used as a 
starting point the year in which religious freedom was widely accepted because 
of custom, common law or legislation.  
To examine whether a longer period of religious deregulation results in 
differences between societies in levels of religious involvement, all societies 
                                                
5 Theoretically the scale ranges from 20 to 100, with 20 meaning no religious freedom and 
100 implying complete religious freedom as explained in the Norris and Inglehart (2004) 
study. In our study most societies rank relatively high due to sample selection.   
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between 1981 and 2000 were given an average score on history of religious 
deregulation. For example, when a society deregulated its religious market in 
1890, it enjoyed 91 years of deregulation in 1981 and 110 years in 2000. 
Hence, the average duration score for the 1981 - 2000 period is (91 + 110) / 2 
=100.5 years. The variation in average duration between societies is quite 
large, as it varies from 0 up to 205.4 years.  
Like in any other market it is unlikely that the influence of duration on 
involvement will take on a linear course, since there may be floor effects (when 
the history of religious deregulation is relatively short) and/or ceiling effects 
(when duration covers a relatively long period). For example, it is quite likely 
that after 150 years of religious freedom it will not matter that much when 
another 50 years is added. We will take these possible non-linear effects into 
account in the analyses. For means of convenience and interpretation, the 
variable history of religious deregulation is mean-centered in the analyses.  
To examine trends within societies between 1981 and 2006, all societies 
scored 0 on the variable ‘years of religious deregulation since 1981’ and 
depending on the year religious freedom came into practice scored 0 or higher 
in subsequent surveys. For example, the Netherlands scored 0 in 1981 and 
scored 19 in 2000 as religious freedom started in 1848 and was not interrupted 
between 1981 and 2000. In Slovakia, however, the score in the 1990 survey 
was 0, as it was a communist society in which religion was banned. In 1993 the 
religious market became deregulated so in the year 2000, 7 years of 
uninterrupted years of religious freedom had passed. Since the difference 
between the first and the fourth wave of the WVS is 25 years, the variation of 
duration since 1981 varies from 0 to 25 years.6  
 
2.4.4 The Human Development Index  
The Human Development Index (HDI) was chosen as a measure for 
modernization. It indicates the level of development of a society and the 
amount of options and autonomy for persons in a given society. The index 
combines measures of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, and 
GDP per capita for countries worldwide. In our data set, the HDI ranges from 
0.71 to 0.93, with an average of 0.88. This index was also used in the study of 
Norris and Inglehart (2004). For means of convenience and interpretation 
Human Development Index is also mean-centered in the analyses. 
                                                
6 The variable ‘years of deregulation since 1981 is rather similar to the variable ‘survey 
sweep’ but not equal (Peason’s correlation coefficient = .874). We will address this issue 
further at the fore-last paragraph of the analysis section. 
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2.4.5 Compositional influences: individual level variables 
Compositional effects of age and social economic status (SES) are also taken 
into account. The latter is a standardized combination of educational attainment 
and income. Respondents had to have a valid score on education and/or income 
to determine their social economic status. Ranging from 0 to 2 the average SES 
is 0.93. The variable SES has fewer observations than the other variables, due 
to missings on this variable for Sweden in 1990, and some random missings for 
other countries and years. Since SES is an ordinal scale we also included 
dummy indicators including a dummy for missing cases. However, this 
strategy did not affect the results. For reasons of parsimony, we therefore 
report SES as a scale. The average respondent was 44 years old. Table 3 shows 
the descriptives of the variables included in our analyses. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables in the analysis 
 Range Mean Standard deviation 
Society level variables:a    
 Degree of religious deregulation 65 – 95 81.15 8.98 
 History of religious deregulation (in years) 0 – 205 58.83 68.29 
 HDI 0.71 – 0.93 0.87 0.06 
 Post-Communist 0/1 0.35 0.49 
    
Society-wave level variables:b    
 Years of religious deregulation since 1981 0 – 25  11.25 8.78 
    
Individual level variables:c    
 Religious attendance 0/1 0.59 0.49 
 Age 18 – 90  44.58 17.34 
 S.E.S (Social Economic Status)d 0 – 2  0.93 0.73 
                                                                                      Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00, ‘06. 
a = Means and standard deviations are calculated averages  over all 26 societies.   
b = Means and standard deviations are calculated averages over all 80 society-wave    
combinations. 
c= Averages and standard deviations are calculated over all 106,710 individuals. 
d= Calculated over 95,290 individuals (this includes 79 society-wave  
combinations, missing the entire 1990 Sweden sweep, and some random missings  
for other society-wave combinations). 
 
2.5 Analysis 
2.5.1 General patterns of religious deregulation 
Using multi-level analysis, we first estimated a random intercept model. In this 
model, the intercept turned out to have significant random components, 
indicating that church attendance varies over both survey waves and societies. 
The results are displayed in Table 4. Model 1 tests whether a higher degree of 
deregulation between societies results in higher levels of attendance. Like 
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Norris and Inglehart (2004) we find no evidence that a higher degree of 
deregulation results in higher levels of attendance. 
To test whether the duration of deregulation between societies affects 
levels of attendance in a positive way the history of religious deregulation (in 
years) is added in Model 2. Contrary to religious market theory, findings show 
that in societies with a longer history of religious deregulation, people do not 
have a significantly higher probability to attend religious services compared to 
people living in societies with a shorter record of religious deregulation.  
It is important to note that we also tested the rivalling secularization 
hypothesis (i.e., more deregulation leads to less involvement) and found the 
negative parameter estimate in model 2 to be significant (one-tailed p<0.01). In 
other words, as the history of religious deregulation lasts longer, the probability 
to attend declines and this is clearly in line with predictions of secularisation 
theory (Bruce 2002; Martin 1991).  
As stated earlier, the process of religious deregulation may have its own 
set backs but eventually it results in higher levels of religious involvement 
(Stark and Iannaconne 1994). We therefore checked whether a non-linear effect 
of a society’s history of religious deregulation on involvement existed, but no 
such influence was found. This is rather striking because in some societies 
deregulation is going on for decades if not centuries and it is to be expected 
that the influence of deregulation flatten off. For now, no support for 
hypothesis 2a is found.  
In Model 3 the duration of religious deregulation within societies is 
examined. If the deregulation hypothesis of religious market theory is correct, 
the longer a society has deregulated its religious market, the more individuals 
in this society will attend religious services (hypothesis 2b) This is time-related 
specification of the deregulation hypothesis 2a. Findings show that ‘years of 
religious deregulation since 1981’ has no significant negative relation with 
attendance. Hence, hypothesis 2b is not supported either. In model 4 we 
checked for possible start-up costs or saturation effects for ‘years of religious 
deregulation since 1981’, and again we cannot detect a significant non-linear 
effect.  
Model 5 and 6 include possible interaction effects. It might well be that 
in societies with a longer history of religious deregulation, the influence of the 
degree of deregulation follows a different path than in societies that have only 
recently opened up their religious markets. Additionally, according to religious 
market theory, the positive effect of the degree of religious freedom on 
attendance should be stronger when religious deregulation within a society 
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lasted longer, i.e. years of religious deregulation since 1981. However, models 
5 and 6 reveal no evidence favouring either of these interaction hypotheses.  
 
2.5.2 A more stringent test: modernity and post-communism 
By including the Human Development Index, as an indicator of modernity, into 
the analysis we originally wanted to examine whether the expected relationship 
between deregulation and involvement is (to some extent) confounded. 
Modernity is presumed to influence both religious regulation and involvement 
negatively. If so, the relationship between deregulation and involvement could 
weaken or even disappear.  It is also important to consider post-communism as 
a possible suppressor effect of modernity. Religion suffered greatly in societies 
that were communist (Smart 1998). Consequently, attendance in former 
communist societies is relatively low, despite a relatively low HDI-coefficient. 
This might suppress the often-found negative association between HDI and 
religious involvement (Norris and Inglehart 2004). To take this suppressor 
effect into account we included next to modernity a fixed dummy effect for 
post-communism. Finally, in principal also deregulation effects might become 
more prominent if one controls for modernity. There is no reason to believe 
that both secularization processes as well as market effects do not exist 
simultaneously and that the deregulation of the market becomes significant if 
we control for modernity. 
As model 7 shows, HDI and post-communism both have a significant, 
negative effect on attendance. More interestingly is that the parameter estimate 
for the degree of religious deregulation becomes larger and significant. We like 
to note that the negative influence of HDI is much larger that the positive effect 
of deregulation, resulting in a net decline in church attendance.7 Although both 
theories seem to apply simultaneously, modernisation corrodes church 
attendance to a larger extent than deregulation can stimulate church attendance. 
Lastly, in Models 8 and 9 the individual variables age and social status 
are included to take into account compositional effects. These models show 
that age and social-economic status are significantly and positively related to 
religious involvement.8 Additionally, the individual characteristics do not 
                                                
7 This can be inferred form the formula: y= 0.030*XDegree of religious deregulation – 11.709*XHDI. 
Computing the logit to attend, other things held equal, with the minimum and maximum 
values of both variables.  
8 Some may argue that in societies with a longer record of deregulation, the elderly are 
exposed to influences of deregulation for a longer period of time than youngsters, and are 
therefore more devout. However, no such interaction between deregulation and age were 
found. Meaning that effects of deregulation on attendance are similar for all ages in all the 
societies analysed, irrespective of their record of deregulation. 
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Table 4: Hierarchical logistic regression models for religious attendance 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept  0 .443***     0.446***     0.448***     0.447*** 0.476***     0.473*** 
       
Society level variables (between societies):       
 Degree of religious deregulation      0.016     0.021    0.020    0.020    0.020 
 History of rel. deregulation (in years)        -0.004 ^   -0.003   -0.003   -0.003 
 HDI       
 Post-Communist (dummy variable)       
 Degree * History of rel deregulation         0.000 
       
Society-wave level variables:a (within  societies)       
 Years of rel. deregulation since 1981       -0.004    -0.004   -0.004 
 Years rel. since 1981 – squared        -0.000   -0.000 
 Degree * rel. deregulation since 1981       
 Degree * rel. deregulation since 1981 – squared       
        
Individual level variables:       
 Age       
 S.E.S.       
       
Variance components:       
 Years of rel. deregulation since 1981           
Degree * rel. deregulation since 1981 – squared       
 Society level variance 0.508*** 0.499*** 0.495*** 0.482*** 0.476*** 0.470*** 
 Society–wave level variance 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 
*** = sign p<0.01 (one-tailed).             Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00, ‘06. 
  ** = sign p<0.05 (one-tailed). 
    * = sign p<0.10 (one-tailed). 
    ^ = sign p<0.01 (one-tailed, testing the rivalling secularization hypothesis). 
a = time varying variables. 
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Table 4 continued: Hierarchical logistic regression models for religious attendance 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Intercept      0.485*** 0.778***   0.423***     0.403*** 
     
Society level variables (between societies):     
 Degree of religious deregulation       0.021     0.030**     0.030**     0.030** 
 History of rel. deregulation (in years)      -0.003    -0.002    -0.002    -0.002 
 HDI  -11.709*** -11.973***  -11.956*** 
 Post-Communist (dummy variable)      -0.859**     -0.898**     -0.900** 
 Degree * History of rel deregulation     
     
Society-wave level variables:a (within  societies)     
 Years of rel. deregulation since 1981       0.000     -0.006     -0.009 ^    -0.009 ^ 
 Years rel. since 1981 – squared      -0.001         
 Degree * rel. deregulation since 1981     -0.000    
 Degree * rel. deregulation since 1981 – squared     -0.000    
     
Individual level variables:     
 Age   0.014*** 0.014*** 
 S.E.S.         0.026** 
     
Variance components:     
 Years of rel. deregulation since 1981      0.000    
Degree * rel. deregulation since 1981 – squared      0.000    
 Society level variance 0.476*** 0.365*** 0.377*** 0.381*** 
 Society–wave level variance 0.026*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 
*** = sign p<0.01 (one-tailed).                Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00, ‘06. 
  ** = sign p<0.05 (one-tailed). 
    ^ = sign p<0.01 (one-tailed, testing the rivalling secularization hypothesis). 
a = time varying variables. 
Models 1 through 8: N1= 106,710, N2=80 N3= 26. 
Model 9: N1= 99,049, N2=79, N3= 26. 
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Table 5: Attendance per country and wave, in percentages and estimated 
              decennial, log linear trends (cf. note 9).9 
  
1981 
 
1990 
 
2000 
 
2006 
 
Change 
Year religious 
freedom  
Traditionally Catholic societies       
 Austria na. 67.4 68.4 n.a.     0.05 1867 
 Belgium 50.0 51.8 49.7 na.   -0.02 1831 
 France 34.1 40.9 33.0 32.5   -0.06* 1789 
 Hungary na. 51.6 44.6 na. -0.28*** 1972 
 Ireland 92.8 95.2 89.2 na. -0.26*** 1937 
 Italy 73.8 79.8 83.0 83.3 0.25*** 1948 
 Malta 95.7 91.7 94.0 na.   -0.11 1964 
 Poland na. 92.6 91.1 92.4   -0.03 1988 
 Portugal na. 59.9 66.6 na. 0.29***  
 Slovakia  na. 61.7 67.4 na. 0.25*** 1993 
 Slovenia na. 63.4 62.3 63.7    0.00 1991 
 Spain 67.4 59.7 56.5 41.4 -0.34*** 1978 
       
Traditionally Orthodox societies       
 Bulgaria na. 36.5 66.1 62.9 0.74*** 1949 
 Czech Republic na. 35.4 35.4 na.   -0.01 1992 
 Republic of Moldova na. na. 84.1 74.9 -0.96*** 1991 
 Romania na. 85.6 90.0 79.9 -0.28*** 1991 
       
Traditionally Protestant societies       
 Canada 68.2 64.6 65.0 59.3 -0.13*** 1982 
 Denmark 42.8 42.5 50.0 na. 0.15*** - 
 Finland na. 50.0 52.2 54.8 0.12* 1870 
 Iceland 52.0 55.1 56.9 na.    0.10* 1944 
 Latvia na. 53.4 57.3 na.    0.16  
 Sweden 45.5 33.7 41.3 33.8 -0.13*** 1975 
       
Traditionally Mixed societies       
 Germany 58.3 51.7 47.6 42.8 -0.23*** 1918 
 Netherlands 53.7 52.7 45.6 39.1 -0.23*** 1848 
 United Kingdom of Great Britain  40.6 44.3 35.6 42.7   -0.02 1871 
 United States of America 76.5 74.2 78.4 61.1 -0.21*** 1789 
na. = no data available.           Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00, ‘06. 
*** = sign p<0.01 (two-tailed). 
  ** = sign p<0.05 (two-tailed).                                    
    * = sign p<0.10 (two-tailed). 
 
considerably affect the effects of level-2 and level-3 variables. We like to note that we 
even found a negative effect of years of deregulation since 1981 in model 8 and 9, 
when testing the rivalling secularization hypothesis. 
One might wonder what the trend in church attendance is in all countries when degree 
of secularization does have a positive effect while modernization has a negative effect 
                                                
9 Attendance for a few countries drops heavily between 2000 and 2006. After inspection, it showed 
that these shifts are due to people making the transition from infrequent attendance (on holydays only, 
and once or a few times a year) to no attendance (never attend). 
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on church attendance. Table 5 shows trends for all societies.10 In the period 1981-2006 
on average church attendance levels decreased significantly in 11 countries, increased 
significantly in 7 countries and remained quite stable in 8 societies.  Although 
secularization seems to dominate one simply cannot ignore the increases in 8 societies. 
In sum, the general pattern is that the degree of religious deregulation has 
initially no significant positive influence on church attendance in European societies 
and North America in the 1981-2006 period. However, when the level of modernity 
and post-communism is taken into account, the degree of deregulation increases from 
.021 to .030 and becomes significantly positive. However, its influence is completely 
counteracted by modernisation in the Western nations analysed here. Modernity 
proves to be corrosive to religious life, as thought by some secularisation theorists 
(Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Martin 1978, 1991; Wilson 1966). In other words, even 
though free religious markets in the West temper the corrosive influence of modernity 
somewhat, this counter-balance is not substantial enough to fully counteract the 
profound negative impact modernity has on religious involvement. 
Furthermore, our findings do not support hypotheses 2a and 2b; duration of 
deregulation has no positive significant effect on involvement. Although the history of 
religious deregulation differs from society to society, individuals living in societies 
that have a deregulated religious market for decades do not have a greater chance to 
attend religious services than individuals living in societies with a shorter history of 
deregulation. 
Moreover, not only do individuals differ between societies also within societies 
individuals differ in their chance to attend. This is important because the deregulation 
hypothesis is foremost a hypothesis pertaining to individuals within a religious market 
(which is mostly confined within a society). Our findings show that within societies 
individual religious involvement does not increase as the period of deregulation carries 
on in those very societies. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter examined to what extent the duration and degree of religious deregulation 
explain differences in religious involvement of citizens in Europe and North America. 
Differences between societies and trends within societies were examined to test the 
deregulation hypothesis of religious market theory. This chapter revealed some 
findings in line with, and others contradicting religious market theory.  
                                                
10 Since floor and ceiling effects are conceivable, we used logistic regression to estimate a trend 
parameter. At the individual level, we used the following logistic equation: log(p1/(1–p1) = a + 
b1*wave.  In this equation, p1 is the probability of scoring 1 on church attendance, and b1 is the trend 
parameter indicating whether church attendance became increased (positive b) or decreased (negative 
b) over the years. Note that the variable wave is a metric measure with four categories: 1981, 1990, 
2000 and 2006. 
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For differences between Western European and Northern American societies 
corroboration was found for the hypothesized effect of the degree of deregulation: 
when controlling for modernity, it has a significant positive effect on church 
attendance. We like to add that we found a corroding influence of modernisation on 
attendance for this set of Western societies, which backs a cardinal point of 
secularisation theory (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Martin 1978, 1991; Wilson 1966). 
Furthermore this effect is quite strong so even when the positive effect of the degree of 
deregulation on involvement is to hold, the religious revival as predicted by religious 
market theory will not emerge as modernity totally counters the influences of 
deregulation (Stark 1999).  Next, we found that the history of religious deregulation 
had no positive influence on individual attendance. We even found a significant 
negative effect in model 2, when testing the rivalling secularization hypothesis. The 
absence of a significant positive influence poses a serious challenge for religious 
market theory, which states that individuals in societies with a longer history of 
religious deregulation show higher levels of attendance than individuals living in 
societies with a shorter history of deregulation.  
Within societies we found no evidence that the duration of religious 
deregulation affects religious involvement positively. Instead, we even found a 
negative effect in models 8 and 9, when testing the rivalling secularization hypothesis. 
This again is troublesome for religious market theory as the deregulation hypothesis of 
religious market theory primarily pertains to trends within societies (Stark and Finke 
2000). Religious market theory predicts that a revival in religious involvement would 
happen in Europe, when the state created a free-market for religion, forcing religious 
organizations into competition for customers (Aldridge 2000; Stark and Finke 2000). 
From the data examined we conclude that this does not seem to be happening today 
neither has it happened in the past decades. 
Although it is likely that religious deregulation may have different pathways in 
societies with diverse religious heritages we did not take them into account. Our first 
argument relies on religious market theory itself. Religious market theory explains 
religious variation on basis of a variety of settings, across time and place (Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000), not distinguishing between settings with 
different religious traditions (e.g. Stark and Finke 2000). This theory is concerned with 
the structure of the religious market – regulation, total diversity, market shares, and 
competition – not the dominant religious signature of the religious market. It does not 
differentiate whether a geographical area is predominantly Catholic, Protestant, 
Islamic, or some other religious tradition. The second argument is methodological. As 
the focus of this chapter is to simultaneously test between societies and trends within 
those societies, reliable data was available for 26 nations only. Hence, lack the 
statistical power necessary to differentiate between societies with religious heritages 
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(Achen 2005; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Although the inclusion of more waves per 
nation and including more, especially non-western nations is favourable for more 
reliable trend estimates, we think the time span was large enough to investigate 
whether religious deregulation does raise levels of individual religious involvement. In 
sum, to the extent that the degree and duration of a free, deregulated religious market 
explain differences in religious involvement between and within various European and 
Northern American societies in the 1981 to 2006 period, some support for the claims 
of religious market theory has been found. Even so, most findings are troubling for 
religious market theory and indeed do not support the deregulation hypothesis. In 
religious markets where the clergy have to make effort to attract and bind clientele, it 
is not evident that more individuals attend religious services. However, before we 
draw this conclusion we should realize that we did not test the hypothesis that clergy 
indeed become more active in a deregulated market and this is a very basic 
assumption. Quite likely, the religious picture of most European and Northern 
American societies is that of continuous secularisation somewhat tempered by the 
degree of deregulation. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Does belonging accompany believing? 
Correlations and trends in Western Europe and North America  
between 1981 and 200011 
 
 
 
Using the European and World Value Surveys from 1981, 1990 and 2000, this chapter 
examines trends in Christian beliefs, Christian belonging (church attendance) and the 
relationship between believing and belonging. It further looks at the influence of 
religious diversity on this relationship in Western Europe and North America. 
The evidence of a growing gap between believing and belonging is thus far 
unpersuasive. The main finding of this chapter is that in most countries there is no 
growing gap between Christian believing and Christian belonging. Indeed, the 
relationship between believing and belonging at the individual level has remained 
practically unchanged in the Western world over the past two decades. The slight 
weakening in the relation between believing and belonging measured for some 
countries stems from the fact that in those countries both believing and belonging 
declined, but the decline in belonging was stronger. Moreover, a higher degree of 
religious diversity does not result in a stronger association between believing and 
belonging, as would be expected from religious market theory.  
 
3.1 Introduction and research questions 
There is abundant evidence that both church membership rates and church attendance 
have declined in most West European societies over the past decades (Martin 1991; 
Davie 1994, 2003; Lechner 1996; Stark and Iannaccone 1996; Bruce 2002). Although 
secularization and religious market theory both explain why church membership rates 
and attendance have dwindled, the question of whether Christian beliefs have declined 
as well,  resulting in a growing gap between believing and belonging, is not settled yet. 
This chapter examines trends in the relationship between Christian believing and 
Christian belonging between 1981 and 2000 and investigates the extent to which 
religious diversity affects this relationship.  
Davie (1990a; 1994; 2002) added another dimension to the debate about 
secularization by explicitly focusing on the relationship between ‘belonging’, that is, 
                                                
11 A different version of this chapter is published in the Review of religious research 50 (1): 16-34.  
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church membership and church attendance, and ‘believing’, that is, adherence to 
religious beliefs. Davie’s analyses showed that countries with low church membership 
rates do not necessarily have low levels of religious belief. This was subsequently 
called ‘believing without belonging’ (Davie 1990b; 1994; 2002). Davie’s general 
hypothesis is that in Western societies a growing number of people uphold religious 
beliefs without formal attachment to a church. This hypothesis, however, was only 
tested by comparing church membership rates and average religious belief at the 
country level. To avoid the risk of the so-called ‘ecological fallacy’ (Robinson 1950), 
which arises from aggregating religious participation and religious belief, we explicitly 
examine the relationship between ‘believing’ and ‘belonging’ of individuals in 
Western Europe and North America. Furthermore, we derive rival hypotheses about 
the trend in this relationship from secularization theory and religious market theory. 
Secularization theory states that religious practice and belief are directly related 
and current trends are towards fewer individuals attending religious practice and 
towards fewer individuals expressing religious beliefs, although these trends possibly 
move at different speeds and in different directions (Berger 1967; Martin 1978; Wilson 
1982; Bruce 2002). Because these two trends are related, the relationship between 
believing and belonging should by and large be stable over time. Alternatively, the 
relationship could also become stronger if more people who believe also start 
belonging, and people who stopped belonging, later, also stop believing. According to 
religious market theory, religious belief is an exogenous phenomenon, which is not 
affected by the extent to which individuals attend religious services. Subsequently, a 
decrease in religious practice is not necessarily accompanied by a weakening of 
religious belief or an adoption of secular ideas (Iannaccone 1997; Stark 1997). As a 
consequence, the relationship between believing and belonging should decline over 
time. Given these different expectations, our first research question has two parts: 
1a. What are the trends in religious belief (believing) and religious practice  
           (belonging) in Western Europe and North America between 1981 and 2000? 
and 
1b. What is the trend in the relationship between believing and belonging in  
            Western Europe and North America between 1981 and 2000? 
  
The concept of religious diversity has played a key role in both secularization and 
religious market theory. Secularization theory states that religious diversity induces 
lower levels of both believing and belonging, because alternative religions tend to 
challenge the plausibility structure of well-established beliefs (Berger 1967; Bruce 
2002). This may cause a decline in both individual belief and individual belonging.  If 
this decline occurs at roughly the same pace, the relationship between believing and 
belonging is expected to be unaffected by the degree of religious diversity in a society. 
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In contrast, religious market theory states that religious diversity fosters religious 
participation, as societies with religious monopolies have large unmet religious needs 
while societies with a high degree of religious diversity are more likely to satisfy 
diverse religious needs (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). If this is the case, a strong 
relationship between believing and belonging should be found in societies with more 
religious diversity. Our second research question aims to provide insight into the 
relationship between religious diversity and the extent to which individual believing 
and belonging go hand in hand: 
2. To what extent did religious diversity affect the relationship between 
believing and belonging in Western Europe and North America between 1981 
and 2000? 
 
This chapter aims to improve upon previous research in three ways. First, neither 
Davie (1990a; 1990b; 1994; 2002) nor her critics (Voas and Crockett 2005) examined 
the relationship between believing and belonging at the individual level. Instead, they 
studied the relation between socio-demographic characteristics and religious 
commitment at an aggregate country level. However, comparing church membership 
rates and percentages of people who express Christian beliefs may be misleading. For 
instance, if the percentage of people expressing beliefs is higher than the percentage 
attending religious services, one may infer that there is indeed believing without 
belonging. However, individuals who often attend religious services may have 
stronger beliefs than individuals attending religious services less often. In other words, 
even though more people uphold Christian beliefs than there are church members, 
there could be a strong association between the two at the individual level.  
Second, our analysis focuses on believing and belonging in a strict Christian 
sense. Voas and Crockett (2005) call this the strong version of ‘believing without 
belonging’. This implies that where people uphold Christian beliefs but do not attend 
Christian church services, there is ‘believing without belonging’.12 Davie did not relate 
Christian beliefs to Christian belonging. For example, if one examines belonging to a 
Christian church, one should also examine Christian beliefs rather than belief in any 
religious faith, since the gap between believing and belonging would otherwise be 
overestimated. Therefore, we explicitly focus on the relationship between Christian 
believing and Christian belonging (at the individual level). This offers a new 
opportunity to test both secularization theory and religious market theory. The 
                                                
12 The weak version of ‘believing without belonging’ is, according to Voas and Crockett (2005), a 
comparison of Christian belonging with whatever individuals express as religious beliefs. Beliefs in 
the weak version can be as vague as a belief in ‘something’. We argue that the strong version provides 
more insight into the process of secularisation and religious vitality than the weaker version since the 
latter is rather difficult, if not impossible, to falsify. 
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questions about religious beliefs in the data carry a monotheistic, Christian signature, 
therefore we solely focus on Christian believing and belonging.  
Third, with respect to the stability of Christian belief and church attendance, 
most research has employed only data from one or two points in time (Davie 1990a; 
Stark and Iannaccone 1994; 1996). A longer time period is preferable to obtain more 
accurate estimates of religious fluctuations. Therefore, we use data from the three 
waves of the European Value Survey in addition to similar data for North America, 
covering the period between 1981 and 2000.  
 
3.2 Theory and hypotheses 
Various explanations have been put forward to explain the strong empirical evidence 
of declining church membership and attendance throughout Western Europe (Stark 
and Iannaccone 1994; Bruce 2002). Moreover, there is disagreement as to whether the 
decline in religious participation has been accompanied by a decline in religious belief 
as well.  
Secularization theorists argue that practice and belief are directly related. In their 
view, believing and belonging follow roughly the same downward trend. This 
argument contains a Durkheimian notion of religion. In order to have ‘definite’ beliefs 
one is dependent on the surrounding social environment, at least to some extent 
(Berger and Luckmann 1974; Bruce 1999). Religious gatherings are assumed to 
empower creeds, making church membership and attendance vital for individual 
religiosity to endure. Consequently, the relationship between believing and belonging 
is over time expected to remain about equally strong. However, if the secularization 
process in the long run leads to a small proportion of hardcore religious people and a 
large proportion of non-religious people, the relationship could become even stronger. 
The implication is that ‘believing without belonging’ is at best a short (individual) 
transitional phase in the emergence of a thoroughly secular culture, and not a new 
feature of late modernity (Voas and Crockett 2005).  This leads to our first hypothesis: 
1a. In Western Europe and North America, there has been a decline of both 
individual Christian believing and belonging, and therefore the relationship 
between individual Christian believing and Christian belonging did not weaken 
over time. 
 
Religious market theorists, on the other hand, argue that belief in the supernatural is 
strong and reasonably robust, while religious practice might be substantially less in 
case there is inadequate religious supply. While outward expressions of religion – like 
church membership and attendance – decline, individual belief endures. As a 
consequence, religious belief becomes heterogeneous and detached from traditional 
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religious institutions. This results in a growing gap between believing and belonging. 
This gap is expected to continue to grow as long as European governments maintain 
their support to certain religious traditions, forcing religious organizations into 
competition for ‘customers’ and allowing the emergence of religious diversity (Stark 
and Iannaccone 1994; Finke 1997). If, according to religious market theory, individual 
belief endures and belonging declines, the relationship between believing and 
belonging will weaken over time. Therefore the competing hypothesis of religious 
market theory reads: 
1b. In Western Europe and North America, individual Christian believing has 
been stable while belonging has decreased; therefore the relationship between 
individual Christian believing and Christian belonging weakened over time. 
 
Next to trends in believing and belonging and their (changing) relationship we focus 
on a factor that might influence this relationship, namely religious diversity. 
According to secularization theory, the plausibility of religion in a monopolistic 
situation is massive and durable in consciousness. Furthermore, effective socialization 
in such a context means that religion is taken as self-evident (Berger 1967; Berger and 
Luckmann 1974). In other words, in a monotheistic society, the religious ‘canopy’ is 
stable and durable; hence religious belief and participation are widespread (Berger 
1967). Secularization theory assumes that people who have religious beliefs belong to 
a church as well. Consequently, the relationship between believing and belonging is 
expected to be strong. If more religions co-exist in a society (i.e., if there is more 
religious diversity), religious plausibility structures supposedly lose strength, therefore 
causing secularization. In such a situation, individual disbelief rises and levels of 
religious participation decline (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; 2003). In sum, according to 
secularization theory, religious diversity causes religious belief and participation to 
decline simultaneously. Consequently, the relationship between those two remains 
more or less the same, regardless of the level of religious diversity. Correspondingly, 
hypothesis 2a reads:  
2a. The relationship between individual Christian believing and Christian 
belonging is independent of societies’ level of religious diversity. 
 
Religious market theorists, on the other hand, stress that the relation between belief 
and participation is affected by the degree of religious diversity present in a country. 
They argue that the state influences religious participation by regulating religious 
markets – i.e., whether to allow religious diversity via subsidizing or suppressing 
certain religious traditions (Berger 1967; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). It is assumed 
that a stable religious demand exists but also that people differ in their religious desires 
and tastes. Accordingly, religious diversity is rooted in social niches: groups of people 
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sharing the same specific religious preferences (Finke and Stark 1988; Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994; Stark 2001). This diverse nature of religious demand necessitates 
diversity. Thus, in societies where religious diversity is absent or low, not everyone is 
able to satisfy their religious needs. This is due to the inherent inability to satisfy all 
distinct consumer preferences where there is only one religious institution (Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994). Levels of religious participation will consequently be low. As it is 
assumed that all people have more or less stable religious needs, the relationship 
between believing and belonging will consequently be weak. When more religious 
suppliers enter a religious market, the urge to satisfy demands of individual customers 
becomes stronger. Therefore, churches will likely specialize, to stay attractive. Thus, 
the increase in religious choice enables more people to satisfy their religious needs – 
and they would express their belief by going to church – leading to religious 
revitalization (Finke and Stark 1988). Hence, a larger proportion of a population will 
be religiously involved and the relationship between believing and belonging will be 
strong. Hence, our hypotheses derived from religious market theory reads as follows:  
2b. The relationship between individual Christian believing and Christian 
belonging in societies with a high degree of religious diversity is stronger than 
in societies with a low degree of religious diversity.  
 
3.3 Data and operationalisation 
3.3.1 Categories of religious diversity 
Since the often-used index of religious diversity, the Herfindahl Index, has proven 
highly problematic (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Voas, Olson and Crockett 2002), we use 
Martin’s (1978) categorization of societies to determine the degree of religious 
diversity. Most Western European societies have a long history of a strong bond with 
the church, which can be traced as far back as before Emperor Constantine (ca. 285-
337). In recent history, this close entanglement of state and church has been largely 
dissolved. However, the historical situation in which one or two churches are 
supported by the state still resonates throughout Europe.  
Societies with a history of Catholic monopoly, like France, Spain and Italy, 
have the least religious diversity in Europe nowadays. These nations cannot be said to 
have an unregulated religious economy, nor do they have any substantial religious 
diversity (Martin 1978; Stark and Iannaccone 1994).  
 Besides nations with a history of a Catholic monopoly there are nations, which 
are traditionally Protestant. Examples are the Scandinavian countries, England, and 
Canada. These societies continue to have Protestant monopolies. In most Protestant 
Western European nations, especially the Scandinavian countries, there is however 
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some degree of religious diversity but only within the state-church. This makes them 
slightly more pluralistic than traditionally Catholic societies (Martin 1978).  
Countries like the Netherlands and Germany traditionally have a mixed 
situation. Historically, these societies are partly organized on a confessional basis 
(Martin 1978). Sometimes, the United Kingdom is also regarded as a religiously mixed 
country due to the presence of Catholics and Protestants, with their fierce conflict, in a 
predominantly Anglican society. Since we aim here to improve on work of Davie, we 
categorize the United Kingdom, similar to Davie, as traditionally mixed (Davie 2002). 
The United States is characterized by separation of church and state and a highly 
unregulated religious economy (Stark and Iannaccone 1994) which makes it highly 
pluralistic. 
In sum, societies can range from having virtually no religious diversity to 
having a highly pluralistic religious economy. Traditionally Catholic countries have 
virtually no religious diversity, while traditionally Protestant societies have a higher 
degree of religious diversity. Societies with a traditionally mixed situation are even 
more pluralistic, while the United States has the highest degree of religious diversity.  
To test our hypotheses we constructed a repeated cross-sectional dataset from 
the European Value Surveys and the World Value Surveys including the waves from 
1981, 1990 and 2000. We selected the United States and Canada and 11 Western 
European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom). Not included were countries that were 
only available in one or two waves and countries that missed important items 
measuring traditional Christian beliefs. East Germany was excluded because of its 
post-communist character. The selected respondents were individuals between 18 and 
90 years of age who were either non-denominational or belonged to a Christian 
denomination. No adherents of other faiths were included because the focus is on 
Christian believing and belonging. These selections resulted in a combined dataset of 
55,464 individuals distributed over 13 countries. Table 1 presents the distribution of 
respondents over the countries and respective waves. 
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Table 1: Respondents per country and wave. 
 1981 1990 2000 Total per country 
Traditionally Catholic societies      
     Belgium 1005 2725 1776 5506 
     France 836 975 1580 3391 
     Ireland 1172 997 969 3138 
     Italy 1347 2004 1986 5337 
     Spain 2296 4104 2366 8766 
     
Traditionally Protestant societies     
     Canada 1254 1650 1840 4744 
     Denmark 1165 928 992 3085 
     Iceland 823 667 923 2413 
     Sweden 884 985 1003 2872 
     
Traditionally mixed societies     
     West Germany 1297 2079 1080 4456 
     Netherlands 1166 974 946 3086 
     United Kingdom  1490 1649 894 4033 
     
     United States of America 2206 1593 838 4637 
Total N 16941 21330 17193 55464 
    Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00.   
 
3.3.2 Variables measuring Christian beliefs and belonging 
The European Value Surveys measure various aspects of Christian belief. We selected 
those which were asked in all societies and in all three waves: belief in (i) God, (ii) life 
after death, (iii) heaven and (iv) hell.13 The answer categories employed were ‘no’ and 
‘yes’. The ‘don’t know’ response category turned out to be a small proportion of the 
respondents, with an average of approximately 10 percent in any of the waves. We 
omitted this category from further analyses, because the response signifies doubt at the 
least and disbelief at the most (Bruce 1995, Lechner 1996).14 
To answer our research questions we constructed an overall Christian belief 
scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81).15 Respondents had to have a valid answer on at least 
three of the four Christian beliefs to be included in the overall scale.   
Religious participation – belonging – is measured by church attendance. People 
were asked how often they attended religious services, apart from weddings, funerals 
and festivities. All holy day categories were merged, as well as attendance of ‘less than 
                                                
13 Although the beliefs used here are not solely Christian, they are definitely typical of Christian 
religions. 
14 We also merged the ‘don’t know’ and ‘no’ categories. This did not substantially change our results. 
Of all estimated trends, 45 remained the same, in two cases the trends became even more significant 
and in five cases significant trends disappeared.  
15 For the 1981, 1990 and 2000 waves, Cronbach’s alphas were also calculated for each country 
separately, all resulted in reliable scales with no substantial deviations from the overall Cronbach’s 
alpha. See appendix B, Table 1.  
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once a year’ and ‘almost never’. The answer categories derived thus ranged from ‘less 
than once a year’ to ‘more than once a week’ and were converted into a per year 
attendance scale.16 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables in the 
analyses. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables. 
 Range Mean Standard deviation 
Belonging 0-104 18.83 30.25 
Belief in:      God 0 / 1 0.81 0.39 
                     life after death 0 / 1 0.59 0.49 
                     heaven 0 / 1 0.53 0.50 
                     hell  0 / 1 0.32 0.47 
Christian belief 0 – 1  0.56 0.38 
             Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00. 
 
3.4 Analyses  
From secularization theory and religious market theory we inferred competing 
predictions about possible changes in Christian belief. To get a detailed picture of the 
changes in Christian belief that took place between 1981 and 2000, we first separately 
analysed each item that measures an aspect of Christian belief. Since floor and ceiling 
effects are conceivable, we used logistic regression to estimate a trend parameter.17 
Table 3 displays the results of the analysis.  
Belief in God declined in more than half of the traditionally Catholic societies. 
In Ireland there was no significant change while in Italy we observed a significant 
increase. In all of the traditionally mixed societies and in the United States belief in 
God has significantly declined. In half of the traditionally Protestant societies there 
was no significant change. Sweden witnessed a decrease in the number of people who 
believe in God, whereas Denmark saw a slight increase.  
Believing in life after death decreased significantly in most Catholic countries. 
Again, in Italy we note a rise in belief in life after death. In traditionally Protestant and 
                                                
16 The distribution of the church attendance measure (a per year scale) is skewed to the right in most 
countries, which might result in non-linear relationships between Christian belief and church 
attendance. As a consequence, the Pearson correlation coefficients (cf. Table 4) could be an 
underestimation of the real relationship between Christian belief and church attendance. To check 
whether skewness is a serious problem, we computed for each country and wave the Eta coefficient 
(we assume Christian belief to be metric). Next, we compared each observed Pearson correlation 
coefficient and the Eta counterpart and found only small differences. This led us to conclude that it is 
warranted to present the widely used and easy to compute Pearson correlation coefficient instead of 
Eta figures. See appendix B, Table 2. 
17 At the individual level, we used the following logistic equation:  
Log(p1/(1–p1) = a + b1*wave.  In this equation, p1 is the probability of scoring 1 on any of the items 
measuring Christian belief, and b1 is the trend parameter indicating whether this particular item 
became more popular (positive b) or less popular (negative b) over the years. Note that the variable 
wave is a metric measure with three categories: 1981, 1990 and 2000. 
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Table 3: Belief in God, life after death, heaven and hell, in percentages per country per wave and estimated decennial log linear trends.  
 Belief in God Belief in life after death Belief in heaven Belief in hell 
 1981 1990 2000 Trend 1981 1981 2000 Trend 1981 1990 2000 Trend 1981 1990 2000 Trend 
Traditionally Catholic societies                 
    Belgium 86.8 70.9  70.2 -0.38** 50.0 44.3  44.1 -0.10** 42.6 33.1  31.0 -0.24** 22.1 16.1  17.2 -0.13** 
    France 85.4 61.1  60.9 -0.54** 52.0 43.5  44.3 -0.14** 36.4 31.8  30.8 -0.12** 20.1 16.6  18.9   -0.02 
    Ireland 97.8 97.6  96.7 -0.22 85.0 83.3  81.6 -0.13** 89.6 89.5  87.1 -0.13* 60.2 52.4  55.3 -0.11** 
    Italy 87.9 90.0  93.5 0.36** 56.9 67.6  72.7  0.36** 44.3 52.4  58.7 0.30** 33.3 40.4  49.1 0.35** 
    Spain 91.5 85.5  85.0 -0.29** 66.9 51.0 53.1 -0.28** 55.5 52.0  50.9 -0.10** 38.3 29.3  36.7   -0.03 
                 
Traditionally Protestant societies                 
    Canada 93.3 88.3  91.1  -0.10 70.7 68.9  74.9 0.13** 75.3 71.4  76.8 0.07 42.3 40.9  51.2 0.21** 
    Denmark 63.0 66.9  68.7 0.14** 29.7 33.5  37.6 0.19** 16.5 18.6  17.9 0.05 8.0 7.4  8.7    0.05 
    Iceland 82.0 86.2  84.1   0.08 82.2 81.4  77.8 -0.15** 58.4 57.3  58.2   -0.00 13.0 11.6  16.8 0.18** 
    Sweden 61.8 45.6  53.2 -0.16** 34.3 38.8 46.3 0.27** 31.2 30.9  30.2   -0.03 9.5 8.0  8.8   -0.04 
                 
Traditionally mixed societies                 
    West Germany 79.6 77.4  71.7 -0.23** 45.8 49.6 40.5 -0.11** 33.9 36.4  32.0   -0.05 14.7 14.1 20.7 0.23** 
    Netherlands 70.7 63.4  57.9 -0.30** 50.5 44.4  49.3   -0.03 44.2 36.4  35.4 -0.20** 16.1 13.5  12.6 -0.15** 
    United Kingdom 84.3 81.6 71.3 -0.41** 63.3 55.2  58.7 -0.13** 67.8 64.4  56.8 -0.24** 38.5 34.3  37.1   -0.05 
                 
    United States of America 98.0 96.3  96.0 -0.39** 80.7 79.0  84.8    0.11* 91.0 87.4 88.5 -0.17** 74.6 71.9  75.3   -0.01 
** = sign p<0.05 (two-tailed).                                    Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00. 
  * = sign p<0.10 (two-tailed). 
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mixed societies, the results vary. For instance, in the Netherlands there was no 
significant change, while in Iceland, Germany and the United Kingdom there was a 
significant decline. In Canada, Denmark, Sweden and the United States the number of 
people who believe in life after death increased significantly. 
Belief in heaven declined in four out of the five traditionally Catholic societies, 
only Italy witnessed an increase. In the traditionally Protestant societies no change was 
measured in belief in heaven. In Germany, the percentage of people who believe in 
heaven did not significantly decline, while in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and the United States a significant downward trend occurred.  
For belief in hell the pattern is diverse. Somewhat less than half of the countries 
experienced no significant change in belief in hell. In traditionally Catholic societies 
there was either a decline or stability, with the exception of Italy where it increased. 
The opposite was true for the traditionally Protestant societies, where belief in hell 
either remained stable or increased. For the traditionally mixed societies, there was no 
significant change in the United Kingdom and United States. In Germany belief in hell 
increased and the Netherlands saw a decline in the percentage of people who believe in 
hell.  
Next, we estimated the general trend in Christian belief and belonging as 
displayed in Table 4. The largest absolute decrease in Christian belief was found in 
France (-0.05 per 10 years), whereas the largest increase was in Italy (0.07). In six 
countries (Belgium, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom) the 
trend in Christian belief is significantly downward. Interestingly, along with Italy, 
Germany and the United States, in none of the traditionally Protestant societies was 
there any sign of an overall decrease.  
Almost the same conclusions can be drawn from the estimated trend in church 
attendance, that is, Christian belonging. In traditionally Catholic societies, except Italy, 
and in traditionally mixed societies, church attendance rates are on the decline. In the 
traditionally Protestant societies of Denmark and Iceland there is stability, the trend is 
significant negative for both Canada and Sweden. The United States again shows no 
change in church attendance rates during 1981-2000. In order to compare the trends in 
believing and belonging per country we also calculated a standardized trend for each 
country. In most of the countries with a downward trend in believing, the downfall in 
belonging was relatively stronger. In only three societies, Canada, Denmark, and 
Sweden, did Christian belief increase somewhat or remained stable, while belonging to 
a church decreased, indicating a trend towards ‘believing without belonging’.  
From secularization theory and religious market theory, we derived competing 
predictions about possible changes in the relationship between Christian believing and 
belonging. We then formally tested the extent to which Christian believing and 
Christian belonging at the individual level went together over the past two decades. 
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We used OLS regression analysis to estimate the linear trend in the Pearson correlation 
coefficients between Christian beliefs and Christian belonging. Table 5 displays the 
results.18  
With the exception of the United States, all trends in the relationship between 
believing and belonging are negative. As pointed out earlier, in only three countries 
(i.e., Canada, Denmark and Sweden) this decrease is the result of increasing and 
respectively stable Christian belief, and decreasing church attendance rates (cf. Table 
4). In Italy, for instance, the estimated correlation was 0.536 in 1981 and dropped 
significantly, by 0.05 points every ten years. This, however, is the result of a trend 
towards stronger beliefs and higher rates of belonging. Interestingly, the correlation 
between believing and belonging in the United States did not change between 1981 
and 2000.  
A rather low correlation between believing and belonging does not necessarily 
imply that belief is widespread while belonging is marginal. In countries with a history 
of a religious monopoly there might well be ‘belonging without believing’, i.e., 
widespread attachment to institutionalized religion with relatively weak Christian 
belief (Hamberg and Pettersson 1994). Besides, religiosity may be driven by non-
religious incentives. It is known that there are non-religious sanctions for non-
participation in the United States (Martin 1978; Moore 1994; Chaves and Gorski 
2001). However, in our analyses we found no corroboration for these arguments. We 
thus conclude that the correlations presented indeed reflect ‘believing without 
belonging’, as found in off-diagonal effects. Changes towards ‘believing without 
belonging’ are stronger and far more common than changes towards belonging without 
believing.19 In general, people who have Christian beliefs but do not attend church 
 
                                                
18 In Table 5 the individual scores on Christian beliefs (Likert-scale) and Christian belonging have 
been standardized within each country and wave (average=0, standard deviation=1). Then, we 
estimated for each country an OLS model with Christian beliefs regressed on belonging and the 
interaction between belonging and wave (the intercept and the b-coefficient for wave equal zero 
because of within country/wave standardization). The b-coefficient for belonging denotes the 
estimated correlation in 1981 while the b-coefficient for belonging*wave denotes the (linear) 
decennial change of the 1981 correlation. Because we assume a linear change, this is an approximation 
of the observed correlations in our samples. Therefore, we provided also these observed correlations 
between Christian beliefs and Christian belonging within each country and wave. So, in the sample 
from Belgium a correlation of 0.504 was found, while in the OLS regression this correlation is 
estimated to be 0.509.  The observed correlation in 1990 amounts to 0.496 (decline of 0.008) while it 
amounts to 0.474 in 2000 (decline of 0.022). According to OLS estimates the correlation dropped 
(linear) from 0.509 in 1981 to 0.492 in 1990, to 0.475 in 2000 (decennial linear change -0.017 and 
non-significant). Overall, the differences between the observed correlations per wave and the 
correlations assuming linear change are small. They can be calculated from Table 5 and graphically 
displayed in Appendix B, Figure 1. 
19 For a complete overview of the relationship between individual believing and individual belonging, 
we refer to Table 3 in the appendix B. 
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Table 4: Christian belief (total) and belonging (church attendance), in mean scores per country per wave  
  and estimated unstandardised and standardized linear trends (decennial change). 
 Christian belief Belonging (church attendance) 
 1981 1990 2000 Trend 1981 1990 2000 Trend 
Traditionally Catholic societies     unstandard. standard.†    unstandard standard.† 
     Belgium 0.496 0.404 0.397 -0.04** -0.12 20.90 17.78 12.75 -4.42** -0.16 
     France 0.476 0.378 0.372 -0.05** -0.14 9.75  6.85  5.75 -1.99** -0.11 
     Ireland 0.834 0.810 0.807 -0.01** -0.06 58.05 54.53 43.93 -7.38** -0.22 
     Italy 0.545 0.616 0.683 0.07** 0.20 22.67 26.87 28.48 2.92**  0.09 
     Spain 0.627 0.540 0.558 -0.03** -0.10 27.97 20.84 18.54 -4.88** -0.15 
          
Traditionally Protestant societies          
     Canada 0.704 0.676 0.735 0.02** 0.06 22.02 19.36 19.75       -1.05* -0.03 
     Denmark 0.275 0.305 0.319 0.02** 0.08 2.89 3.02  3.21        0.17  0.02 
     Iceland 0.586 0.593 0.588       0.00 0.00 3.22 2.55 3.23        0.03  0.00 
     Sweden 0.333 0.302 0.335      0.00 0.01 4.74 4.21 3.20 -0.82**  -0.06 
          
Traditionally mixed societies          
     West Germany 0.425 0.434 0.401      -0.01 -0.04 13.65 12.92 10.78 -1.50** -0.06 
     Netherlands 0.451 0.388 0.385 -0.04** -0.10 17.65 13.29 9.71 -4.19** -0.16 
     United Kingdom  0.629 0.590 0.557 -0.04** -0.10 16.23 13.49 9.42 -3.54** -0.13 
          
     United States of America 0.864 0.839 0.863      0.00 -0.02 32.36 32.46 33.10       35.00 (0.01) 
** =  sign p<0.05 (two-tailed).             Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00. 
  * =  sign p<0.10 (two-tailed). 
† = trend parameter is standardized within country:  -0.12 means a decrease of  0.12 standard deviation in 10 years.  
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Table 5: OLS regression (per country) of Christian beliefs on Christian  
 belonging (church attendance) and wave, and observed correlations  
 between Christian beliefs and Christian belonging per country  
 and wave (cf. note 18). 
 Estim. corr. 
1981 
Decennial 
change 
 
corr 1981 
 
 corr 1990 
 
 corr 2000 
Traditionally Catholic societies       
     Belgium 0.509** -0.017 0.504 0.496 0.474 
     France 0.456**     -0.058** 0.425 0.453 0.342 
     Ireland 0.401**     -0.019 0.418 0.346 0.384 
     Italy 0.536** -0.053** 0.489 0.541 0.411 
     Spain 0.555** -0.053** 0.552 0.510 0.452 
      
Traditionally Protestant societies      
     Canada 0.375**    -0.034* 0.384 0.330 0.315 
     Denmark 0.438** -0.058** 0.451 0.357 0.340 
     Iceland 0.212** -0.069** 0.223 0.121 0.089 
     Sweden 0.414**     -0.039 0.379 0.443 0.314 
      
Traditionally mixed societies      
     West Germany 0.549**    -0.039* 0.528 0.540 0.455 
     Netherlands 0.564**  -0.033 0.557 0.549 0.494 
     United Kingdom  0.434** -0.054** 0.434 0.383 0.332 
      
     United States of America 0.274**   0.023 0.226 0.317 0.301 
** = sign p<0.01 (one-tailed).        Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ’00. 
  * = sign p<0.05 (one-tailed). 
 
cause the gap between Christian believing and Christian belonging rather than 
individuals belonging to a Christian church without expressing Christian beliefs. In 
addition, in traditionally Catholic and mixed societies correlations between believing 
and belonging remain high. This indicates that there is no widespread Christian 
believing without Christian belonging in those countries.  
In sum, we find evidence in favour of the first part of hypothesis 1a: in Western 
Europe and North America, there has been a decline of both individual Christian 
believing and belonging. However, the relationship between believing and belonging 
did weaken significantly for some societies over time. Though, where the relationship 
did weaken, it was not the result of a trend towards ‘believing without belonging’. 
Mostly, any weakening of this relationship was the product of a process by which both 
Christian belief and belonging declined, however – and this is crucial – at different 
rates. 
 The results in Table 5 also provide an answer to the question of the extent to 
which religious diversity influences the relationship between believing and belonging. 
The relationship between believing and belonging in societies with a little religious 
diversity is not uniformly weaker than in societies with a high degree of religious 
diversity. The situation in the United States is striking in this respect. Despite a high 
degree of religious diversity, the correlation between individuals believing and 
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belonging is relatively low. This suggests a relatively lot of Christian religiosity 
outside of churches, compared to countries with a lower degree of religious diversity. 
Moreover, the correlation between believing and belonging is relatively high in 
traditionally Catholic and mixed societies. These findings do not lend support to either 
hypothesis 2a or 2b. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we uncovered several important facts associated with Christian 
religiosity in modern Western societies. First, we derived testable and rival hypotheses 
about the relationship between believing and belonging from secularization and 
religious market theory. In this respect our main finding was that in most countries 
there is no growing gap between Christian believing and Christian belonging. The 
relationship between believing and belonging at the individual level has changed in the 
Western world over the past two decades. As we showed, the slight decrease in the 
relationship between believing and belonging that was found in several societies was 
due to the fact that both believing and belonging declined in those countries; but that 
belonging declined more strongly than believing. Along with decreasing religious 
belief, this implies that ‘believing without belonging’, as Voas and Crockett (2005) 
argued, is at best a short transitional period as a predominantly secular culture appears 
and not a characteristic of late modernity.  
Second, secularization theory and religious market theory are both refuted when 
it comes to hypotheses regarding the extent to which religious diversity influences the 
relationship between believing and belonging. The relationship between Christian 
believing and Christian belonging varies for societies that differ in their degree of 
religious diversity, but not in the expected direction. Strikingly, the relationship 
between Christian believing and Christian belonging is relatively weak in the United 
States, the most religiously diverse country. This finding is opposite to religious 
market theorists’ expectations (Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Finke 1997). The 
relatively weak relationship between Christian believing and Christian belonging in a 
highly pluralistic society is in accordance with previous findings of Kelly and De 
Graaf (1997). According to religious market theory, societies with religious 
monopolies should have large unmet religious needs, unlike societies with highly 
diverse religious markets, like the United States, where diverse religious needs are 
expected to be met. This implies that those who do not attend church are more devout 
in monopolistic societies. Like Kelley and De Graaf (1997) we found the opposite: 
People who do not, or to a lesser extent, belong are more devout in societies with 
diverse religious markets – such as the United States – than in societies with a low 
degree of religious diversity. Perhaps we should examine more country-specific 
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characteristics to explain these differences in correlations between believing and 
belonging. 
We can best summarize this chapter by saying that religious market theory 
explains little of the recent changes of direction in religiosity. For now, secularization 
theory does a better job. Most religious beliefs are declining, and the process of 
secularization seems to still be continuing in Western societies – with the possible 
exception of Italy. Although Christian belief is high in the United States, belief in God 
and heaven are declining too. It is quite likely that the results found in this chapter 
underestimate the actual situation, due to differences in fertility. Religious people, on 
average, have more children than non-religious people (Hout, Greely and Wilde 2001). 
This means that a larger group of people would be somewhere in the transitional phase 
moving from religious to secular. This would further weaken the relationship between 
believing and belonging, since religious people lose their faith more often than non-
religious people become religious.  
A promising avenue for future research would be to take changes in the number 
of religious services into account, in addition to religious diversity. Denominations 
might vary in the extent to which they invest in their own supply. Availability of 
religious services does seem to influence religious participation (Hamberg and 
Pettersson 1997; Bernts and De Graaf 2003). This might explain the relative success of 
predominantly Catholic societies, which is otherwise a troubling anomaly for religious 
market theory (Iannaccone 1991; Chaves and Cann 1992; Chaves and Gorski 2001). 
Processes of secularization in modern Western societies present a complex and 
mixed picture. Nevertheless, in this general outline, secularization theory seems most 
plausible for the time being, compared to religious market theory. Unlike Davie, we 
found no evidence of a common European trend towards more believing without 
belonging. When it comes to the question of whether belonging still accompanies 
believing, our answer would be yes, at least for now.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Diverse local religious markets and religious involvement:  
Religious diversity and membership in US counties 
 
 
 
This chapter tests the contradictory hypotheses of secularisation and religious market 
theory on religious diversity by examining differences in religious involvement in 3140 
US counties. There is much debate and ambiguity about religious diversity, and 
whether or not religious diversity corrodes or fosters religious involvement. In this 
chapter religious diversity is first specified and consequently a distinction is made 
between diversity in religious doctrines and diversity in numerical strength. Second, 
alternative indices are introduced based on actual supply rather than on satisfied 
demand. Third, religious diversity is examined at the county level, which is more 
realistic than the often-applied country level.  
Based on the 2000 sweep of the Glenmary and US census surveys our findings 
suggest a non-linear relationship between religious diversity and religious 
involvement. Troubling findings for religious market theory are found, though 
secularisation theory is not supported unequivocally. In the United States involvement 
is highest in counties with a religious oligopoly of the three traditional American 
religions (Mainline Protestantism, Evangelicalism, and Catholicism) compared to very 
diverse religious markets, and counties with religious monopolies. Additionally, 
numerical strength of congregations seem to increase membership levels thereby 
somewhat countering the declining levels of membership caused by diverse religious 
doctrines.  
 
4.1 Introduction and question  
In most Western societies religious beliefs, membership, and attendance are declining. 
According to secularisation theory, one of the explanations for this decline is that 
religious diversity corrodes religious life (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Wilson 1966). In 
religiously heterogeneous markets plausibility structures of religion are losing 
strength, because religions are deprived of their absolute claims and exclusive truth. 
This view is challenged by religious market theory, which argues that religious 
diversity fosters religiosity (Finke and Stark 1988; Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994). Religious market theory explains low membership rates, and 
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religious downfall in general by the relatively homogeneous markets in the West, 
especially in Europe. Presumably, a monopoly faith is unable to satisfy the variety of 
religious demands (Stark and Iannaccone 1994, 1996). However, there is no 
convincing evidence that more religious diversity results in either more or less 
religious involvement (Chaves and Gorski 2001, Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002). So, 
it is still unclear in which way religious diversity affects religious involvement, if 
indeed it does. This situation is largely due to the issue about what constitutes religious 
diversity and to methodological issues.  
Different conclusions about the relationship between religious diversity and 
religious involvement are to a large extent caused by theoretical vagueness about 
diversity and competition.20 Religious diversity is closely related to competition and is 
often regarded as a substitute for religious competition. However, religious market 
theorists never define competition (e.g., Stark and Finke 2002). Consequently, 
competition is used in a variety of somewhat opposing ways in different explanatory 
settings (Olson 2002). In general, it is assumed that religious diversity generates 
religious competition.21 Competition, in its turn, is presumed to result in more religious 
choice for the individual. It is the increased choice options, available due to 
competition, which will generate higher levels of religious involvement (Finke and 
Stark 1988; Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 1994, 1996). Hence, religious 
competition is the mechanism between religious diversity and involvement. In this 
chapter we will spell out the assumed relationship between diversity and competition. 
By describing how and to what extent the various forms of religious diversity affects 
religious competition, the association between diversity and competition becomes 
clearer. Thereby, we aim to get a better understanding about the relationship between 
religious diversity and religious involvement, because religious competition is still a 
‘black box’.  
Summarizing, the focus of this chapter is testing the diversity hypothesis. The 
religious diversity hypothesis refers to the relationship between the number of 
religions present in the religious market – religious supply – and religious 
involvement. By describing how the various forms of religious diversity affect 
involvement, the underlying theoretical mechanism of religious competition becomes 
clearer. We think that the US county data provide the opportunity to measure various 
forms of diversity at a level (i.e. county level) that is to be preferred to previous tests 
                                                
20 The ambiguity about the relationship between religious diversity and religious involvement is deteriorated 
further because there is no clear distinction between religious diversity and market shares (Finke and Stark 1988; 
Stark and Iannaccone 1994, 1996). Sometimes market share is regarded interchangeable with religious diversity, 
although it is distinct from diversity (Bruce 1999; Olson 1999). 
21 Religious market theory argues that competition lies at the heart of the theory; religious diversity only matters 
to the extent that it fosters competition (Stark and Iannaccone 1996). However, religious market theorists do not 
specify under which conditions diversity does or does not boost religious competition. 
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using measures of diversity at the country level. The focus on counties will also 
provide information whether the United States is religiously indeed as competitive as 
is often assumed, since we will focus at a context level that captures a conceivable 
market for individuals. At a lower level the market might be less pluralistic. This way 
we aim for theoretical as well as empirical progress. Competing hypotheses are 
formulated and tested with the Glenmary 2000 sweep and the 2000 US census data 
both pertaining to counties. Examining the US case is interesting because it is the 
heartland of the religious diversity hypothesis (Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Warner 
1993).  Therefore the general question is:   
How and to what extent does religious diversity influence religious involvement 
in counties of the United States? 
 
4.1.1 Associations between religious diversity, denominations and involvement 
At first glance both the secularization theory and the supply side theory may seem to 
imply some sort of linear association between religious diversity and religious 
involvement. However, with respect to the supply-side given the economic literature, it 
is unlikely that religious diversity increases involvement endlessly. Nor is it likely 
from a supply-and-demand point of view that under all circumstances religious 
diversity either lowers or heightens involvement. For example, Stark and Finke (2000: 
219) argue that religious diversity has a saturation point: beyond a certain point, the 
market is saturated and additional diversity and competition do not increase the overall 
level of religious involvement. Hence, they claim there is a ceiling effect and 
maximum diversity is reached until everyone in a given population belongs to her or 
his own individual congregation (Stark and Finke 2000: 219).  
Olson and Hadaway (1999) showed that there is a negative curvilinear 
relationship between religious diversity and membership on the level of Canadian 
towns and counties. Next to this, Olson (1999) and Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002) 
mention that the relationship between religious denominations and religious diversity 
is mathematically necessarily related. When one or a few religious denomination 
become increasingly bigger it pushes other denominations out of the market, thus 
lowering religious diversity.  
 
4.1.2 Two forms of religious diversity 
Forms of religious diversity and hypotheses on religious diversity will be deduced 
from two theories – secularisation theory and religious market theory. We will first 
discuss these theories and derive two forms of religious diversity from them. 
Secularisation theory regards religious diversity as the number of different religious 
doctrines present in the religious market (e.g. Berger 1967, Bruce 1999, 2000). 
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Proponents of religious market theory do not define religious diversity as explicit as 
secularisation theorists and therefore leave room for different interpretations of 
diversity, depending on the explanatory setting (e.g. Iannaccone 1991; Stark and Finke 
2002). The two forms of religious diversity we distinguish based on both theories are, 
first, diversity pertaining to different doctrines, thereby fostering competition between 
religious consumer segments. The second form is diversity focussing on religious 
doctrines that are relatively similar, thereby fostering competition within religious 
consumer segments.  
The first form of religious diversity focuses on the number of religious firms 
with different doctrines. Secularisation theory emphasizes the presence of different 
religious doctrines to cause declining religious plausibility (Berger 1967). Different 
religious doctrines have different claims about truth. Consequently, upholding claims 
of absolute truth become increasingly difficult in a market with numerous religious 
doctrines. This doctrinal diversity deprives all religions of their plausibility (Berger 
1967; Wilson 1966). Religious market theory assumes a mechanism at play that is 
totally different. Religious market theory stresses the importance of different doctrines 
because they trigger competition and foster choice (Stark and Finke 2002). Different 
religious doctrines serve the various, distinct consumer segments (Stark and Finke 
2002). By serving a greater proportion of individuals with different religious needs, 
multiple firms can cover most of the religious market (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). 
Hence, for religious diversity it is the availability of religious firms with a different 
doctrine that matters.  
The second form of religious diversity is numerical strength, i.e. the number of 
religious firms with similar doctrines. The distinction between different religious 
doctrines and branches of similar religious doctrines is often hazy. Therefore, 
following the logic of secularisation theory, coexistence of religious bodies relatively 
similar in doctrine may be enough to weaken religious plausibility. Berger (1967) and 
Martin (1996) argued that religions relatively similar in creed had a tendency to 
ecumenism and avoid competition to sustain an overarching plausibility structure to 
remain credible for possible and active adherents. Hence, even slight differences in 
theology may cause religious plausibility structures to crumble. In opposition to this 
are claims of religious market theory, focussing on religious choice (Stark and Finke 
2000, 2002). Choice requires a selection of goods that are different, but not too 
different. Only when a variety of religious bodies are aiming to serve the same 
religious consumer segment, people within this segment have religious options to 
choose from. A comparison with buying fruit might clarify this aspect; when someone 
has a taste for apples he is not interested in oranges but is interested in varieties of 
apples. Hence, a market is religiously diverse when multiple religious bodies compete 
to satisfy the same consumer segment. Competition within one specific consumer 
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segment leaves more feasible options for the individual to choose from (Stark 2001; 
Stark and Finke 2002).22 Moore (1994) pursued this line of research and showed that 
the fiercest competition takes place between denominations that are quite the same in 
doctrine and praxis. 
After having distinguished different theoretical forms of religious diversity, the 
logical next question is how to measure these forms. With regard to religious diversity, 
both secularisation theory and religious market theory focus on the supply-side of the 
religious market. Though it is unclear whether religious diversity should be measured 
on an individual, denominational or societal level. To examine religious diversity 
using individual level data is flawed because it captures religious membership (i.e. 
satisfied demand) rather than the religions that offer their ‘products’ on the market (i.e. 
religious supply). Besides, the degree of religious diversity is likely to be 
underestimated using individual level data. Respondents adhering to minor religions or 
branches thereof will not always show up in surveys, thereby creating a gap between 
the actual degree of religious diversity within the market and the survey outcomes. In 
addition to this, using (aggregated) individual level data may lead to mathematical 
dependencies between religious involvement and the index of religious diversity 
(Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002:215).23  
An alternative to derive religious diversity from individual membership is to 
determine the degree of diversity on a societal level. However, it is neither logically 
necessary nor empirically likely that religious diversity at the country level accords 
with religious diversity within a lower unit of analysis. Additionally, when a country 
has different religious monopolies in various counties, aggregating them would paint 
an inaccurate picture of a religiously diverse country. So, religious diversity would be 
overestimated at the country level. 
Obtaining the degree of religious diversity from either individual level or 
country level data thus creates problems. We argue that an individual’s religious 
involvement is most likely to be influenced by the religious diversity in that person’s 
local or regional setting. Thus, religious diversity should be observed at a local level 
and involvement at the individual level.  
Therefore, this chapter does not use data at a societal level to determine the degree of 
religious diversity but rather examines religious diversity at a level more 
commensurate with the religious options available to individuals: their regional 
                                                
22 Likely, this also depends on the size of the consumer segments. Lots of competition in small 
consumer segments may have less effect on membership levels than moderate competition in popular 
consumer segments. 
23 The negative or positive influence of diversity on religious involvement is due to variations in size 
distributions of the denominations examined, which are in fact aggregated memberships. When large 
denominations vary, the correlation tends to be negative, whereas small denominations differ in size 
the correlation tends to be positive. 
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surroundings, that is US counties. Unfortunately, we do not have data on religious 
involvement at the individual level per county. Therefore, as a second best, we use 
aggregated membership data because personal propensities imply relative frequencies 
in populations.  
  
4.2 Hypotheses and the causality issue 
Hypotheses on religious involvement are first and foremost about individual changes 
over time (e.g. Bruce 2002, Stark and Finke 2000). Thus, changes in religious diversity 
will affect individual religious involvement, whether that is membership, attending or 
ecclesiastical activity. However, much attention has gone to explaining why various 
areas with different degrees of religious diversity have different levels of overall 
religious involvement. In short, dynamic individual level hypotheses were transformed 
into static hypotheses pertaining to lager units of analyses, e.g. counties or countries, 
and tested on cross-sectional macro-level data. Unfortunately, we have no individual 
level data available to match with US county data. Therefore we are unable to use 
individual membership or attendance as the dependent variable. Of course, this bears 
the danger of ecological fallacies.24 However, we test hypotheses following theories 
that aim to explain relations at a country level (e.g. Stark and Iannaconne 1996). 
Besides, if macro findings are not in line with theoretically presumed propensities on a 
micro level, this challenges the paralleled individual thesis as well. Hence, we spell out 
cross-sectional county level hypotheses derived form dynamic individual level 
hypotheses. In Figure 1 the theoretically assumed relations are displayed. 
 
Figure 1: The relationships between religious diversity, competition and involvement 
                along with various forms of diversity.  The numerals correspond with the  
                relevant hypothesis. 
   
Religious diversity:  Religious involvement: 
    - Diversity between different religious doctrines      - Church membership 
    - Diversity between similar religious doctrines   
   
   
   
 Religious competition:  
      - Between different denominations  
      - Between similar denominations  
   
An unbroken arrow indicates theoretical relationships,  
the dotted arrow indicates the underlying mechanism. 
 
                                                
24 Ecological fallacies occur when macro indicators are correlated while at the same time 
corresponding micro indicators are not causally related. 
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Before we will discuss our hypotheses in detail, we would like to make clear from the 
beginning that we have to be aware of the causality issue in general when we test the 
hypotheses. As we will show later in detail, the county data we use concern a one shot 
observation, which implies that it is difficult to say anything about the causal direction 
or sign of an association. This makes it especially difficult to test hypotheses 
pertaining to the religious market theory. The prediction is that religious diversity at 
the context level will increase religious involvement. However, the data makes it 
impossible to distinguish this from the reverse interpretation that higher levels of 
involvement may cause new denominations to move into the local market. 
Nevertheless, if the relationship between diversity and involvement is negative or non-
existent, this surely contradicts the interpretation of the supply side theory. In other 
words, potentially we can reject a supply side hypothesis if the sign of the association 
is negative, but if the association has the predicted positive sign we cannot conclude 
that the supply side hypothesis is supported. This is less of a problem with the 
hypothesis based on the secularization theory, since a positive sign is not allowed 
according to the theory and it is hard to imagine an alternative interpretation of a 
negative sign, i.e. it is very unlikely that a decline in religious involvement or a decline 
in church members will boost diversity. We therefore believe that our tests of the 
hypotheses provide relevant information about the general validity of the theories 
involved.   
 
4.2.1 Diversity and secularity 
Secularisation theory predicts that the more religions present in the religious market, 
the lower religious involvement of individuals will be. In a society where there is one 
single religion, levels of religious beliefs and involvement are said to be high and 
widespread (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002). Secularisation theorists have argued that 
religious diversity undermines religious credibility (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Martin 
1978; Wilson 1966). In a monopolistic situation religion is stable and durable in 
consciousness because of effective socialization; religion will be taken as self-evident 
reality (Berger 1967; Berger and Luckmann 1974). When multiple religions co-exist, 
the evident reality of religion and its truths can no longer be taken for granted because 
a multitude of faiths are competing for plausibility. Besides, in the religiously diverse 
situation people are not only able to choose between varieties of religions but also to 
choose for the option of having no religion at all. The existence of religious diversity 
thus cripples effective religious socialization (Berger and Luckmann 1974).  
About the influence of religious diversity on religious involvement 
secularisation theory is quite specific. The theory points to a religious market where 
religions are competing and in so doing their plausibility structures are undermining 
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each other, ultimately bringing religious downfall (Berger 1967). Consequently, if 
religions with different doctrines are present in the religious market, the market is 
religiously diverse. This diversity will weaken the religious canopy causing religious 
decline. Conversely, religious downfall will not occur if plausibility structures are 
alike. 
In this context, we point out that in states and counties where religious 
traditions are dominant or even hold a near monopoly position, like Mormonism in 
Utah or Catholics in the southern counties, the percentage of church members is higher 
(Kilpinen 2003).25 Hence, the United States may not be as religiously diverse as it 
appears to be. Certainly, on a national or even state level there is a fair amount of 
religious heterogeneity. However, on a local, county level there may be considerable 
religious homogeneity. Thus, to the extent that denominations in a county have 
different doctrines – lacking an overarching plausibility structure – the lower the level 
of overall religious involvement within that county. Accordingly, the general 
hypothesis on religious diversity following secularisation theory reads:  
1a. The more doctrinal diversity a county has, the lower the relative number of 
church members in that county. 
 
Obviously, collaboration is easier for denominations, when they have less 
dissimilarity. For instance, the Protestants among themselves will collaborate and 
merge easier than Protestants do with other denominations, like Catholics (Martin 
1996). However, even with slight differences plausibility structures may crumble. This 
is the case with contemporary ecumenical associations and protestant denominations 
that are quite similar in their creeds (Moore 1994). Congregations may differ slightly 
on theologically trivial issues but this might result in an overall crumbling of the 
religious canopy too. Proximity of marginally different religious bodies as well as 
substantially different denominations within a county may result in less religious 
involvement.  
In sum, following secularisation theory, even minor theological differences 
between congregations may lower the levels of involvement. Even in doctrinally 
similar denominations, slight differences result in weakened plausibility structures. 
The more congregations present within the local religious market, the weaker religious 
plausibility is and therefore the less religious involved people are. Numerical strength 
of one or a few denominations results in competition between congregations on more 
trivial issues, which may also result in lower levels of religious involvement. 
Accordingly, the numerical strength hypothesis on religious diversity following 
secularisation theory reads: 
                                                
25 See Appendix C Figure 1 and 2. 
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1b. The more congregations a county has, the lower the relative number of 
church members in that county.  
 
4.2.2 Diverse markets, blossoming religiosity   
Religious market theory – mirroring secularisation theory – assumes the overall 
demand for religion to be stable over time and place but that there is considerable 
variation in specific religious needs (Stark 1997; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). 
Variation in religious needs is presumably nested in distinctive and durable religious 
consumer segments. A consumer segment is a market segment of potential adherents 
sharing particular religious needs. The idea is that levels of participation will be higher 
in settings with a richer religious supply, offering more religious choice and thereby 
serving more consumer segments (Finke and Stark 1988, 1998; Stark and Finke 2000; 
Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone 1995).  
When different religious consumer segments exist and thus considerable 
variation in specific religious needs, there should also be substantial variation in 
religious doctrines and rituals. In monopoly markets, religious involvement tends to be 
low due to the inability of the monopoly church to satisfy the specific religious 
demands of every religious consumer segment (Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and 
Finke 2002). The only way people in the relatively unserved segments become 
religiously active is when more religions enter the market (Stark and Iannaccone 1994, 
1996; Finke 1997). When more religious bodies enter the market, and thus 
considerable variation in religious doctrines become available, these firms will 
compete with each other for some portion of the religious market. If not, individuals 
are not mobilized and will not be able to satisfy their religious needs (Stark and Finke 
2000). Even though in a situation with an abundance of religious firms, there may not 
be much choice if they are all alike (Bruce 1999; Hamberg and Pettersson 1997). 
Subsequently, when there are no religious firms that differ considerably in doctrines 
and rituals, some religious consumer segments remain unserved. In other words, the 
more distinct religious firms present in the religious market, the greater the proportion 
of the religious market that is covered. Hence, the general hypothesis of religious 
market theory on diversity, opposing hypothesis 1a of secularisation theory, reads:  
2a. The more doctrinal diversity a county has, the higher the relative numbers 
of church members in that county. 
 
To religious market theory, religious diversity is not confined to different religious 
doctrines (Stark and Finke 2002). It is assumed that individuals within a religious 
consumer segment generally do not move to another segment and have the same 
religious needs throughout their life (Stark and Finke 2002). Then switching takes 
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place only between relatively similar denominations. Therefore, religious diversity is 
also present between religious bodies with similar doctrines. Competition is fiercer 
between denominations serving the same religious consumer segment, since religious 
choice is seen as a variety of viable religious options for the individual to choose from. 
Otherwise individuals within a consumer segment still would have only one viable 
option (Stark 2001; Stark and Finke 2002). 
When religious diversity implies competition between religious bodies with 
similar doctrines, it follows naturally that even in an apparently religiously diverse 
market there is no competition if all denominations serve other consumer segments. 
Only when there are religious bodies aimed to satisfy the same distinct consumer 
preferences, by offering similar religious products there is diversity, competition and 
feasible religious options for the individual to choose from.  
In sum, when there is only one religious body for each consumer segment, there 
is still no religious choice for the individual since there is only one option available. 
Hence, it could be argued that despite absence of doctrinal diversity, there is a diverse 
religious market nonetheless due to great numerical diversity of one or a few 
denominations having lots of congregations. Hence, we come up with a second 
hypothesis, focusing on religious diversity as numerical strength instead of doctrinal 
dissimilarity, which reads:  
2b. The more congregations a county has, the higher the relative number of 
church members in that county. 
 
4.3 Measuring religious diversity: deficiencies and solutions 
Although most research uses the Herfindahl index to measure religious diversity, this 
line of research has three major shortcomings (Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002). The 
severity of those deficiencies will be examined and sorted out in this paragraph.   
The first and most severe deficiency is an overlooked biased mathematical 
relationship between religious involvement and the index of religious diversity. Voas, 
Crocket & Olson (2002) find ‘that nonzero correlations (between the index measuring 
religious diversity and religious involvement) will occur for mathematical reasons that 
depend only on the size distributions of the denominations in a data set across 
geographical units’. The index is calculated by taking the sum of the squares of the 
proportion of adherents of each denomination. The mathematical dependency arises 
when the dependent variable is also based on individual religious involvement. This 
finding implies that the vast majority of results of previous research have no meaning 
whatsoever. This deficit can to some extent be overcome to have an alternative index 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 83 
of diversity, which is not a mathematical artefact of the dependent variable, not only 
theoretically but analytically as well.26  
The second deficiency of the Herfindahl index is that it is ‘theoretically blind’. 
Van Tubergen, te Grotenhuis, and Ultee (2005) argue that it matters which signature 
the religious market carries, whether predominantly Catholic, Protestant or secular. It 
seems apparent that being a Protestant in a mainly Protestant environment differs from 
being a Protestant in a mainly Catholic surrounding.  
The third deficiency could also be regarded as an extension of the second 
because this line of research excludes non-denominationalists making no difference 
between religious markets with a secular or non-secular context. Preferably, an 
alternative index should take into account the degree of secularity because some 
scholars argue there is competition with a secular view as well (Bruce 1999; Lechner 
2008).  
Olson (2004) argues that alternative measures of religious diversity cannot 
circumvent the mathematical problems identified by Voas et al. (2002). Alternative 
measures will also be strongly positively or negatively correlated with the use of the 
Herfindahl index applied to religious research. If they are not, one has to wonder 
whether they are alternative measures of diversity. Olson argues that alternative 
measures of diversity are necessarily correlated with the Herfindahl index because 
they measure approximately the same thing. Therefore, almost any measure of 
diversity will have a mathematically necessary, non-causal, component to its 
correlation with almost any (aggregated) measure of religious involvement.  
This pessimistic view implies there is no appropriate way to examine religious 
diversity’s influence on religious involvement. However, forms of religious diversity 
do not necessarily have to relate to each other nor do they have to be interchangeable, 
in contrast to measurements of the same form of religious diversity. Besides, the 
Herfindahl index applied to religious research is not so much a measure of religious 
supply but rather an index of overall religious membership. Thus, diversity is 
measured by the proportion of people already member of a certain church or 
denomination (i.e. satisfied demand). Therefore, we use measures of religious diversity 
largely independent of the Herfindahl index.27  
In this chapter we propose a relatively simple and straightforward alternative to 
measure religious diversity from a purely supply-side perspective. We avoid the 
fallacies of the previous index by following two strategies. First and foremost is to use 
a measure based on the religious options on offer in the market rather than deriving 
                                                
26 Previous research sometimes did control for the proportion of Catholics (e.g. Finke and Stark 1988). 
However, controlling for any large (non-)religious groups aggravates the problem because it is an 
arithmetic component of both the diversity index and the dependent variable (Olson 1999). 
27 See Appendix C Table 1. 
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diversity from variety on the demand-side. Both secularisation and religious market 
theory imply that religious diversity is the number of (different) religions or 
congregations in the religious market. Therefore, the number of religious bodies with 
different religious doctrines is taken into account, as well as the numerical presence of 
congregations in the local market. Second, the alternative index has to be only weakly 
related to the Herfindahl index.  
 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Data 
The data used is the 2000 sweep of the Glenmary survey supplemented with US 
population census data. These datasets hold information about religiosity and 
demographics on county level. In total all 3140 US counties were included. The 
Glenmary survey represents statistics for 149 denominations, religious associations, 
and communions on the number of congregations within each county of the United 
States. The data also includes membership rates, as defined by the religious body. Not 
only do the data provide information on Christian bodies but on numbers of 
synagogues, mosques, eastern religions, Latter-day Saints, Unitarian and Universalist 
groups as well.  
 
4.4.2 Religious membership 
To examine whether religious diversity influences religious involvement, we took 
religious membership per 1000 people as the dependent variable. The Glenmary 
survey defines members as “all members, including full members, their children and 
the estimated number of other participants who are not considered members; for 
example, the ‘baptised,’ ‘those not confirmed,’ ‘those not eligible for communion,’ 
‘those regularly attending services,’ and the like.” The total number of adherents 
divided by the total county population results in membership per 1000 people. 
Religious membership per 1000 people ranges from 18.16 to 1000, as displayed in 
Table 1. An anomaly is that there are 39 counties (1.2 percent) reporting more 
members than total population. Reasons for this discrepancy will no doubt differ from 
county to county, but the most reasonable explanations would include U.S. Census 
population undercount, church membership overcount, and county of residence 
differing from county of membership. This is especially likely in Virginia where many 
cities have been separated from their adjoining counties (cf. the Association for 
Religious Data Archives (www.thearda.com) for further details on data collection). 
The membership rates of these counties were set to 1000. 
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4.4.3 Religious diversity 
The Glenmarry data holds information of 149 religious bodies across the United 
States. Although major efforts were undertaken to enlist all African American 
denominations, some minor African American denominations are not well represented 
in the data. We merged these denominations into mainline Protestant or Evangelical, 
according to their denominational signature.  
 To determine the variety of different religious doctrines in the local religious 
market, all religions with different theological doctrines were counted. We distinguish 
in total 16 categories representing different religious doctrines. The major religious 
doctrines are Mainline Protestantism, Evangelical and Catholic. Churches and temples 
of eastern religions, like Orthodox Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, 
Taoism, Sikhism, Zoroastrism, and Bahai are relatively sparse. Nevertheless, we 
choose not to merge these bodies because they have distinct religious doctrines and 
therefore contribute to the diversity on the religious market. Latter-day Saints, Church 
of Christ, Universalists, Judaism, and Islam were treated in a similar fashion. 
Consequently, the number of religious doctrines in a county varies from 1 to 16.  
Next to this form of religious diversity, we have data pertaining to the total 
number of congregations within a county. A congregation is regarded as a place of 
religious service within a certain denominational branch. Thus, a religious doctrine 
may have many congregations within one county. Originally, in only 2.7 percent of all 
counties the number of congregations was more than 400. The most extreme case was 
Los Angeles County, with 4044 congregations.  Because a few extreme scores have a 
high influence on the average, standard deviation and estimates, we set the score for all 
counties with 400 or more congregations to 400.  Based on this truncation, US 
counties have on average 77.46 congregations (standard deviation 82.31) within their 
boundaries. Because even after truncation, the variable is strongly skewed to the right, 
we log transformed the scores (average 3.91, standard deviation 0.93).  
 
4.4.4 Modernity and median household income per county 
The structure of the religious market may be influenced by modernity. Modernity is 
known to be corrosive to religious life (Norris and Inglehart 2004). To account for this 
possible confounding effect of modernity, the 2000 US county census data was added 
to the Glenmary data. We use median household income as an indicator for the degree 
of modernity. The median household income approximates the level of economical 
development of a county. Not controlling for the degree modernity, in one way or 
another, areas may overestimate the influence of religious diversity because religious 
membership is the United States also has a strong social and cultural component (e.g. 
Wilson 1966). Median household income ranges from 9333 dollar to 82929 dollar. For 
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means of convenience and interpretation, median household income is mean-centred in 
the analysis. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.  
 Range  Mean Standard deviation 
- Membership per 1000 people 18.16 – 1000.00  528.67 181.12 
- Number of religious doctrines 1 – 16  5.38 2.55 
- Number of congregations  1 – 400  77.46 82.31 
- Median household income 9333.00 – 82929.00  35368.18 8916.89 
N= 3140          Source: Glenmary 2000 & US County Census 2000. 
 
4.5 Analysis 
To get an accurate picture of the association between religious diversity and religious 
membership, both the doctrinal make-up and numerical strength of congregations in 
the religious market of all 3140 US counties are examined. The results are displayed in 
Figure 2 and 3. 
 Figure 2 displays the number of religious doctrines against the observed mean 
membership per 1000 people. It shows that membership is not highest in a religious 
monopoly but is highest when 3 different religions are present (and competing) in the 
religious market of a county. When 4 or more religious doctrines are present 
membership levels per 1000 people are lower than when 3 doctrines are present. 
Strikingly, levels of membership remain relatively stable when 5 or more religious 
doctrines are present in a county. However, when 5 or more religious doctrines are 
present membership levels are higher than in a religious monopoly or if only 2 
religious doctrines are present. 
The dotted line represents relationship between the number of religious 
doctrines and the number of counties. Figure 2 shows that a large amount of counties 
(almost 900) have 4 religious doctrines. The majority of the counties have somewhere 
between 1 and 5 religious doctrines (71.1 percent). In order to know what religious 
doctrines are present in counties we examined the prevalence of the religious 
doctrines. The findings are displayed in Table 2. 
Table 2 reveals that the religious market in most US counties is not all that 
diverse. In counties with three denominations the make-up of the religious market 
seems to consist mostly out of the ‘big three’ denominations of Mainline 
Protestantism, Evangelicalism and Catholicism. In 99.2 percent of the counties 
Mainline Protestantism is present in the religious market. Similar percentages are 
found for Evangelicalism and Catholicism, both well above 90 percent. In 93.2 percent 
of the counties all of the ‘big three’ are present in the religious market. When there are 
fewer that 3 religious doctrines present in a county, the ones present are most likely to 
be one or two of the big three. Table 2 also makes clear that the markets of counties 
with 3 to 6 religious doctrines mostly consist of the ‘big three’, and some combination 
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of the other sizable Christian denominations (Churches of Christ and/or Mormonism) 
and the more ‘exotic’ religious doctrines. 
 
              Figure 2: Number of religious doctrines against average membership per 1000 (left y-axis)  
                and number of counties (right y-axis). The black unbroken line represents the  
                membership rate per number of doctrines, the dotted line represents number  
                of counties per number of doctrines. 
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       Source: Glenmary 2000. 
            = Number of religious doctrines against average membership per 1000.                          
= Number of religious doctrines against number of counties.  
 
In sum, the relationship between different religious doctrines and membership does not 
appear to be linear. Religious involvement is highest when three religious doctrines 
(mostly Mainline Protestantism, Evangelicalism and Catholicism) are engaged in 
religious competition. In addition to this, in most counties the religious markets 
consists of denominations of Mainline Protestantism, Evangelicalism, Catholicism, 
and either Churches of Christ or Mormonism. 
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Table 2: Occurrence of a religious doctrine in percentages 
               and absolute numbers in counties. 
 Percentage Number of counties 
- The big 3 denominations 93.2 2926 
    - Mainline Protestantism 99.2 3117 
    - Evangelicalism 99.1 3111 
    - Catholicism 94.2 2958 
   
- Other sizable Christian denominations 49.6 1559 
    - Churches of Christ 77.4 2429 
    - Latter Day Saints (Mormonism) 57.4 1802 
   
- Other denominations   
    - Orthodox Christianity 17.2 540 
    - Unitarians 18.9 593 
    - Judaism 19.7 619 
    - Islam 13.5 424 
    - Baha’i 16.0 501 
    - Buddhism 11.4 359 
    - Hindu 6.6 206 
    - Sikh 3.8 118 
    - Jainism 2.3 71 
    - Zoroastrism 0.8 26 
    - Taoism 0.8 24 
N= 3140           Source: Glenmary 2000. 
 
Next, we plotted the number of congregations against membership levels and counties. 
This is displayed in Figure 3. The line symbolises the observed mean membership per 
1000 people per number of congregations. It shows that membership initially increases 
when the total number of congregations increases, and then it fluctuates heavily 
without any clear trend. We cannot explain these fluctuations, and both secularisation 
theory and religious market theory do not provide a clarification either. Just as the 
number of religious doctrines we can conclude that the relationship between the 
number of congregations and membership does not appear to be linear. The dotted line 
represents the number of counties per  specific number of congregations in counties. 
Clearly, more than half of the counties (61.2 percent) have somewhere between 1 and 
65 congregations of whatever denominational signature. 
In sum, the idea that the relationship between religious diversity and religious 
involvement is more or less linear is proven to be wrong. Figure 2 and 3 clearly show 
that religious diversity does not solely decrease or increase involvement. Besides, 
there is not any clear-cut ceiling effect as Stark and Finke (2000) claimed. 
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               Figure 3: Number of congregations against average membership per 1000 (left y-axis)  
                 and number of counties (right y-axis). The black unbroken line represents the  
                 membership rate per number of congregations, the dotted line represents  
                 number of counties per number of congregations. Although no county has 0  
                 congregations the x-axis starts begins at 0 for means of convenience. 
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 Source: Glenmary 2000. 
            = Number of congregations against mean membership per 1000.                          
= Number of counties against number of congregations.  
 
For reasons of parsimony we will use a multiple regression analysis to estimate with a 
limited number of parameters the net effects of the number of doctrines and the 
number of congregations in a county. We therefore will model the association patterns 
in Figure 2 and Figure 3 with OLS regression models. Figures 2 and 3 both show a 
sharp increase at the beginning, followed by a gradual decrease while thereafter it is 
hard to tell whether there is any trend. This is most clear in Figure 2:  the sharp 
increase of the number of church members per 1000 occurs between 1 and 3 doctrines. 
The optimum is reached at 3; this means that a county has the largest share of church 
members (i.e., on average about 600) when there are 3 religious competitors. More 
than 4 doctrines seem to be counterproductive as it leads to less church members. This 
process comes to an end when there are 6 or more doctrines in a county; from there on 
the average relative share is about 500 per 1000. The same pattern, albeit less 
pronounced, can be found in Figure 3: a sharp increase between 0-25, a decrease 
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between 25-65 and then more or less stability between 65 and more.  From Figures 2 
and 3 one can conclude that the vast majority of all counties are to be found between 1 
and 5 doctrines (71.1 percent) and between 0 and 65 congregations (61.2 percent). In 
other words, the observed process in which a sharp increase is followed by a gradual 
increase is based on a very large share of all counties. In sum, the associations 
observed in both figures can be described with a parabolic function (first part of the 
process), combined with a linear trend for the second part.  The OLS regression 
equation for the number of doctrines reads: 
 
Church members per 1000 = constant1(1-5) + b1 * doctrines(1-5) + b2 * doctrines2(1-5) +           
    constant2(6-16) + b3 * doctrines(6-16) + e1 (1) 
(where subscript 1-5 denotes counties with 1 to 5 doctrines, and 6-16 denotes counties with 6 
to 16 doctrines).  
 
The equation for the number of congregations is similar: 
 
Church members per 1000 = constant1(0-65) + b1 * congregations(0-65) +                                  
                                              b2 * congregations 2(0-65) + constant2(66-400) +  
                                               b3 * congregations (66-400) + e2   (2)  
(where subscript 0-65 denotes counties with 0-65 congregations and 66-400 denotes counties 
with 66-400 or more). 
 
For reasons of convenience we centred the variables ‘doctrines’ (1-5) and 
‘congregations’ (1-65), which implies that constant1 in the first equation equals the 
estimated relative share of church members in a county with an average number of 
doctrines (5.38). Contstant1 in the second equation equals the estimated share in 
counties with an median number of congregations (i.e., 50).28 Constant2 in the first 
equation is the difference between a county with an average number of doctrines and a 
county with 6 doctrines. Constant2 in the second equation denotes the difference 
between a county with an median number of congregations and 66 congregations. To 
evaluate whether these equations capture the main processes well enough, we 
calculated the predicted church members per 1000 and compared them to the observed 
numbers. From Figure 4 and Figure 5 it can be inferred that the observed means and 
their estimated counterparts match rather closely. Besides, Pearson’s correlation 
between the aggregated observed and estimated values amounts to 0.85 for religious 
doctrines and 0.43 for congregations. This rather low correlation of 0.43 is due to the 
heavily fluctuations in membership levels in counties with more than 65 
                                                
28 We took the median (50) instead of the average (70.46) because the latter lies outside the range 1-
65. This means that when we would mean-centre the intercept would not equal the estimated number 
for counties with about 70 congregations.    
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congregations. The correlation for counties between 1-65 congregations is 0.90 and for 
counties with +65 congregations the correlation is 0.11. All in all, we are confident 
that we are able to summarize the data in Figure 4 and 5 with the OLS equations 
containing 5 parameters. 
 
Figure 4: Number of religious doctrines by predicted and observed mean membership per    
               1000 people. 
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 Source: Glenmary 2000. 
            = Predicted mean membership per 1000.                          
= Observed mean membership per 1000.  
 
In Table 3, the OLS estimates can be found (cf. Model 1 and Model 2). We refrained 
from presenting p-values, because we analyse the whole population instead of a 
sample of counties.  
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Table 3: OLS regression estimates on membership per 1000 people. 
 Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Constant1 (church members per 1000 in average county) 472.99 528.71 475.13 475.06 
     
- Religious doctrines (parabolic function)     
    Number of doctrines (1-5), mean centred (b1) -117.87  -97.49  -95.02 
    Number of doctrines mean centred and squared (b2) -32.38  -23.94 -23.32 
- Religious doctrines (linear function)      
    Constant2 (difference between average and 6 doctrines)      3.31  -7.35 -5.13 
    Number of doctrines (6-16) (b3) 1.65     -8.66 -7.43  
     
- Total number of congregations (parabolic section)     
    Number of congregations (0-65), log transformed and     
    mean centred (b1) 
 -80.23 -39.24 -38.89 
    Number of congregations mean centred and squared (b2)  -40.99 -26.44 -26.51 
- Total number of congregations (linear function)     
    Constant2 (difference between average and 1.82 (ln 66)    -26.48 -11.36 -11.78 
    Number of congregations (66-400, log transformed) (b3)  3.22 62.86 63.02 
     
- Median household income (x 1000)    -0.91 
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.025 0.060 0.062 
N= 3140                Source: Glenmary 2000 & US Census 2000. 
 
In Model 1, constant1 equals 472.99. This means that in a county with an average 
number of doctrines (i.e. 5.38 doctrines) the estimated number of church members per 
1000 amounts to 473. The estimate (b1) for the number of doctrines is -117.87, which 
means that in point 5.38 (= average number of doctrines) the parabola is falling.  
In addition, the effect of the squared number of doctrines is -32.38.  Because 
the variable ‘number of doctrines’ is mean centred this means that for values below 
average the negative effect of 117.87 is decreasing, turning into a positive effect just 
after the parabola reaches its maximum. This point is defined as –b1 / 2 * b2 = 117.87 
/ 2 * -32.38 = -1.82. So, that is -1.82 below average or 5.38 – 1.82 = 3.56. This 
eventually means that in counties with 3 to 4 religious doctrines the relative share of 
church members is highest. The parabola is related to counties ranging between 1 and 
5 doctrines. After this point the process is more or less linear and starts at 
approximately 476 church members per 1000 (472.99 + 3.31).  From that point onward 
the number of church members rises with 1.65 for every next doctrine. This implies 
that in a county with the maximum of doctrines (16) the relative share is about 490 
(472.99 + 1.65 * (16-6)). 
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              Figure 5: Number of congregations by predicted and observed mean  
    membership per 1000 people. Although no county has 0  
    congregations the x-axis starts begins at 0 for means of convenience. 
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 Source: Glenmary 2000. 
            = Predicted mean membership per 1000.                          
= Observed mean membership per 1000.  
 
Similar interpretations apply to the number of congregations in Model 2 of Table 3, 
and displayed graphically in Figure 5. In a county with an median number of 
congregations (i.e. 50 congregations) the estimated number of church members per 
1000 is about 529. The estimate (b1) for the number of congregations is negative (-
80.23), meaning that when there are 50 counties the parabola has a falling tendency. 
Furthermore, the effect of the squared number of congregations is -40.99.  This implies 
that for values below the median the negative effect of -80.23 is decreasing, turning 
into a positive effect just after the parabola reaches its maximum, at nearly 19.29 
Hence, in counties with about 19 congregations the relative share of church members 
is highest. The parabola is related to counties ranging between 1 and 65 congregations. 
After this point the process is more or less linear and starts at approximately 502 
church members per 1000 (528.71 - 26.48).  From that point onward the number of 
                                                
29 The maximum is calculated with 80.23 / 2 * -40.99 = -0,97, that is 0,97 below the median. This 
median is ln50, so the maximum is at ln50 – 0.97 = 2.93 which is about 19 congregations (2.93e = 
18.95). 
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church members rises with 3.22 for 1 unit increase of the log transformed variable). 
This implies that in a county with the maximum of congregations (400) the relative 
share is about 508 (502 + 3.22 * (ln(400) – ln(66)).  This means that on average there 
is hardly any difference between a county with 66 congregations and 400 (or more) 
congregations. 
From secularisation theory and religious market theory we derived competing 
predictions about the relation between religious diversity and membership. So far, we 
have shown that the bivariate relationship between religious diversity and religious 
involvement in the United States is non linear: religious diversity increases religious 
involvement up to a certain maximum then it decreases somewhat, and thereafter there 
is hardly any effect of religious diversity.  
Next we combined equations (1) and (2) in a multiple OLS regression analysis. 
We do so because in the bivariate analyses the effects may be over- or underestimated 
because we did not take into account the fact that the number of congregations 
increases as the number of doctrines is larger within a county (Pearson’s correlation 
between the number of doctrines and the log transformed number of congregations is 
0.73). In a multiple analysis the effect of the number of congregations is regardless (or 
controlled for) the number of doctrines and vice versa. The results can be found in 
Model 3 of Table 3. 
Figure 6 graphically displays the relationship between the number of religious 
doctrines and membership levels per 1000 people after controlling for the number of 
congregations. Initially, when more doctrines enter the market membership levels are 
raising. This is graphically presented in Figure 6. Membership levels again peak when 
3 to 4 religious doctrines are present, thereafter the membership decline strongly for 
counties with 4 or 5 doctrines. In counties with 6 doctrines or more membership levels 
decline at a constant rate. Interestingly when more than 8 religious doctrines are 
present, membership levels are at the same or even lower level compared to a religious 
monopoly. Combined with the finding that most counties have somewhere between 3 
and 6 religious doctrines in their markets, membership levels are highest in a religious 
oligopoly with 3 doctrines and decline when more religious doctrines enter the market.  
As stated previously (cf. Table 2) this oligopoly of three or four consists of almost 
always of Mainline Protestantism, Evangelicalism, and Catholicism. 
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              Figure 6: Estimated mean membership by number of religious doctrines 
                per 1000 people, after controlling for the number of congregations. 
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         Source: Glenmary 2000. 
 
Likewise, we examined whether the effect of the number of congregations on 
membership per 1000 people changes when controlled for the influence of religious 
doctrines. The results are displayed in Figure 7 and the estimates are shown in Model 3 
of Table 3. Figure 7 shows that membership levels increase rapidly till about 20 
congregations are present in the local market. Thereafter membership levels decline 
just a little to rise again shortly after.  The global pattern now is that the number of 
congregations has a positive effect on religious involvement with a decreasing 
marginal utility. This was underestimated in the bivariate analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. MEMBERSHIP AND DIVERSITY 
 
 96 
 
              Figure 7: Estimated mean membership by number of congregations  
                 per 1000 people, after controlling for different religious doctrines. 
                 Although no county has 0 congregations the x-axis starts begins  
    at 0 for means of convenience. 
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          Source: Glenmary 2000. 
 
All in all, if the two forms of diversity are taken into account simultaneously, the 
parabolic function of ’religious doctrines’ and ‘the number of congregations’ does not 
change profoundly. What does change is the linear part of the estimates of both 
‘religious doctrines’ and ‘number of congregations’: the effects become stronger and 
are opposed to each other. The controlled effect of congregations is 62.86 while the 
uncontrolled effect is 3.22. This is called a suppression effect: when a county has 
many congregations they often have many doctrines, many doctrines is however 
detrimental to church membership rates (cf. Figure 6). In a bivariate analysis, this is 
counterbalancing the positive effect that congregations have. In sum for ‘religious 
doctrines’ the influence has become negative (for counties with 6 or more doctrines), 
whereas for ‘the number of congregations’ the influence is stronger positive (for 
counties with 66 or more congregations).  
As a final step, the median household income as an indicator of modernity was 
taken into account. Median household income is taken into account to examine 
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whether the degree of modernity may distort the relationship between diversity and 
involvement. Model 4 of Table 3 shows that median household income has a 
significant negative influence on membership levels. However, the estimates of both 
religious doctrines and number of congregations remain virtually unchanged.  
The relationship between number of religious doctrines and involvement is for 
a wide range negative, given that the bulk of the counties have somewhere between 3 
and 6 doctrines (68.6 percent). This implies that an important prediction of 
secularisation theory is supported; a richer supply of different religious doctrines 
results in lower rates of membership (e.g. Berger 1967; Bruce 2002). Yet, we cannot 
conclude that the secularization hypothesis is corroborated in all cases. Illustrative is 
that when Mainline Protestantism, Evangelicalism and Catholicism are engaged in 
religious competition membership levels are highest. In other scenarios, with either no 
diversity or more than 3 religious doctrines, religious involvement is lower. Hence, the 
secularization hypothesis on doctrines (hypotheses 1a) is corroborated in about two 
third of all cases while the competing hypothesis of religious market theory 
(hypothesis 2a) is valid in one third of the range. . Therefore religious market theory 
deserves some credit. Religious market theory presumes that religious diversity 
increases religious involvement because churches compete (Stark and Finke 2000). 
This increase in involvement only applies when the ‘big three’ denominations are 
competing. Puzzling is that when other religious doctrines come into play, 
membership levels are lower. Apparently, religious diversity may increase religious 
involvement by means of religious competition but too much competition weakens 
religious plausibility structures and consequently religious involvement declines. 
For the number of congregations a slightly different picture emerges. In line 
with the presumption of religious market theory we found that more congregations 
result in higher levels of membership. The more congregations of Mainline 
Protestantism, Evangelicalism, Catholicism, other (non-)Christian faiths, or a mixture 
thereof seem to increase membership. Though, the positive influence of congregational 
strength is mostly countered by the negative influence of different religious doctrines. 
In addition, even though the association between the number of congregations and 
religious involvement is in accordance with religious market theory, we cannot 
conclude that hypothesis 2b is unequivocally supported. Causality may run counter. A 
stated earlier, based on these data we are unable to resolve the issue whether more 
congregations cause high levels of membership or whether higher membership levels 
draws more congregations into the market. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
To get a more precise impression of the relationship between religious diversity and 
religious involvement we examined to what extent religious diversity influence 
religious involvement in US counties. Some alterative measures were used to 
overcome theoretical and methodological problems plaguing the Herfindahl index as 
applied to religious research.  
First, we clarified how religious diversity triggers competition. Because 
competition is the assumed mechanism through which diversity affects involvement. 
Thereby describing more precise how the various forms of religious diversity affect 
involvement. Second, we used a measure to adequately capture religious diversity. 
Third, religious diversity was examined on a level consistent with theory and logical 
for the individual. The United States was examined because to some scholars it is seen 
as an exceptional or extreme case (Bruce 2002; Davie 2002), making it interesting to 
examine which theory holds water.  
 Both secularization and religious market theory predict that religious diversity 
influences religious involvement, the former predicting a religious decline and the 
latter expecting a religious revitalization (Bruce 2002; Stark and Finke 2000). 
Secularization theory implies that a variety of religious suppliers, regardless of 
doctrine, present in the religious market will result in a downfall of religious life 
(Berger 1967). Religious market theory predicts exactly the opposite.  
The first form of diversity pursues the line of reasoning that the number of 
different religious doctrines present in the religious economy defines diversity. Based 
on either competing plausibility structures or religious consumer segments with 
distinct religious preferences (e.g. Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Finke 1997; Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994, 1996). The second form of diversity starts off from the point that the 
distinction between different doctrines and congregations is often unclear, and that 
competition between religious bodies is confined to a specific religious consumer 
segment. Accordingly, religious bodies should be quite similar in doctrine. Numerical 
strength of congregations then provides the individual feasible options to choose from.  
For measuring forms of diversity we used indices that are relatively free of the 
problems plaguing the Herfindahl index (Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002). It is 
incorrect to measure diversity based on (aggregated) individual data, as it measures 
satisfied demand (i.e. memberships) rather than supply (i.e. religious on offer) and 
causes mathematical artefacts. In addition, religious diversity should be measured on a 
level that makes sense to the individual. Hence, religious diversity should pertain to 
regional markets, not the country as a whole as it is unlikely that a person from New 
York is influenced by the religious economy in Houston. We also followed 
suggestions of Chaves and Gorski (2001) to use as many geographical units as 
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possible and to use an index of diversity, which is not a mathematical artefact of the 
dependent variable neither theoretically nor analytically but measures the degree of 
diversity (i.e. religious supply) in the religious market. 
 Findings of all 3140 US counties show that in religious monopolies 
membership levels are relatively low. Levels of involvement are highest when three 
different religious doctrines are present in the religious market. In a county with more 
than three religious doctrines membership levels become lower when the number of 
religious doctrines are higher. Because most counties have somewhere between three 
and six religious doctrines the general trend is that more different religious doctrines 
lead to lower levels of involvement. Thereby, a key presumption of secularization 
theory is corroborated for counties with 4 or more different doctrines: more religious 
diversity leads to less religious involvement. Consequently, a cardinal prediction of 
religious market theory is not supported. However, the presumption of secularisation 
theory that involvement in religious monopolies is always higher than in diverse 
religious markets does not hold for the United States.  
 For the relationship between the number of congregations in a county and 
membership levels, a different somewhat different picture emerges. In counties with 
more congregations, membership levels are higher. Although the influence of the 
number of congregations is positive, this influence does not fully counter the corrosive 
influence on membership of doctrinal diversity. Numerical strength compensates only 
somewhat for the loss in theological plausibility. The effects of religious doctrines are 
stronger than those of the number of congregations; the variance explained by 
religious doctrines is greater than the variance explained by the number of 
congregations. Additionally, the sheave of the parameter of religious doctrines is 
higher than that of the number of congregations (see Appendix C Table 2). 
 Both secularisation theory and religious market theory should be adjusted or 
need new auxiliary assumptions, because the relationship between diversity and 
involvement does not follow a linear path. More religious diversity does not result in 
only declining or increasing levels of religious involvement. The relationship between 
the two is more complex. Sometimes the association between diversity and 
involvement is positive, in other situations it is negative. However, and this is 
important, for most counties the relationship between religious diversity and religious 
involvement in the United States is negative: the more religious doctrines present in 
the religious market of US counties, the lower membership levels are. However, the 
opposite applies for the number of congregations.   
 The ambiguous relationship between religious diversity and religious 
involvement was the starting point for this chapter. The inconclusiveness about the 
direction of this relationship is due to indistinctness about religious diversity and the 
consequential methodological issues. By distinguishing between various forms of 
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religious diversity and using more appropriate measurements thereof, we hope to have 
contributed towards a clearer understanding about the relationship between diversity 
and involvement. It seems that some forms of religious diversity – lots of substantially 
different doctrines – causes religious involvement to decline. However, other forms of 
religious diversity – denominations similar in creed, aiming to serve the same 
consumer segment – seem to compensate somewhat for the influences corrosive to 
religiosity. 
Religious market theory and secularization theory should be adjusted for 
religious involvement in the United States when keeping in mind the puzzling finding 
that religious involvement increases as the number of religious doctrines increase until 
all of the three established US religious doctrines are present (i.e. Mainline 
Protestantism, Evangelicalism, and Catholicism). Involvement is lower when more 
(exotic) religious doctrines are present in the religious market next to the familiar 
religious establishment. The general trend is that more religious doctrines result in 
lower levels of involvement and more congregations in higher levels of involvement. 
It seems that competition between religious doctrines boosts religious involvement as 
long as this competition is contained within the religious oligopoly. That is, between 
religious doctrines already widely common in the United States: Mainline 
Protestantism, Evangelicalism, and Catholicism. When more exotic religious doctrines 
enter the market, religious plausibility crumbles and involvement drops. 
In general, this chapter shows that even in the United States where religion is 
still strong, cracks are appearing in the religious canopy where multiple religious firms 
are competing for adherents. This is in line with recent individual level data (Lugo et 
al. 2008).  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Roman Catholics in the Netherlands: 
Effects of external and internal diversity on church attendance30 
 
 
 
The religious market theory faces the anomaly that predominantly Catholic societies 
have relatively, though not uniform, high levels of church attendance. To address this 
incongruity, the current chapter examines three amendments of religious market 
theory. Testing the theory and two of its amendments, it determines the extent to which 
and under what conditions religious diversity, both within the church and external to 
it, affects church going among Roman Catholics in the Netherlands. This chapter has 
several innovative aspects. First, religious diversity is measured at the local level, thus 
preventing religious heterogeneity at the national level from masking local religious 
homogeneity. Second, internal and external diversity are examined, the former being 
the number of ‘firms’ offering different religious doctrines and the latter being the 
different types of offerings within the various religious ‘firms’. Third, in analysing 
diversity, it incorporates the proportion of secular residents. After all, religious bodies 
no longer compete only with one another, they also contend with secular alternatives. 
Using a multiple-source dataset, this chapter’s findings reveal that both greater 
external diversity and more diversity of religious services offered reduce the 
percentage of Catholics that attend mass. However, having a more secular 
surrounding and offering greater numbers of services increases the proportion of 
Catholics attending. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Sociologists have proposed the religious market theory to explain why the United 
States deviates from the modernization-makes-for-secularization paradigm (Stark and 
Bainbridge 1985). The general proposition of religious market theory reads:  
 
To the degree that a religious economy is competitive and diverse overall levels of religious 
participation will tend to be high. Conversely, to the degree that a religious economy is 
                                                
30 This chapter is submitted to an international journal for the sociology of religion. 
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monopolised by one or two state-supported firms, overall levels of participation will tend to be 
low (Stark 1998; Stark and Iannaccone 1994: 233). 
 
After its introduction, religious market theory became the ‘new paradigm’ (Warner 
1993). The theory was soon elaborated to elucidate differences between countries in 
the religious involvement of their populations (Stark and Finke 2000). Despite or 
rather because of this expansion, religious market theory now faces several difficulties. 
Besides, Lechner (1996) argued that religion competes not only with other creeds but 
with secular options as well. Bruce (2002) linked the revival of religion not to 
increased religious supply but to rapid modernization and increased ethnic 
identification.  
Among these difficulties there are two nagging anomalies, one regarding 
Catholic countries and another for the Netherlands, a religiously mixed country. If 
religious diversity fosters religious participation, as the religious market theory holds, 
countries that are predominantly Catholic should exhibit relatively low and uniform 
levels of religious participation. They, however, do not. Religious participation rates 
vary and quite often are high in Catholic-dominated countries (Chaves and Cann 
1992). This is one major anomaly facing market theory. Another is the religiously 
mixed Netherlands, where church membership and attendance has been dropping for 
decades for all denominations, despite the diversity offered (Lechner 1996). 
In the face of these anomalies, this chapter inquires into the effects of religious 
diversity on church going among Roman Catholics in the Netherlands. Our general 
research question reads:  
To what extent and under what conditions does religious diversity influence  
rates of religious involvement of Roman Catholics among parishes in 
contemporary Dutch society?  
 
While neither religious market theory nor secularization theory is advocated, this 
chapter draws on religious market theory to derive hypotheses at the level of Catholic 
parishes in the Netherlands. Before it does so, the Catholic anomaly and the Dutch 
case are re-examined, and an additional assumption is explored regarding the effect of 
the degree of secularity in the environment on religious involvement. Then, religious 
market theory, which came up with three amendments, is clarified by reviewing the 
different attempts to address the Catholic anomaly. The first and second amendments 
concern the specification of religious involvement, which is the phenomenon to be 
explained. The third amendment concerns a shift in the form of religious diversity – 
the phenomenon supposedly accounting for involvement.31  
                                                
31 Forms of religious diversity do not necessarily have to relate to each other nor do they have to be 
interchangeable. Therefore, we do not speak of measures for religious diversity. This gives the 
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A general criticism is made of the tendency for measures of religious diversity 
to be pitched at too high a level. The hypotheses derived from religious market theory, 
including its amendments and elaborations, are tested using Dutch data for Roman 
Catholic parishes in 2003 and 2004.  
 
5.2 Theoretical background 
5.2.1 The Catholic anomaly and the Dutch case 
In its original form, the Catholic anomaly invokes data for Western countries from the 
1981 and 1983 World Values Survey. To examine whether this anomaly still holds, 
Table 1 presents pertinent figures from the 2000 European Values Survey. 
 
Table 1: Religious composition in traditionally Protestant, Catholic, and mixed societies 
              and church attendance of at least once a week for Protestants (left panel) and 
              Catholics (right panel) in percentages, 2000.              
  
 
Secular 
 
 
Protestant 
Protestant 
church 
attendance 
  
 
Secular 
  
 
Catholic 
 
Catholic church 
attendance 
Denmark 10.1 87.5 1.9 Austria 12.5 81.3 27.3 
Finland  11.7 85.5 4.1 Belgium 35.7 55.7 25.7 
Sweden 25.3 71.4 4.3 France 42.6 53.9 12.8 
    Ireland   6.9 89.2 70.9 
    Italy 17.9 81.6 48.0 
    Portugal 11.4 85.9 41.3 
    Spain 16.9 81.5 29.7 
Netherlands 55.0 17.8 41.1 Netherlands 55.0 22.1 19.0 
Germany 39.7 36.1 11.1 Germany 39.7 22.0 26.8 
                        Source: EVS 2000. 
 
From Table 1, we see that the religious diversity hypothesis of religious market theory 
holds for Protestants in Protestant nations and for Protestants in the religiously mixed 
Netherlands. However, the religious diversity hypothesis does not hold for Catholics in 
Catholic nations or for Catholics in the Netherlands, where members of this faith 
display low religious involvement. Hence, there is an anomaly not only for countries 
that are predominantly Catholic but also for Catholics in at least one religiously mixed 
country.  
Looking at other countries, in Italy about 80 per cent of the public is at least 
nominally Catholic, and of these Catholics somewhat less than half attend mass at least 
once a week. This is far too much religious participation to fit the ‘new paradigm’ 
(Diotallevi 2002: 142). Scoring highest is the religiously homogenous Irish Republic, 
where 71 per cent of Catholics attend religious services at least once a week. Of 
course, the religious market theory might explain this devoutness in relation to the 
                                                                                                                                                   
opportunity to raise new questions about the relation between religious diversity and religious 
involvement.  
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violent situation in Northern Ireland. But then the argument shifts from peaceful 
competition within a religious economy to violent competition and ethno-political 
tension involving a neighbouring state. 
Zooming in on France, Table 1 shows that a little more than half of the French 
regard themselves as Catholic, yet only some 13 per cent of these regularly attend 
religious services. This low attendance rate for France is surprising in light of religious 
market theory, since this is a country where Church and State were separated long ago, 
presumably spurring a rise of diversity which by now should have made the Catholic 
Church in the country more vigorous.  
The religiously mixed Netherlands presents another remarkable case. Catholic 
attendance at religious services is higher in the Netherlands than in France but lower 
than in the other Catholic monopolies in the table. Additionally, in the Netherlands, as 
in France, a relatively high level of secularity among the general population is paired 
with low church attendance among Catholics (Table 1). 
 
5.2.2 Recent Dutch religious history 
Recent Dutch history presents other interesting and worrying developments for 
religious market theory. The Dutch population is religiously mixed, with a large 
proportion of inhabitants unaffiliated (Dekker, de Hart, and Peters 1997; Becker and 
de Hart 2006). In the post-war period, Dutch church membership and attendance 
declined (Lechner 1996: 253). Table 2 shows this religious downturn, which is 
particularly evident among Catholics. 
 
Table 2: Religious composition of the Netherlandsa in percentages and percentage 
              of regular attendance (at least once every two weeks) per religious group. 
 1958 1966 1979 1996 2004  1966 1970 1979 1996 2004 
Church 
membership 
     Church 
attendance 
     
Catholic 42 30 29 21 18 Catholic 86 71 49 27 19 
Dutch 
Reformed 
23 18 17 14 6 Dutch 
Reformed 
49 49 38 46 46 
Re-reformed 8 13 8 8 5 Re-reformed 95 89 81 68 63 
Non-Christian 3 4 3 4 7       
Unaffiliated 24 35 43 53 64       
             Source: SCP 2006 (for 1958, 1970 and 2004) & GIN 1996 (for 1966, 1979 and 1996). 
a: two-step question. 
 
According to Lechner (2008), in an attempt to halt their losses, Catholic churches in 
the Netherlands adopted more liberal teachings, but were opposed by policies in 
Rome. Concurrently, secular organizations stepped up their provision of health and 
leisure services, competing with Catholic offerings. The welfare state thus gradually 
replaced the Catholic pillar of society (Lechner 2008: 125).  
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Lechner (1996: 257) further notes the apparent lack of any large unsatisfied 
demand in the Netherlands. About 48 per cent of the Dutch regard themselves as at 
least somewhat believing and about 40 percent claims church membership. Yet in 
modern societies, amidst diverse religious options, people may choose to have no 
religion at all. Religious firms would likely compete for these unaffiliated individuals. 
Thus, it seems that churches must compete not only against one another but against 
secular options as well.  
If the secular segment draws people out of the churches, the churches may draw 
people away from the secular segment as well. Hence, religious market theory might 
also work in the secularized settings of the Netherlands. If this is so, ‘depillarization’ 
would fuel competition, resulting in increased religious participation. However, during 
the depillarization period, up until today, leaving the church became quite common in 
the Netherlands (de Graaf, Need, and Ultee 2004). Especially among the younger 
generations, secularist thought advanced in the Netherlands. Dutch young people 
detach themselves from religion despite the country’s rich religious supply. This 
constitutes the Dutch anomaly. 
 
5.2.3 Three amendments to religious market theory 
Extending the religious market theory are three amendments, which have been 
proposed by proponents of the theory.32 These amendments can be regarded as add-ons 
to the general proposition, because any general theory, as religious market theory 
claims to be, requires additional assumptions to yield predictions.  
Until now, most studies on religious involvement have investigated church 
membership and attendance. Sometimes a third form of involvement is added, priest 
ordination rates. If market theory is taken stringently it should hold for all of these 
forms of religious involvement. Later on in this paragraph, it will come clear that 
attendance is of primary importance. The first amendment relates to churchly activity. 
According to Stark (1992), for 45 nations, the level of Catholic commitment varies 
inversely to the proportion of Catholics in the population. However, Stark gives no 
overall rates of religious involvement. Instead, he measures religious commitment in 
terms of the number of priests per 10,000 Catholics. Therefore, the first amendment 
reads: The more diverse a religious economy is, the higher priest ordination rates will 
be. However, this breaks with measurement of religious involvement in terms of 
church membership and attendance (e.g. Stark and Finke 2000). Moreover, Stark’s 
                                                
32 After Lechner (1996) showed that religious market theory did not apply to the Dutch case, Stark and 
Iannaccone (1996) stated that religious firms serving as organizational vehicles for social conflict 
boost attendance even if the religious market lacks diversity. However, this amendment is ad hoc and 
not applicable to the current situation in the Netherlands. Besides, the Dutch have no record of violent 
religious conflict in the 19th and 20th century. 
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(1992) findings seem at odds with other research. Seidler (1979), for example, found 
for 131 US dioceses a lower percentage of Roman Catholics to be associated with a 
higher resignation rate among Roman Catholic priests. In fact, many Western nations 
have a shortage of priests, resulting in the merging of parishes. Indeed, callings into 
the priesthood have become so infrequent as to diminish their value as a measure in 
contemporary comparative research. In short, the shift from measures of overall 
participation to ordination rates of priests would seem an evasion (Stark 1992). 
Ordination rates give weak information at best about the level of commitment of the 
average Catholic. Hence, we do not pursue this line of research and in our tests we 
utilize instead the percentage of Roman Catholics that attends mass.  
Another way of absorbing the Catholic anomaly is by stating that religious 
monopolies, including Catholic ones, always manage to appear vastly more popular 
and pervasive than they are (Stark and Iannaccone 1994: 235). A major effect of the 
withdrawal of state support to monopoly faiths in Europe and Latin America may in 
fact have been to lay bare widespread apathy rather than to reflect a decline in piety. 
As such, large gaps may exist between membership of a church and attendance at 
divine services. The implicit argument here is that one should examine not 
membership rates, but attendance rates in order to rigorously test the theory. Thus, 
while the religious canopy might seem strong, appearances may deceive, and 
underneath may lurk widespread indifference to the monopoly faith (Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994: 235). Clearly, from Table 1 this does not apply to most Catholic 
monopolies. Only Spain and Austria are countries where apathy is perhaps 
widespread, as membership in those societies is quite high and attendance low. The 
research line investigating church attendance rates of Roman Catholics thus deserves 
continuation. To this end, we formulate for the purpose of testing the following 
amendment to religious market theory: To the degree that a religious economy lacks 
religious diversity, overall levels of attendance will be low whereas membership rates 
will be high.  
The third amendment elaborates the idea of competition. It states that the 
Roman Catholic Church’s internal diversity generates a relatively high degree of 
participation in situations which lack religious diversity outside of Catholicism 
(Diotallevi 2002: 149). Indeed, the hierarchical structure of the church leaves room for 
internal variation without undermining cohesiveness. Numerous orders coexist within 
the Catholic Church, in a structure which functions as a counterpart to the sects and 
schisms that have been the major source of innovation within Protestantism 
(Iannaccone 1991).33 So variation in religious involvement could perhaps be explained 
                                                
33 The Catholic faith spans many societies, and church leaders offer various styles of worship, 
providing adherents different divine services. However, this argument has never been followed up 
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by a greater or lesser internal diversity of the national Roman Catholic Church. Thus, 
the third amendment of religious market theory reads: To the degree that a religious 
economy is uniformly Catholic, overall levels of involvement will be high if 
Catholicism maintains a high degree of internal diversity.  
May, as amendments of religious market theory indicate, variations in the 
religious involvement of Dutch Roman Catholics be explained by differences in 
internal and external diversity? Based on the second and third amendments to religious 
market theory, hypotheses should be spelled out positing a positive relationship 
between religious diversity and religious participation, as well as under which 
particular conditions this relationship may be stronger. 
 
5.2.4 More elaborations  
All of these amendments may be off-target. It is neither logically necessary nor 
empirically likely that religious diversity at the national level accords with religious 
diversity within a lower unit of analysis. Finke, Guest and Stark (1991: 207) said as 
much without pursuing the implications of this point. A thesis for further research on 
the Catholic anomaly states that an individual’s religious involvement is more likely to 
be influenced by the religious diversity in that person’s local environment than by the 
overall diversity of the country. A society may well be religiously heterogeneous 
overall but at the same time locally homogeneous. This creates an illusion of a 
religiously diverse society, whereas the reality is a patchwork of local religious 
monopolies, thereby overestimating religious diversity at the country level. Table 3, 
splits the Netherlands into provinces and nicely illustrates this point.34 The findings 
displayed indicate first that in provinces with a relatively high proportion of either 
Catholics or Protestants, religious service attendance rates are higher than average. 
Second, where more people are secular, a core of ardent believers remains, indicated 
by low membership rates and high percentages of regular attendance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
with figures showing priests or other elements within the Catholic Church catering to a special market 
segment (Iannaccone 1991).  
34 An attentive reader may remark that the percentages for Catholic attendance in the North and for 
Protestant attendance in the South are based on very small numbers. That is true but the small numbers 
illustrate the point we want to drive home: local homogeneity may go together with national diversity.  
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Table 3: Religious composition (two-step question) by Dutch provinces and regular  
              attendance of Catholics (left panel) and Protestants (right panel) in percentages. 
  
Catholic 
 
N 
Catholic 
Church 
attendancea 
 
N 
 
Protestant 
 
N 
Protestant 
Church 
attendancea 
 
N 
 
Secul
ar 
 
N  
Netherlands:           
North: 4.9 19 21.1 4 22.6 88 42.0 37 72.5 282 
    - Groningen 3.0 5 20.0  1 20.7 35 40.0 14 76.3 129 
    - Friesland 4.2 3 0.0  0 35.2 25 60.0 15 60.6 43 
    - Drenthe 7.4  11 27.3 3 18.8 28 18.6 8 73.8 110 
           
Central: 20.8 224 14.7 33 24.8 267 41.1 110 54.4 586 
    - Overijssel 23.5 71 21.1  15 34.1 103 51.4 53 42.4 128 
    - Gelderland 24.0 107 14.2  15 20.9 93 41.9 39 55.1 245 
    - Utrecht 12.3 30 0.0  0 19.8 48 23.0 11 67.9 165 
    - Flevoland 18.4 16 18.8 3 26.4 23 30.4 7 55.2 48 
           
Coast: 12.4 132 10.6 14 15.9 170 33.5 57 71.7 764 
    - North Holland 13.7 55 9.1 5 7.0 28 21.4 6 79.4 319 
    - South Holland 10.4 60 11.6 7 20.3 117 34.2 40 69.2 398 
    - Zeeland 19.1 17 11.8 2 28.1 25 32.0 8 52.8 47 
           
South: 53.5 382 10.7 41 5.2 37 32.4 12 41.3 295 
    - North Brabant 50.2 265 9.0 24 6.4 34 35.3 12 43.4 229 
    - Limburg 62.9 117 14.6  17 1.6 3 0.0 0 35.5 66 
National average 20.8  13.1  19.9  32.4  59.3  
N=3,243 (of which 1319 are church members).          Source: Dutch Family Survey ‘98, ‘03. 
a: at least once a week.       
 
Using the same strategy of moving to a lower level of analysis, Hamberg and 
Pettersson (1994) found that in Swedish municipalities with a higher degree of 
religious  
diversity, religious participation was somewhat higher, though still quite low 
compared to municipalities with a lower degree of religious diversity. In this context, 
we point out that in US counties without a dominant denomination, the percentage of 
church members is lower (Kilpinen 2003). These findings challenge religious market 
theory, but also imply that there is room for a market theory of religion pertaining to 
local markets. For that reason, the present chapter does not compare countries but 
rather examines religious diversity at a level commensurate with the religious options 
available to individuals, which are not the societal or provincial level but the parish 
and municipal level.  
Furthermore, we continue on Lechner’s (1996, 2008) idea that the degree of 
secularity affects the religious market. By specifying this idea, hypotheses may be 
formulated about the influence of the percentage of secular people on religious 
involvement. In a modern society like the Netherlands, with a high degree of 
functional differentiation, it may be that religious traditions not only compete against 
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one another but against secular options as well, due to overlapping functions like 
provision of education, health and social care. 
This chapter examines the percentage of attending Catholics at the level of 
Catholic parishes to determine whether Dutch Catholics fit the original religious 
market proposition, or match one of the religious market amendments. In so doing, the 
theoretical contribution made is threefold: (1) the second and third amendments are 
moulded into testable hypotheses, (2) religious diversity is measured at a relevant 
level, and (3) the degree of secularity is taken into account.  
 
5.3 One general proposition, seven hypotheses 
We start from the general proposition of religious market theory, which holds that 
overall levels of religious participation tend to be higher where a religious economy is 
more diverse. We derive seven hypotheses from this proposition. Two of these specify 
conditions under which certain effects will be stronger. So, apart from five hypotheses 
involving additive effects we have two pertaining to cross-level interactions. Figure 1 
summarizes our seven hypotheses.  
 
5.3.1 Two hypotheses on external diversity 
Until now, when it came to the features of the religious market, the focus has been on 
religious diversity as measured by a large market share of a single firm. This 
measurement is flawed for a theory that stresses supply rather than demand, as it 
pertains to satisfied religious demand rather than to religious options offered to 
individuals. We focus on the supply side of the market: the number of different 
religious suppliers. Even when one religion holds a large segment of a local market, 
the mere presence of other religions keeps the dominant firm on its toes (Finke, Guest, 
and Stark 1996). Presence of other religions forces religious suppliers to be more 
responsive and efficient, which in turn results in a relatively high participation rate 
(Finke 1997). Research has shown that US Catholics and clerics are more vigorous in 
a religiously mixed setting (Stark and Mc Cann 1993). Even a small religious body 
contributes to available religious options, if it propagates an alternate doctrine. The 
higher the number of different religious firms, the higher the participation rates of 
Catholics. 
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Figure 1: Scheme of shifts in explanations of religious diversity and religious involvement,  
               along with forms of diversity and involvement (those used in this chapter are  
  indicated by *). The numerals correspond with the relevant hypothesis. 
   
Religious competition and diversity:  Religious involvement: 
    - Herfindahl index  
    - Catholic diversity (Roman Catholic faiths) (1)* 
    - Attendance level of Roman      
      Catholics (% attending)* 
    - Non-Catholic diversity (non-Roman Catholic faiths) (2)*     - Church membership  
    - % secular people in a municipality (6)*      - Ordination of priests 
- Internal diversity split into       
             -Quantity of services (3)*   
             -Quality of services (4)*   
 - Internal diversity (5)*  
 - % secular people in a municipality (7)* 
  
 
Now, we argue that there are two kinds of external Catholic diversity, both of which 
result in higher attendance rates among Roman Catholics: diversity of creeds within 
the Catholic faith and diversity of religions other than Catholicism. Regarding the 
former, the Roman Catholic Church is not the only supplier of the Catholic faith in the 
Netherlands. Thus, diversity of doctrines within the Catholic church is taken into 
account as a form of religious diversity. Even if in a local area there is a Catholic 
monopoly there still may be external diversity if people can choose between variations 
of the Catholic religion. These alternatives in the Netherlands are the Catholic 
Apostolic Church, the Old Catholic Church and the Free Catholic Church.35  
According to the external diversity hypothesis, the presence of these Catholic 
churches should result in a higher participation rate of Roman Catholics, as these 
creeds differ from the Roman Catholic creed. We add a rider to this hypothesis. The 
theological discord between the Roman Catholic faith and these other Catholic faiths is 
limited because they all are Catholic in nature. Thus, religious options remain confined 
and therefore will appeal to only a few niches, leaving people with other religious 
needs unserved. Hence, our Catholic diversity hypothesis reads:  
1. Greater Catholic diversity within the boundaries of a Roman Catholic parish 
will increase the percentage of attending Roman Catholics within that parish, 
but it will do so marginally. 
 
According to religious market theory, religious diversity is necessary to satisfy 
individuals’ distinct religious demands. Since religious needs are diverse by nature, 
people will seek different versions of faith (Stark 1999). Therefore, religious market 
theory predicts that in a religious monopoly, religious involvement will be relatively 
                                                
35 Catholic immigrant churches are not examined as a separate branch of Catholicism as they are 
virtually non-existent in the Netherlands. Catholic immigrants attend native parishes. 
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low (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). The majority or large minorities have other religious 
needs, which cannot be fulfilled by the established church.  
 If people are able to choose a religion according to their needs, this will result 
in more ardent adherents per religious firm (Stark and Bainbridge 1996). Thus, the 
presence of non-Catholic creeds will increase church attendance of Roman Catholics 
more strongly than the presence of variations of Catholicism. As other non-Catholic 
faiths enter the religious market, individuals enjoy a broader variety of religious 
options. So, people who adhere to the Roman-Catholic faith are likely to be more 
ardent believers as they leave other options aside. As the average member is a more 
fervent follower, average attendance levels will increase. Weak believers and people 
without a true affinity for the Roman-Catholic faith will, according to their needs if 
any, join other religious traditions.  
Research shortly before and after World War II explained the high birth rate of 
Catholics in the Netherlands, compared with that in Germany and Belgium, by the 
higher intensity of religious fervour among Dutch Catholics. The mixture of Catholics 
and Protestants in the Netherlands was said to increase religious feelings and 
contribute to church attendance (van Heek 1954). This is in line with the religious 
market theory and suggests that the attendance level of Roman Catholics could well be 
higher in religiously diverse settings. Consequently, our external diversity hypothesis 
reads:  
2. The more external diversity of non-Catholic faiths a Roman Catholic parish 
has within its boundaries, the higher the percentage of Roman Catholics within 
that parish attending church services.  
 
5.3.2 Three hypotheses on internal diversity 
The possibility of internal diversity as an explanation of relatively high attendance 
rates among Roman Catholics has been hinted at, but not tested (e.g. Chaves and Cann 
1992). A key aspect of internal diversity is the number of religious services offered 
(Hamberg and Pettersson 1997). The rationale is straightforward. The more 
opportunities to attend a religious service, the higher the attendance will be, other 
things being equal.36 So the quantity hypothesis reads:  
3. The larger the number of divine services of a Roman Catholic parish, the 
higher the percentage of Roman Catholics attending within that parish. 
  
The number of divine services is but one type of internal diversity within the Roman 
Catholic Church. Apart from the quantity of divine services, there is the ‘quality’ of 
                                                
36 It also follows that although the number of divine services held is higher, the number of people 
attending per divine service drops. 
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services. There are regular (Eucharist) masses, but also Word and Communion 
services, or combinations of these. Some parishes offer one type of divine service 
only, while others celebrate a range. If a monopoly religion offers some variety, it will 
attract a wider array of people. “Competition within the Catholic church may substitute 
for competition between Catholicism and other denominations” (Iannaccone 1991: 170 
emphasis original). In other words, a Catholic monopoly may mask a diversity of 
religious options within the Catholic faith (Finke, Guest, and Stark 1996). Our quality 
hypothesis on internal diversity reads:  
4. The more different types of services a Roman Catholic parish offers, the 
higher the percentage of attending Roman Catholics within that parish. 37    
 
More external diversity presumably leads to higher levels of involvement because 
individuals can choose the religion that best suits their needs and clergy will be more 
vigorous in their efforts to attract and bind potential adherents. This initial proposition 
of religious market theory can be combined with assumptions on internal diversity. 
Due to its diversity people may find Catholicism the most appealing tradition to satisfy 
their religious needs. Where other variations of the faith are at hand, people within the 
Roman Catholic Church would be relatively zealous, since less ardent individuals 
would opt for other versions of the faith, if any. Yet, within Catholicism people might 
feel that their satisfaction is still sub-optimal. Some fine-tuning may be required to 
achieve a full fulfilment of their needs. If the Catholic Church also offered diverse 
services to its adherents, religious involvement might be more optimal. In short, the 
effect of the external diversity hypothesis (H2) is stronger under the condition of a 
richer internal supply. Therefore, the cross-level interaction hypothesis on internal-
external diversity reads:  
5. When a parish has greater internal diversity, the positive influence of non-
Catholic diversity on the percentage of Roman Catholics attending church 
within a parish is stronger. 
 
5.3.3 Two hypotheses on secular surroundings 
The existence of considerable variation in individual religious tastes implies that 
religious involvement is highest in a diverse market (Stark and Finke 2000). In 
response to vigorous marketing, Roman Catholics will attend services more often. We 
                                                
37 Some may argue that hypotheses 3 and 4 suffer from reverse causation. That may be, however, we 
derive hypotheses following theory. To check the relevance of this point, we examined divine services 
in 2003 and 2004 and the number of attendees in 2003. Using cross tabulations and correlation, 
findings show that the relationship between divine services in 2003 and 2004 is 0.935 (Pearson’s corr. 
significant at p<0.001). However, no significant relation was found between the percentage of 
attending Catholics in 2003 and services in 2004 (corr. 0.041). Hence, we do not consider reverse 
causation a serious issue here. 
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argue that recruitment efforts are higher in religious markets that face not only 
competition among diverse religious firms but also the external threat of secularism. 
Stark (1997) states that every individual is inherently religious. That said, it is still 
reasonable to assume that people will choose no religion at all when faced with 
unsatisfactory or few religious options. Or perhaps secular options will be available 
that better suit their needs. Then the remainder of people who are religiously involved 
are likely to be more fervent adherents to their faith. Less zealous or marginal 
believers will not have joined at all or will have dropped out first (Iannaccone 1994).  
 Van Heek (1954: 103) showed that geographically isolated municipalities in the 
Netherlands display a remarkable religious élan and resistance to secularisation. But 
overall in the Netherlands fervent religious adherents have a tendency to become 
marginal adherents and marginal adherents to become non-members (te Grotenhuis 
1999). This leaves a group of zealous followers of faith. Hence, our secular 
surroundings hypothesis reads:  
6. The more secular the municipality of a Roman Catholic parish, the higher 
the percentage of attending Roman Catholics within that parish. 
 
The ‘threat’ of people dropping out or switching to another denomination forces 
religious suppliers to be more responsive and efficient. Thus, a diverse market within a 
context of secularity should result in more innovative and fiercer recruitment efforts 
than a diverse religious market only. We combine the external diversity hypothesis 
(H2) and the hypothesis on secular surroundings (H6) to argue that non-Catholic 
diversity increases Catholic attendance even more in environments that are more 
secular. This joint effect hypothesis between secular surroundings and external 
diversity reads:  
7. In more secular surroundings, the positive influence of external diversity on 
the percentage of Roman Catholics attending mass within a parish is stronger. 
 
5.4 Data and measurements 
5.4.1 Multiple-source data 
In line with tables 1, 2 and 3 we used data from the Social Cultural Planning Agency, 
‘God in the Netherlands’, the Dutch Family Survey 1998 & 2003, and the World 
Values Survey (file WVS 2006) for our initial analyses. Our main analyses are carried 
out combining different data sources. As such, this is a multiple-source data chapter 
with all data referring to Roman Catholic parishes in 2003 and 2004. 
The data on church attendance in parishes were collected by KASKI (Institute 
for Applied Research on Religion). These data were supplemented with 2004 data 
from the IKGN (Inventarisation of Church Buildings in the Netherlands). The latter 
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data pertain to the numbers and names of churches in municipalities. We also added 
data from the 1971 Census on the percentage of non-affiliated persons in a 
municipality (Naelten 1980). To examine whether secularity may be inferred from 
1971 to examine a 2003-2004 situation, provincial data of the NIPO 2000 sweep was 
used to determine if the 1971 census data was suitable. 
The dataset analysed here pertains to 1,062 Roman Catholic parishes in the 
Netherlands, examined in 2003 and 2004. This accounts for 70 per cent of the total 
1,525 Roman Catholic parishes in the Netherlands in 2003 and 73 per cent of the 1,463 
Catholic parishes in 2004. Members of the parish councils collected the data during 
two observation weekends. The 1,062 parishes were located in 390 municipalities.  
   
5.4.2 Percentage of Catholics attending 
Data for church attendance in the parishes are available for two weekends in 2003 and 
for two weekends in 2004. For our analyses we calculated the average of the two 
weekends in each year. Percentages were computed by dividing the absolute number 
of attending persons as counted at the door by the number of members as given in the 
parish register. By averaging the number of attending Roman Catholics, we filtered out 
random variation.  
 The data has two drawbacks. First, it is not possible with these data to 
determine how Catholic attendance is spread across the divine services offered and 
whether individuals attended multiple times. Hence, to control for systematic 
variation, analyses were carried out on one week only. No considerable differences 
from analyses presented here were found.38 
The mean percentage of attending Roman Catholics is 10.01 with a standard 
deviation of 6.55. Approximately 1 per cent (21 parishes in either 2003 or 2004) were 
outliers, based on the distance to the mean of the normal distribution. For statistical 
reasons these parishes got a maximum score of 41.59 per cent. Table 4 displays these 
descriptive statistics as well as those for the other variables to be discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
38 For analyses, see appendix D Table 1. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of variables. 
 Range Mean St. deviation 
Parish-year level variables:a    
- Percentage of attending Catholics  0.64 – 41.59 10.01 6.55 
- Internal diversity     
    - Quantity of services 0.50 – 17.00  2.11 1.32 
    - Quality of services    
           - No other service offered 0/1 0.44 0.50 
           - At least one other divine service 0/1 0.56 0.50 
    
Parish level variables:b    
- External diversity    
    - Non-Catholic diversity    
           - No other 0/1 0.38 0.49 
           - One other faith 0/1 0.16 0.37 
           - More than one other faith 0/1 0.45 0.50 
    - Catholic diversity    
           - No other 0/1 0.64 0.48 
           - At least one other Catholic faith 0/1 0.36 0.48 
    
Municipality level variables:c    
- Percentage secular 0.28 – 56.52 15.13 13.70 
- Urbanization 0.00 – 4.00  1.48 1.21 
          Source:  KASKI 2003, 2004 & NIPO 2000. 
a= averages and standard deviations calculated      
over all 1,062 parishes in 2003 and 2004 (N=2,124). 
b= averages and standard deviations calculated    
over all 1,062 parishes. 
c= averages and standard deviations calculated over all 390 municipalities. 
 
5.4.3 External religious diversity 
This chapter specifies religious diversity as presence of religious alternatives.39 We 
take the number of different religious doctrines at the parish level as external diversity. 
This external diversity is split into two categories: non-Catholic and Catholic. These 
refer not to the sheer number of religious firms, but respectively to the number of 
denominations with different doctrines (those outside Catholicism) and the number 
with similar doctrines (those within Catholicism). The measures were ‘no other’, ‘one 
other faith’, ‘more than one other faith’. 
 As Table 4 shows, there is quite some variety in whether a Roman-Catholic 
parish faces competition with other, non-Catholic faiths. Parishes without competition 
from other religious creeds make up 38 per cent. Of the remaining 62 per cent, 16 per 
cent competes with just one non-Catholic faith, and 45 per cent of the Roman-Catholic 
parishes compete with two or more other religious doctrines. For Catholic diversity, 
                                                
39 The literature has made much of methodological critiques of standard tests of religious market 
theory. Olson (1999) showed that the association between a large body of adherents (e.g. proportion 
Catholics) in an area and the overall proportion of religious members is for mathematical reasons 
positive. We accept this point and use measures free of methodological failings. We do not apply the 
Herfindahl index, see the critique in Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002). 
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the table shows that 36 per cent of the Roman-Catholic parishes have one or more 
other variation of the Catholic faith within their parish boundaries, which leaves 64 per 
cent having no competition from other Catholic creeds within their boundaries.  
 
5.4.4 Internal religious diversity 
Whereas external diversity refers to a more macro level, there is also religious 
diversity at the denominational level. Hamberg and Petterson (2002: 96) call this 
diversity of the religious supply. This internal diversity – the variety of religious 
services supplied – might explain why Catholics display relatively high levels of 
religious participation (e.g. Chaves and Cann 1992). We divide internal diversity and 
the number of divine services for 2003 and 2004 into the total supply of divine 
services and the variety thereof.  
The ‘quantity of services’ is measured as the total number of divine services 
held in two weeks. As Table 4 shows, the quantity of services ranges from one service 
in four weeks (0.05 indicates half a service per two weeks) to seventeen services in 
two weeks. The ‘quality of services’ is, due to skewness, divided into two categories: 
‘no other’, in which case the parish offers only the standard divine service, and ‘one or 
more other divine service’, in which case a Roman-Catholic parish offers at least one 
service that deviates from their standard service. The former makes up 44 per cent of 
parishes, whereas for the latter 56 per cent of the parishes offers at least one service 
different from their generic mass.  
 
5.4.5 Secular surroundings and urbanization 
Data on the percentage of secular people in the 2003–04 period was available only at 
the provincial level, not for the individual municipalities. We therefore supplemented 
our dataset with 1971 census data, which did include the municipal level figures. We 
found it appropriate to do so because the correlation between the 1971 census and the 
2000 provincial data is relatively high, as we show below.  
 Table 5 presents the percentages of secular people in the Dutch provinces and 
the provincial rankings. Obviously the percentage of secular people in 2000 is 
considerably higher than that in 1971. The relationship expressed in a Pearson’s 
coefficient amounts to 0.824, which implies that the order of ranking in both sources is 
quite similar. The 2000 provincial data thus approximate the data for 1971 quite well. 
For that reason our analyses use the 1971 municipality data from the census. Though 
some provinces shifted in rank, we have possible explanations for these deviations. 
Flevoland started out as an agricultural province. Nowadays its population is largely 
made up of commuters, who resemble Dutch city dwellers. The explanation for the 
shift in the ranking of Zeeland is similar. After the construction of the ‘Delta works’ 
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many Dutch migrated to Zeeland. A possible explanation for Friesland’s fall in rank is 
the fact that the province was traditionally Reformed, and these were the first 
denominations to experience declining rates of church attendance and membership. 
Therefore, Friesland was probably already relatively highly secularized in 1971, only 
waiting to be surpassed by other provinces. 
   
Table 5: Percentages of secular people per province, following 1971 census data  
              and the 2000 survey, and their respective rank in secularity. 
 1971 census ranking 2000 NIPO survey ranking Change in rank 
Groningen 29.14 2 66.83 2 0 
Friesland 25.68 3 42.17 8 -5 
Drenthe 24.60 4 53.99 4 0 
Overijssel 13.23 8 38.44 9 -1 
Gelderland 9.50 9 37.25 10 -1 
Utrecht 15.08 7 47.05 7 0 
North Holland 31.14 1 59.48 3 -2 
South Holland 16.79 6 51.18 5 -1 
Zeeland 8.26 10 48.21 6 +4 
North Brabant 3.12 11 18.58 11 0 
Limburg 1.78 12 11.03 12 0 
Flevoland 21.75 5 68.02 1 +4 
Pearson’s coefficient 0.824**     
** = sign p<0.01 (two-tailed).  
 
The degree of urbanization is taken into account as a control variable. Although in the 
Netherlands the percentage of secular people is generally higher in cities, Pearson’s 
correlation is 0.397. Additionally, most towns and villages in the Netherlands show 
little variation in levels of income, education age, and male-female ratio. Including 
degree of urbanization would amount to a control for ethnicity, as cities are much 
more multi-ethnic than most villages and small towns.  
 
5.5 Analyses 
Because we test hypotheses on features of religious markets taking parishes as units, 
we apply multi-level analysis (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Three levels are 
distinguished. At the first and lowest level are parishes in a respective year. At the 
second level is the parish itself, and the third level comprises municipalities. 
Hypotheses about Roman Catholic attendance in a parish were derived from 
religious market theory. As displayed in Table 6, the analysis starts by estimating a 
random intercept model (model 0), showing variation across all the levels 
distinguished. Then, influences of external religious diversity, internal diversity and 
availability of divine services are introduced. Subsequently, the percentage of secular 
people is added. Table 7 displays cross-level interaction at various levels.  
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Our analyses start with a test of our two hypotheses on Catholic and non-
Catholic diversity (H1 and H2). The first model displays the effect of Catholic 
diversity. It shows that more variations of the Catholic faith in the vicinity lowers the 
percentage of attending Catholics. The effect of non-Catholic diversity also seems to 
significantly lower participation levels of Roman Catholics. Based on these findings, 
both the Catholic diversity hypothesis (H1) and the external diversity hypothesis (H2) 
are refuted.  
The subsequent models introduce our hypotheses on internal diversity (H3 and 
H4). Models 2, 3 and 4 examine the influence of internal diversity on the percentage of 
Catholics attending mass. The second model shows the effects of quality and quantity 
of services. The more services held, the higher the percentage of Catholics attending. 
However, the quality of services has no significant influence on the percentage of 
Roman Catholics attending. Thus, the quantity hypothesis (H3) is corroborated and the 
quality hypothesis (H4) on internal diversity is falsified.  
Model 3 simultaneously tests hypotheses 1 through 4. Again, results show that 
the quantity of services has a significant positive effect on the percentage of Catholics 
attending, whereas the quality of services has no significant effect. External diversity 
has a corroding influence on the percentage of attending Catholics. Some parishes 
within several of the big Dutch cities, like Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague, are 
fine examples of a very diversified supply but with low levels of attendance. 
Nowadays, it is likely that religions compete with secular options as well. 
Model 4 controls for the degree of urbanization and includes the percentage of secular 
inhabitants. Findings show that where the proportion of secular people is higher, the 
percentage of Catholics attending is also higher. Thereby, the secular surroundings 
hypothesis (H6) is corroborated. Nowadays, religions compete with secular options as 
well. Examples of parishes in secular surroundings where attendance among Catholics 
is relatively high are small communities in the provinces of North Holland and 
Groningen and some of the parishes located in Amsterdam and in the city of 
Groningen.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 The small communities are Landsmeer, Hoogezand, Veendam and Winschoten and parishes within 
various municipalities of Zaanstad. 
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Table 6: Hierarchical linear regression models for percentage of attending Catholics. 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  10.064*** 11.741***   8.486***   9.967***   9.965*** 
      
Parish-year level:      
- Internal diversity       
    - Quantity of services      0.801*** 1.009***   1.079*** 
    - Quality (variety) of services      
           - No other service offered   (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
           - At least one other service       -0.183    -0.181     -0.232 
      
Parish level:      
- External diversity      
    - Non-Catholic diversity      
           - No other  (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
           - One other faith   -1.429***   -1.515**  -1.867*** 
           - More than one other faith   -1.694***   -1.715***  -2.310*** 
    - Catholic diversity      
           - No other  (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
           - At least one other Cath. faith   -2.080***   -2.749***  -1.905*** 
      
Municipality level:      
    - Percentage secular       0.094*** 
    - Urbanization      -0.917*** 
      
Variance components:      
    Parish-year level variance   9.156***   9.156***   8.815***   8.748***   8.731*** 
    Parish level variance 29.266*** 27.880*** 29.397*** 27.893*** 27.913*** 
    Municipality level variance   4.375***   3.500***   4.557***   3.227***   1.992*** 
    R2 parish-year level   0.00 0.04 0.04 0.05 
    R2 parish level   0.05 0.00 0.05 0.05 
    R2 municipality level   0.20 -0.24 0.26 0.54 
*** = sign p<0.01 (one-tailed).               Source: KASKI 2003–2004 & NIPO 2000. 
  ** = sign p<0.05 (one-tailed). 
    * = sign p<0.10 (one-tailed). 
N1= 2124, N2= 1062, N3= 390. 
R2 = proportion error reduction on level 1, 2, and 3. R2 turning negative in model 2 is  
due to either sample coincidence or negligible influence of a level 3 variable.  
 
Now hypotheses stating that effects are stronger under some conditions than under 
others (interaction hypotheses H5 and H7) are introduced. To test these combined 
effect hypotheses, slopes of internal diversity (quality and quantity) and non-Catholic 
diversity are allowed to be random at their appropriate levels. For cross-level 
interaction between quality of services and non-Catholic diversity no variance was left 
to explain. Therefore, Table 7 only displays results for interactions between quantity of 
services and external diversity, and non-Catholic diversity and secularity.  
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Table 7: Hierarchical linear regression models including cross-level interactions  
              for percentage of attending Catholics. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept    7.818***   9.990*** 
   
Parish-year level:   
- Internal diversity    
    - Quantity of services    2.228***   1.062*** 
    - Quality (variety) of services   
           - No other service offered (ref.) (ref.) 
           - At least one other service divine service       -0.200       -0.240 
   
Parish level:   
- External diversity   
    - Non-Catholic diversity   
           - No other (ref.) (ref.) 
           - One other faith        1.249   -2.145*** 
           - More than one other faith -0.469   -2.549*** 
    - Catholic diversity   
           - No other (ref.) (ref.) 
           - At least one other Catholic faith   -1.807***   -1.790*** 
   
Municipality level:   
           - Percentage secular   0.093***       0.059** 
           - Urbanization    -0.840***   -0.864*** 
   
Cross-level interactions:   
    - Quantity*no other faith (ref.)  
    - Quantity*one other faith   -1.604***  
    - Quantity*more than one other faith   -1.069***  
    - Non-Catholic diversity   
           - No other*percent secular  (ref.) 
           - One other faith*percent secular   0.021 
           - More than one other faiths*percent secular   0.021 
   
Variance components:   
    - Quantity of services (2nd level)        1.932**  
    - Quantity of services (3rd level)    0.000  
    - Non-Catholic diversity   
           - No other  (ref.) 
           - One other faith         0.000 
           - More than one other faith         3.753 
    Parish-year level variance        2.527**   8.736*** 
    Parish level variance 22.640*** 27.113*** 
    Municipality level variance   3.018***   5.103*** 
    R2 parish-year level  0.72 0.05 
    R2 parish level  0.23 0.07 
    R2 municipality level  0.31 -0.17 
*** = sign p<0.01 (one-tailed).                Source: KASKI 2003, 2004 & NIPO 2000.      
  ** = sign p<0.05 (one-tailed). 
    * = sign p<0.10 (one-tailed). 
N1= 2124, N2= 1062, N3= 390. 
R2 = proportion error reduction on level 1, 2, and 3. R2 turning negative in  
model 2 is due to either sample coincidence or negligible influence of a level 3 variable.  
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Findings provide no evidence that a higher degree of internal diversity increases the 
positive effect of external diversity. Hence, the internal-external diversity hypothesis 
(H5) is falsified. Instead, in Catholic monopolies internal diversity seems more 
efficient. Results in model 2 of Table 7 refute our hypothesis 7 regarding the 
interaction between secular surroundings and external diversity. In more secular 
settings, no strengthened positive influence was found of non-Catholic diversity on the 
percentage of Catholics attending mass within a parish. 
In sum, proximity to other religious options, both Catholic and non-Catholic, 
negatively influences the percentage of attending Catholics. On one hand, the religious 
market hypotheses proposing a positive influence of external religious diversity on 
religious involvement are refuted.  
This gives support to secularization theory, stating that co-existence of multiple 
religions in a region corrodes religious life within that area (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002). 
On the other hand, greater internal supply in terms of quantity does seem to increase 
the percentage of Catholic attendees, especially in monopolistic situations. Where 
people are able to opt for secular alternatives, more Roman Catholics attend. However, 
in highly secularized surroundings the influence of external diversity on participation 
rates is not stronger than in other situations.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
We started off by examining the relatively, though not uniformly, high levels of 
religious participation in Catholic monopolies, asking why Catholics are so difficult to 
square with religious market theory. The deviant case of the Netherlands was also 
outlined, with its religiously mixed population, low attendance among Catholics, and 
large proportion of unaffiliated (Becker and de Hart 2006). Religious market theory 
responded with three theoretical amendments. The first amendment shifted attention 
from individual participation to measures of clergy strength (Stark 1992). The second 
amendment stated that although religious affiliation may be relatively high, underneath 
the religious canopy may lurk widespread religious indifference (Stark and Iannaccone 
1994). The third explained the Catholic anomaly by the Church’s internal diversity 
(Iannaccone 1991).  
Regarding our research question, to what extent and under what conditions does 
religious diversity influence rates of religious involvement of Roman Catholics among 
parishes in contemporary Dutch society, we can now answer the religious revival that 
external diversity has been proposed to bring about has yet to emerge. For now, 
diversity appears to corrode religious participation of Roman Catholics among 
parishes in contemporary Dutch society. We found that increasing the quantity of 
divine services boosts Roman Catholic attendance rates, whereas increasing the variety 
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of services does not. Most likely, quantity of divine services has this effect because 
believers can attend at a time that best suits their daily routine. Finally, in secular 
surroundings a higher percentage of the Roman Catholics attend mass. This is likely 
due to selection rather than causality. Catholic strongholds remain as the efflux of 
marginal devotees continues. 
As for the amendment regarding ecclesial activity, we left it aside because 
ordination rates were viewed as giving weak information about involvement of the 
average Catholic. Besides, ordinations numbers are so low that an increase in the 
quantity of services supplied does not seem to be a realistic option.41 If future research 
on religious markets and involvement brings in ordination rates, this should be done as 
a constraint on the supply of divine services. Indeed, something like a self-reinforcing 
downward spiral may be taking place within Dutch Roman Catholicism. The average 
Catholic layperson is less likely to attend divine services given a weak supply of 
services, and the number of services on offer is dwindling because of lower ordination 
rates.  
The amendment that religious monopolies always manage to appear vastly more 
popular and vibrant than they actually are finds no support in this chapter. Therefore, 
the claim that Catholics are more vigorous in non-Catholic surroundings (Stark 1998) 
seems to carry no weight, at least for Catholics in the Netherlands. Evidence for 
explaining high levels of Catholic involvement by the Catholic Church’s ability to 
maintain a high degree of internal diversity, is not overwhelming either. 
 This chapter incorporated three elaborations on religious market theory. First, 
religious diversity as the unit of research was examined at the more plausible local 
level. After all, a person’s religious involvement is likely to be influenced more by 
local religious diversity than by the religious diversity of the country as a whole. 
Second, the degree of secularism was taken into account. In modern societies, 
religious bodies compete not only among themselves, but also with secular 
alternatives. Results revealed that with a greater proportion of secular people, more 
Catholics attend mass. Third, it has been speculated that a multitude of faiths on offer 
would keep religious firms vigorous (Finke, Guest and Stark 1996). Ignoring market 
shares of religious bodies, this chapter took the mere presence of different religious 
doctrines into account. Examining the religious options on the supply side of the 
market is a more appropriate way to take religious diversity into account than to study 
diversity of satisfied demand. 
Previous research has pointed out that in the Netherlands secularization is a 
gradual process by which ardent religious adherents become marginal adherents and 
                                                
41 In the Netherlands, ordinations of Roman-Catholic priests in absolute numbers dropped from 21 in 
1975 to 5 in 1991 and declined further to 2 in 2006. 
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marginal adherents become non-members (te Grotenhuis 1999), with the latter 
progressing at a faster pace than the former (cf. Chapter 2). We agree with 
secularization theorists who argue that the mere presence of other religions can be 
enough to disintegrate the ‘taken-for-granted’ nature of religion and give rise to 
relativism, bringing secularization closer (Bruce 2002). Any increases in the fervour of 
a religious body are likely due to remnants of fervent believers rather than an influx of 
new devotees. So the mechanism at work is selection rather than causality, as 
supposed by the religious market theory. 
This chapter solved the puzzle for the Netherlands, showing that religious 
involvement is more vibrant in more monopolistic situations where considerable 
secularization has occurred and a relatively small group of fervent adherents remain. 
Overall, the logic of religious market theory seems flawed for the Dutch case.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This study set out to investigate to what extent religious diversity leads to lower or 
higher levels of religious involvement. In the last centuries the religious landscape of 
North America and Europe has changed. When societies opened up, religious 
monopolies seized to exist because other religious traditions settled in. Religious 
markets arose and these markets became more and more diverse. Consequently, people 
came in contact with a broader range of religious ideas.  
Changes in the structure of the religious market have altered levels of religious 
involvement. These changes concern shifts from religious monopolies to a diverse 
religious market, where multiple religions market their ‘products’ (Berger 1967; Stark 
and Finke 2000). However, it was unclear how religious diversity affects religious 
involvement (Chaves and Gorski 2001). Therefore, the influence of religious diversity 
on religious involvement has been the focal point of this book.  
Secularisation theory and religious market theory were used to derive 
competing predictions about the influence of religious diversity on religious 
involvement. The former predicts that religious diversity causes religious decline. The 
latter theory presumes that due to religious diversity, religiosity will flourish. The 
previous empirical chapters have all addressed research questions related to the 
influence of the structure of the religious market on levels and trends of religious 
involvement. 
 In this last chapter of this study we reflect on the outcomes of the empirical 
chapters and the theoretical implications thereof. Thereafter, we formulate an answer 
to the overarching research question and assess the usefulness of secularisation and 
religious market theory in explaining changes in religious involvement. This chapter 
closes with a discussion of the merits and consequences of our findings and some ideas 
for future research. 
 
6.2 Answers to research questions 
In this paragraph we reflect on the empirical findings of the empirical chapters and 
their theoretical implications. The research questions are recapitulated and answers to 
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these questions are given. In Table 1 the research questions and their answers are 
summarised. Table 2 presents an overview of the hypotheses tested, whether they are 
derived from secularisation or religious market theory, and if they were corroborated 
or not.  
 
6.2.1 Religious freedom, deregulation the economy 
Chapter 2 examined to what extent the degree and the duration of religious 
deregulation explain differences in religious involvement of inhabitants within and 
between Europe and North America. The influence of religious deregulation on 
religious involvement was examined in 26 societies in the 1981 to 2006 period. A 
deregulated religious market is a market where individuals have the freedom to adhere 
to whatever faith, if any. For any religious body a deregulated market is a market 
where they are free to establish themselves. Examining the relationship between 
deregulation and religious involvement is important because both secularisation and 
religious market theory presume that deregulation of the religious market is the driving 
force of religious diversity (Bruce 1999; Stark and Iannaccone 1996). Consequently, 
deregulation is presumed to affect religious involvement. To secularisation theory this 
influence is negative whereas for religious market theory deregulation influences 
involvement positively.  
 The focus in Chapter 2 was on religious market theory because an important 
proposition of this theory states that when a society reduces regulation of the religious 
market, levels of religious involvement within that society will be higher (Chaves, 
Scheaeder and Sprindys 1994: 1088; Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark 1997). The research 
question of chapter 2 therefore read (1): To what extent do the degree and the duration 
of a deregulated religious market positively affect individual religious involvement 
within and between European and Northern American societies between 1981 and 
2006? 
 This chapter improved on previous research in three ways. First and foremost, 
variations of involvement on the individual level were examined. Till now, most 
researched analysed the influence of deregulation on aggregated levels only (Chaves 
and Cann 1992; Norris and Inglehart 2004). However, the regulation hypothesis 
pertains primarily to shifts in religious involvement of individuals.  
The second improvement is by taking the duration of religious deregulation into 
account. Previous research focussed on the level of deregulation only (Barro and Mc 
Cleary 2003; Chaves and Cann 1992; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Differences in the 
degree of deregulation between societies were compared to explain variations in 
religious involvement. Whether the findings of this previous research were in line with 
religious market theory or not, non-positive influences of deregulation could be 
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waived away because of an auxiliary assumption. This auxiliary assumption states that 
it would take time for religious deregulation to have an influence on involvement 
(Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Societies did not deregulate their religious markets 
simultaneously. Therefore, the influence of differences in duration of deregulation 
between societies on religious involvement was examined. Findings showed that, 
between societies, a longer history of religious deregulation does not result in higher 
levels of religious involvement. Furthermore, a positive influence of the degree of 
deregulation was found on the chance for individuals to attend, although this influence 
was fully countered by the strong degenerative impact of modernisation in multiple 
analyses.   
 The third improvement was to examine the influence of deregulation over time 
within societies. It is important to examine trends within societies because the 
regulation hypothesis is foremost a hypothesis pertaining to changes in the structure of 
the religious market within societies and its influence on religious involvement of 
individuals living in those societies (Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 
1994). Covering a period of 25 year we found that as the period of deregulation within 
societies carries on, the probability for individuals to attend religious services 
decreases. When people have a sense of that they are able to choose some religious 
tradition that appeals to them, most likely they will opt for no religion at all. Religious 
competition deprives all religions in the market of their plausibility and religious 
decline sets in. This also explains why attendance levels are already lower in societies 
that have deregulated their religious markets earlier in history.  
In sum, findings of chapter 2 are troubling for religious market theory. Most 
hypotheses derived from this theory are refuted, as summarised in Table 2. In 
deregulated religious markets, dominated by the logic of market economics, levels of 
religious involvement decline. In general, deregulation of the religious market both 
between and within societies has a negative influence on religious involvement. These 
findings pose a serious problem for religious market theory, because deregulation is 
presumed to have a positive influence on religious involvement and a must for diverse 
religious markets to emerge (Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). In 
addition, a strong corrosive influence of modernity has been found. Where a positive 
relation between the degree of deregulation and religious involvement was found, 
modernity fully countered this influence. 
 
6.2.2 Declining belonging and shrinking beliefs 
Chapter 3 focussed on the presumed growing gap between believing and belonging. 
Both secularisation and religious market theory try to explain variations in religious 
beliefs and religious practise by differences in religious diversity in European and 
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North American societies. Therefore, the influence of religious diversity on the 
relationship between these forms of religious involvement throughout Western 
societies was examined as well.  
Declining levels of religiosity in the West gave rise to the idea that although 
people do not attend religious services that often anymore, they continue to believe. 
These presumed trends in religiosity were captured in the slogan ‘believing without 
belonging’ (Davie 1990a, 1990b, 1994, 2002). Therefore, trends in believing and 
belonging were examined. In addition, the slogan ‘believing without belonging’ was 
embedded into secularisation and religious market theory because both theories 
presume that religious heritages affect religious involvement (Martin 1978; Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994; Wilson 1982). Thereby ‘believing without belonging’ became a part 
of an overarching problem: to what extend religious diversity affects religious 
involvement. By analysing 13 societies in the 1981-2000 period, using cross-sectional 
data from the European and World Value Survey’s, the following research questions 
were answered (2a, 2b, and 2c): What are the trends in religious belief (believing) and 
religious practice (belonging)? What is the trend in the relationship between believing 
and belonging? And, to what extent did religious diversity affect the relationship 
between believing and belonging in Western Europe and North America between 1981 
and 2000? 
In answering these questions, three improvements on previous research were 
made. First, to accurately examine the extent to which beliefs became detached form 
religious practices, Christian beliefs with their corresponding Christian belonging were 
examined. Previous research studied whatever individuals express as religious beliefs 
and then relate them to traditional religious practice (e.g. church attendance) (Davie 
1990a, 2002, 2003). However, this most likely overestimates the gap between 
believing and belonging. Moreover, trends in specific beliefs and their corresponding 
practises will go unnoticed this way. It is more informative and constitutes a more 
stringent test of the theories to relate specific beliefs to their equivalent practice 
instead of comparing beliefs per se with whatever form of religious practise. In other 
words, beliefs from specific religious traditions have to be related to their equivalent 
belonging of the same religious tradition. 
The second way chapter 3 made an improvement to previous research is by 
including more points in time. This results in more reliable estimates of trends in 
religious involvement. Most trends of believing and belonging employed data from 
one or two points in time only (Davie 1990a; Stark and Iannaccone 1994, 1996).  
The third improvement is by examining the gap between believing and 
belonging on an individual level. Previous research used aggregated data to compare 
differences between the proportion of people who hold certain beliefs and the 
proportion of people who belong to any religion (Davie 1990a, 1990b, 1994, 2002). 
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Although this examines the differences of the gap between believing and belonging 
between societies, aggregated relationships may not always correctly reflect individual 
level relationships. Associating the proportion of people expressing a belief with the 
proportion of people belonging to some religion is something else than to examine the 
relationship between believing and belonging on an individual level.  
By taking the above points into account, we have shown that the emphasis on 
the relationship between beliefs and their corresponding belonging at the individual 
level leads to additional insights. The answers to the research questions are that, both 
religious belief and religious practice are declining in most traditionally Catholic and 
mixed societies. In some traditionally Protestant societies a few beliefs are becoming 
more widespread. Furthermore, there is no overall growing gap between Christian 
believing and Christian belonging. The slight decrease in the relationship between 
believing and belonging found for some countries is due to a decline in both believing 
and belonging, with belonging declining more rapidly than believing. 
Both secularisation and religious market theory try to explain variations in the 
relationship between believing and belonging by differences in religious diversity. 
Secularisation theory states that an overall decline in religious involvement will take 
place when religious markets become more diverse. This also implies that the 
relationship between believing and belonging would be quite stable over time. People 
who go to church less and less will also have less strong beliefs and vice versa (Berger 
1967; Martin 1978; Wilson 1982; Bruce 2002). Religious market theory predicts the 
opposite as it claims that diverse religious markets are better able to satisfy religious 
needs than religious monopolies. Therefore, in societies with a higher degree of 
religious diversity the relationship between believing and belonging is stronger. People 
who believe also belong. However, findings in Chapter 3 show that, the relationship 
between Christian believing and Christian belonging varies for societies that differ in 
their degree of religious diversity, but not in either of the theoretically expected 
directions. In the United States, the most religiously diverse of societies, the 
relationship between Christian believing and Christian belonging is relatively weak. 
Presumptions of both secularization theory and religious market theory about 
the influence of religious diversity on the relationship between believing and 
belonging did not withstand the empirical tests, as Table 2 shows. For religious market 
theory falsification of the hypothesis about the influence of religious diversity on 
believing and belonging is more troublesome than for secularisation theory. According 
to the former theory, societies with religious monopolies should have large unmet 
religious needs, unlike societies with diverse religious markets where diverse religious 
needs are expected to be met (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). If people are unable to 
satisfy their religious needs when exposed to a large variety of religious options, then 
it is possible that those people do not have religious needs at all. This implies that  
 132 
Table 1: Research questions and their answers of the empirical chapters. 
Chapter Research questiona Answer 
2 1. To what extent do the degree and the duration 
of a deregulated religious market positively affect 
individual religious involvement within and 
between societies? 
 
Between societies, a longer history of religious deregulation does not result in higher levels of 
religious involvement. When a positive effect of the degree of deregulation was found on the 
chance for individuals to attend, this influence was fully countered by the strong degenerative 
impact of modernisation. Additionally, as the period of deregulation within societies carries on, 
the probability to attend religious services initially increases marginally, but within half a 
decade chances to attend decreases exponentially. 
 
3 2a.What are the trends in religious belief 
(believing) and religious practice (belonging)? 
 
Both religious belief and religious practice are declining in most traditionally Catholic and 
mixed societies. In some traditionally Protestant societies a few beliefs are becoming more 
widespread. 
 2b. What is the trend in the relationship between 
believing and belonging? 
  
There is no overall growing gap between Christian believing and Christian belonging. The 
slight decrease in the relationship between believing and belonging found for some countries is 
due to a decline in both believing and belonging, with belonging declining more rapidly than 
believing. 
 
 2c. To what extent did religious diversity affect 
the relationship between believing and belonging? 
 
The relationship between Christian believing and Christian belonging varies for societies that 
differ in their degree of religious diversity, but not in either of the theoretically expected 
directions. In the United States, the most religiously diverse society, the relationship between 
Christian believing and Christian belonging is relatively weak. 
 
4 3. How and to what extent does religious diversity 
influence religious involvement in counties of the 
United States? 
 
The relationship between diversity and membership follows a nonlinear path in US counties. In 
a religious oligopoly (consisting of Mainline Protestantism, Evangelicalism, and Catholicism) 
membership levels are highest. When more religious doctrines are present in the religious 
market, levels of membership are lower. However, more congregations heighten membership 
levels. Though, this influence does not fully counter the corrosive influence of doctrinal 
diversity on membership.  
 
5 4. To what extent and under what conditions does 
religious diversity influence rates of religious 
involvement of Roman Catholics among parishes 
in contemporary Dutch society? 
Diversity appears to corrode religious participation of Roman Catholics among parishes in 
contemporary Dutch society. Presence of other versions of Catholicism, other religions, and 
increasing the variety of divine services all lower participation rates. However, increasing the 
quantity of divine services boosts Roman Catholic attendance rates, Additionally, in secular 
surroundings a higher percentage of the Roman Catholics attend mass. 
a = all questions pertain to Western Europe and North America, unless stated otherwise. 
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Table 2: Overview of hypotheses per chatter and their outcome. Corroboration is indicated by ‘+’ and  
 when no support is found this is indicated by  ‘–‘. 
Chapter Theory Hypotheses Outcome 
2 Religious Market Theory Individuals in societies with a higher degree of deregulation of the religious market have higher levels of 
attendance than individuals in societies with lower levels of deregulation. 
+ 
  Individuals in societies with a longer history of religious deregulation show higher levels of attendance than 
individuals living in societies with a shorter history of deregulation. 
– 
  The longer individuals within a society are exposed to deregulation of the religious market, the more these 
individuals will attend religious services. 
– 
3 Secularisation Theory In Western Europe and North America, there has been a decline of both individual Christian believing and 
belonging, and therefore the relationship between individual Christian believing and Christian belonging did 
not weaken over time. 
+ 
  The relationship between individual Christian believing and Christian belonging is independent of societies’ 
level of religious diversity. 
– 
 Religious Market Theory In Western Europe and North America, individual Christian believing has been stable while belonging has 
decreased; therefore the relationship between individual Christian believing and Christian belonging 
weakened over time. 
– 
  The relationship between individual Christian believing and Christian belonging in societies with a high 
degree of religious diversity is stronger than in societies with a low degree of religious diversity. 
– 
4 Secularisation Theory The more doctrinal diversity a county has, the lower the proportion of members in that county. + 
  The more congregations a county has, the lower the proportion of members in that county. – 
 Religious Market Theory The more doctrinal diversity a county has, the higher the proportion of members in that county. – 
  The more congregations a county has, the higher the proportion of members in that county. + 
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Table 2 continued: Overview of hypotheses per chatter and their outcome. Corroboration is indicated by ‘+’ and  
     when no support is found this is indicated by  ‘–‘. 
Chapter Theory Hypotheses Outcome 
5 Religious Market Theory Greater Catholic diversity within the boundaries of a Roman Catholic parish will increase the percentage of 
attending Roman Catholics within that parish, but it will do so marginally. 
– 
  The more external diversity of non-Catholic faiths a Roman Catholic parish has within its boundaries, the 
higher the percentage of Roman Catholics within that parish attending church services. 
– 
  The larger the number of divine services of a Roman Catholic parish, the higher the percentage of Roman 
Catholics attending within that parish. 
+ 
  The more different types of services a Roman Catholic parish offers, the higher the percentage of attending 
Roman Catholics within that parish. 
– 
  When a parish has greater internal diversity, the positive influence of non-Catholic diversity on the 
percentage of Roman Catholics attending church within a parish is stronger. 
_ 
 Secularisation Theory The more secular the municipality of a Roman Catholic parish, the higher the percentage of attending 
Roman Catholics within that parish. 
+ 
 Religious Market Theory In more secular surroundings, the positive influence of external diversity on the percentage of Roman 
Catholics attending mass within a parish is stronger. 
_ 
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people in monopolistic societies, who do not attend church, are more devout than 
people who do not attend in religiously diverse societies. Findings in chapter 3 showed 
the opposite: People who do not, or to a lesser extent, belong are more devout in 
religiously diverse societies than in societies with a low degree of religious diversity. 
These findings are similar to those found by Kelley and De Graaf (1997). 
Although predictions of secularisation theory did not hold to explain the association 
between religious diversity and the strength of the relationship between believing and 
belonging, secularisation theory did explain the trends in religious involvement better 
than religious market theory. In general, findings are more in line with predictions of 
secularisation theory because the decrease in the relationship between believing and 
belonging found in several societies was due to the fact that both believing and 
belonging declined in those countries. This decrease in involvement takes place at 
different rates: religious belonging declines more rapidly than corresponding Christian 
beliefs. 
 
6.2.3 Diversity and membership 
Chapter 4 focused on the relationship between religious diversity and church 
membership in counties of the United States. Much debate is about the case of the 
United States. For secularisation theory, the United States is an anomaly with its high 
degree of religious diversity and high levels of religious involvement. Nonetheless, 
some argued that despite the fact that in the United States religiosity is high, cultural 
and social incentives are prevailing above religious motivations (Moore 1994; Wilson 
1966). So, even though membership and attendance levels are high, there is a high 
degree of internal secularisation (e.g. little theological knowledge of adherents). 
Therefore, the United States would fit presumptions secularisation theory quite well 
(Wilson 1966). However, the argument of internal secularisation is rather ad hoc and 
seems an evasion from the original presumption. This presumption states that changes 
in the structure of the religious market are responsible for variations in religious 
involvement. If secularisation theory is to hold for the United States is should come up 
with additional presumptions about religious markets and examine the religious market 
of the United States at a level more commensurate, in terms of religious choices, to the 
individual. 
In contrast to secularisation theory is religious market theory. For religious 
market theory, the United States is regarded as an unmistakable example for the logic 
of market economics applied to religion. When various religious needs are met by 
religious market with a diverse supply, levels of religious involvement are presumed to 
be high (Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). In sum, 
secularisation and religious market theory make rivalling predictions about the 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
 136 
membership levels in areas with a low and high degree of diversity. The former theory 
predicts religious decline whereas the latter one expects religious revitalization (Bruce 
2002; Stark and Finke 2000). This rivalry between the theories lead to the research 
question (3), how and to what extent does religious diversity influence religious 
involvement in counties of the United States? 
To correctly answer this question, two forms of religious diversity were 
distinguished: diversity pertaining to the number of different religious doctrines in the 
market (i.e. competition between religious consumer segments), and the numerical 
strength of congregations (i.e. competition within religious consumer segments). These 
forms of religious diversity pertain to local religious market because it is more likely 
that a person is influenced by the religious diversity in his locale that by that of the 
country as a whole. Next to this, indices to measure these forms of religious diversity 
were used. These indices more accurately captured religious supply (i.e. the number of 
religion offering their ‘product’) rather than satisfied demand (i.e. membership). 
Besides, these indices were largely free from the mathematical dependencies between 
diversity and involvement, which plagued the Herfindahl index as applied in religious 
research (Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002).  
These two forms of religious diversity were taken into account to examine their 
influence on religious involvement in the local religious market of 3140 US counties. 
The puzzling finding of chapter 4 show that, the relationship between diversity and 
membership follows a nonlinear path in US counties. In a religious oligopoly 
(consisting of Mainline Protestantism, Evangelicalism, and Catholicism) membership 
levels are highest. When more (exotic) religious doctrines are present in the religious 
market, levels of membership are lower. However, more congregations heighten 
membership levels. Though, this influence does not fully counter the corrosive 
influence of doctrinal diversity on membership.  
Despite of improvements on previous research two issues remained unresolved. 
First, hypotheses on religious involvement are first and foremost about individual 
changes over time (e.g. Bruce 2002, Stark and Finke 2000). Thus, changes in diversity 
of the religious market will affect individual religious involvement, whether that is 
membership, attendance or ecclesiastical activity. Data to properly test such 
hypotheses are yet unavailable. Consequently, hypotheses pertaining to changes of 
individuals in their religiosity (dynamic individual level hypotheses) had to be 
transformed into static hypotheses pertaining to differences in levels of involvement 
across counties (static aggregated cross-sectional hypotheses). This is still a second 
best choice because individual propensities imply relative frequencies on a county 
level.  
Second, it is difficult to say anything about the causality, due to the fact the data 
concern a one shot observation. This is especially problematic with respect to test 
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hypotheses pertaining to the religious market theory. The prediction is that religious 
diversity at the context level will increase the number of church members. However, a 
positive association between diversity and membership could also be explained by the 
mechanism that more members cause more churches to move into the local market. 
Nevertheless, if the relationship between diversity and involvement is negative or non-
existent we are sure that this contradicts the interpretation of the religious market 
theory. In other words, potentially we can reject a supply side hypothesis if the sign of 
the association is negative, but if the association has the predicted positive sign we 
cannot corroborate the hypothesis. This is less of a problem with the hypothesis based 
on the secularization theory, since a positive sign is not allowed according to the 
theory and it is hard to imagine an alternative interpretation of a negative sign, i.e. it is 
very unlikely that a decline in religious involvement or a decline in church members 
will boost diversity. 
In general, predictions of secularisation theory did prove to hold water for the 
United States case when it comes to the effect of different doctrines. However, 
numerical strength may retain some of the losses due to weakened theological 
plausibility structures brought about by religious diversity. Consequently, 
presumptions of religious market theory proved their value too. An important 
implication for both theories therefore is that religious diversity has to be broken up 
into its various forms. It is too crude to argue that religious diversity always and 
everywhere leads to lower levels of religious involvement. In near religious 
monopolies in the United States, religious involvement is higher than in religious 
monopolies.  
 
6.2.4 Anomalies and amendments for Catholicism’s internal diversity 
In chapter 5, the number and variety of divine services are taken into account. Earlier, 
in the concluding paragraph of chapter 3, we suggested that denominations might vary 
in the extent to which they invest in their own supply. Furthermore, the venue taken to 
break religious diversity up in its various forms is continued and elaborated. 
Additionally, attention is focused on two anomalies religious market theory faces. The 
first regards Catholic monopolies, the second pertains to findings for religious 
involvement for the Netherlands.  
 The first anomaly religious market theory faces with respect to Catholic 
monopolies is that people in Catholic monopolies have relatively high levels of 
involvement. Whereas religious market theory presumes that in Catholic monopolies 
levels of involvement are relatively low and uniform (Chaves and Cann 1992). Next to 
this anomaly, there is a second anomaly. In the religiously diverse and relatively 
secular Netherlands attendance levels of Roman Catholics are lower than those of the 
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Belgian and Austrian Catholic monopolies. To religious market theory this is troubling 
because it presumes levels of involvement to be relatively high in diverse religious 
markets (Stark and Finke 2000). In addition, the high proportion of unaffiliated people 
may imply that in the Netherlands denominations not only have to compete amongst 
themselves but against secular options as well. Competition may not be confined to 
religious market only. For example, secular institutions nowadays offer healthcare, 
feeding the poor, and education as well. 
To explain the Catholic anomaly religious market theory came with 
amendments. The first amendment claims that although religious affiliation may be 
relatively high, underneath the religious canopy lurks widespread religious 
indifference (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). To examine religiosity in monopoly 
situations, beliefs and church attendance should be examined instead of membership. 
The second amendment stated that the Roman Catholic Church’s internal diversity 
generates a relatively high degree of participation in monopoly situations (Iannaccone 
1991). These amendments were tested in the Dutch case as they coincide with the 
anomaly more specific for the Netherlands – a varied religious supply but low levels of 
religious involvement. All in all, this led to the research question (4), to what extent 
and under what conditions does religious diversity influence rates of religious 
involvement of Roman Catholics among parishes in contemporary Dutch society? 
Three contributions to research in this field were made. First, religious diversity 
as the unit of research was examined at a level more commensurate to the individual. 
We argue that it is more likely that an individual is influenced by the make-up of the 
local religious market than by the religious market of the society as a whole. Religious 
diversity at a lower level, for example municipalities or neighbourhoods, is of more 
importance to individuals. Most research used the religious diversity of the society as a 
whole to examine the impact thereof on religious involvement. However, it is quite 
likely that in a country there are local religious monopolies. Aggregating them would 
create the illusion of a religiously diverse nation. The degree of diversity on a society 
level thus not necessarily reflects religious diversity on a lower level.  
The second way in which this chapter makes improvements to previous 
research is by distinguishing the various forms of religious diversity present in the 
local religious market. These can be categorised in two categories; internal and 
external diversity. The forms of external diversity included: presence of other 
religions, other Catholic denominations (because in the Netherlands Roman-
Catholicism is not the only version of Catholicism), and the secular alternative. Next 
to this is internal diversity. Internal religious diversity was split up into two forms: the 
quantity of divine services offered, and the variety of religious services on offer 
(quality of services). 
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Third, all religious traditions, no matter how few devotees, were taken into 
account. Finke, Guest and Stark (1996) speculated that any number of faiths on offer 
keeps all religious firms vigorous. Hence, the relationship between religious diversity 
and religious involvement is influenced by the number of religions present in the 
market, irrespective of size.  
Findings reveal that diversity appears to corrode religious participation of 
Roman Catholics among parishes in contemporary Dutch society. Presence of other 
versions of Catholicism, other religions, and increasing the variety of divine services 
all lower participation rates. However, increasing the quantity of divine services 
boosts Roman Catholic attendance rates. Additionally, in secular surroundings a 
higher percentage of the Roman Catholics attend mass.  
Results of chapter 5 show that the amendments religious market theory made to 
cope with the Catholic anomaly did not prove to hold water. Stark and Iannaccone 
(1994) argued that appearances deceive. However, chapter 5 makes clear that at least 
for the Netherlands, religious monopolies do not manage to appear more vibrant than 
they actually are. Areas that have religious monopolies are religiously more vibrant 
than regions that have diverse religious markets. Besides, the presumed internal 
diversity of the Catholic Church to maintain high levels of involvement as suggested 
by Iannaccone (1991) proved to be non-existent. On the contrary, internal diversity 
causes religious decline among Roman-Catholics in the Netherlands. However, 
offering a divine service multiple times a day gives believers an opportunity to attend 
at a time that best suits their daily routine.  
The implications of our findings for religious market theory look grim. So far as 
the Dutch case is concerned, religious diversity lowers levels of religious involvement 
and amendments regarding the Catholic anomaly are falsified. It seems that nowadays 
people opt for secular alternatives even in an abundance of religious options.  
 
6.3 General conclusions and discussion 
In this paragraph an answer to the overarching research question is formulated and the 
usefulness of secularisation and religious market theory is evaluated. A graphical 
overview of this study along with the relationships found between religious 
deregulation, diversity, competition, and involvement, is presented in Figure 1. 
 In the introductory chapter of this study we explained that North American and 
European societies became religiously more diverse as they entered the modern era. 
This deeply changed religiosity in those societies. The homogeneous, consistent 
religious canopy of societies was no more. In this new situation, where multiple 
religions coexist, religion was said to become a matter of marketing (Berger 1967; 
Martin 1978; Stark and Finke 2000). This market situation is forcing religions to 
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compete and to make effort to attract and bind possible adherents to their faith. In this 
study two rival theories were examined, which try to predict the influence religious 
diversity has on religious involvement. One of these is secularisation theory, the other 
being religious market theory. Secularisation theory concentrates on the individual, 
who supposedly becoming less and less religious as he is exposed to a range of ideas 
about reality. Conversely, religious market theory draws attention to the capacity of 
religions to stimulate and satisfy demand for their faith. However, it was still unclear 
to what extent religious diversity leads to lower or higher levels of religious 
involvement.  
The ambivalence of the relationship between religious diversity and 
involvement was due to various theoretical and methodological problems (Chaves and 
Gorski 2001). Nevertheless, in recent decades religious involvement in North America 
and Europe declined. All of the major traditional religions saw a downfall in their 
numbers of followers. What was the cause of this decline, diminishing plausibility of 
religion due to religious diversity or an imbalance between religious supply and 
demand? This study aimed to give an answer to this question. In the previous chapters, 
the influence of deregulating the religious market and various forms of religious 
diversity on religious involvement – beliefs, membership, and attendance of religious 
services – in North America and Europe were examined. By doing so, several 
important findings were made to understand the relationship between religious 
diversity and religious involvement.  
We found, in chapter 2, that individuals living in societies that deregulated their 
markets long ago have lower levels of religious involvement than those who live in 
societies that have just recently opened up their markets. Within Western societies, 
religious involvement of individuals declines rapidly as the duration of deregulation 
within those societies prolongs. In contrast to religious market theory predictions, 
deregulation lowers religious involvement. The deregulation of religious markets in 
most Western societies gave religions the opportunity to flood into the religious 
markets. Consequently, more diverse religious markets emerged. 
The religious markets in North America and Europe are pretty well stocked and 
no growing gap between believing and belonging has been found. However, the influx 
of various religious traditions, formerly exotic to the traditional religious climate, 
caused religious involvement to decline. In regions where a religious monopoly 
survived despite a wider context that is either very religiously diverse or secular 
religious involvement is still strong, as we have shown in chapter 4 and 5. This is even 
more so when there is less internal diversity but lots of opportunities for people to 
attend religious services.  
All in all, the answer to the overarching research question based on the findings 
of this study is that religious diversity in most cases leads to lower levels of religious 
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involvement. Declining levels of religious involvement in North America and Europe 
are not due to imbalances in supply and demand but due to weakened plausibility 
structures of religion. Even in the United States cracks are appearing in the relatively 
vibrant religious canopy as multiple religious bodies are competing for adherents. 
Religious involvement in the United States is dwindling. Whether this will eventually 
result in similar, low levels of religious involvement in Europe remains to be seen. In 
general, when people come in contact with an array of religious options, religious 
involvement is most likely to decline. 
Next to the generally negative influence of religious diversity, modernity has a 
strong corrosive influence on religious involvement as well. In the few situations 
where religious diversity seems to boost religious involvement, it is more appropriate 
to conclude that, at best, it is just hampering religious decline brought about by 
modernity. 
The impact of modernity overshadows the influence of religious diversity on 
involvement. Any increases in the fervour of a religious body are likely to be remnants 
of fervent believers rather than an influx of new devotees. In other words, less fervent 
and marginal members are leaving church due to declining religious plausibility rather 
than the influx of new adherents due to an increase in religious choice. In regions 
where considerable secularization has occurred, only a relatively small group of 
fervent adherents remain, as findings of chapters 3 and 5 have shown. 
 Given the nuances that not all forms of religious diversity cause religiosity to 
decline, the findings of this study are widely in favour of secularisation theory. Of all 
twenty hypotheses tested in this study only two hypotheses of religious market theory 
were corroborated. Hence, in explaining processes of religious involvement and the 
influence of religious diversity thereon in North America and Europe in recent 
decades, secularisation theory does a better job than religious market theory. 
Furthermore, secularisation theory is more encompassing. It explains the rise of 
religious diversity and the influence thereof on religious involvement. In addition, 
secularisation theory takes modernity into account as well. Religious market theory 
solely focuses on the influence of deregulation and its derivatives on religious 
involvement. 
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Figure 1: Outcome of the study and the relationships between religious deregulation, diversity, competition and involvement. 
 Behind the various subs, a ‘+’ indicates a positive influence, whereas a ‘–‘ signifies a negative influence, and ‘ns.’ denotes no influence. 
Society level County & Denominational level Individual level 
    
Religious deregulation:   Religious involvement: 
   - Duration of deregulation between societies (–)    - Beliefs 
   - Duration of deregulation within societies (–) 
                                      
   - Membership 
   - Degree of deregulation (–)     - Attendance 
  Modernity (–)                                                                                                    
  
   Religious diversity:  Religious competition:  
     - Religious heritages (–)   - Between different   
     - External diversity:       denominations  
          - Between similar religious     
            doctrines (+) 
  - Between similar       
    denominations 
 
          - Between different religious  
            doctrines (–) 
  - With secular alternatives  
     - Internal diversity:    
          - Variety of religious services (–)   
          - Quantity of religious services (+)   
     - Secular alternatives (–)   
    
Unbroken arrows indicate theoretically causal relationships, and are examined in this study. 
Dotted lines indicate underlying mechanisms. 
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6.4 Evaluating religious markets, diversity and involvement 
The theories used in this study have added to our understanding on how religious 
diversity affects religious involvement. Several empirical chapters examined this 
relationship by taking various forms of religious diversity and different kinds of 
religious involvement into account. The findings shed a new light on previous research 
and have consequences for understanding the relationship between religious diversity 
and religious involvement. It shows that breaking religious diversity up in its various 
forms is important because results show some striking differences between these 
forms. Most important, religious involvement declines and is, on average, lower when 
various religions are present in religious markets (chapter 3, 4, and 5). However, 
numerical strength in the United States, and Roman Catholic churches offering many 
similar religious services seem to retain some of the losses (chapter 4 and 5). In 
general, religious involvement is higher in religious monopolies than it is in diverse 
religious markets. This also applies for the United States where religiosity is still 
relatively high but nevertheless declining.  
  The United States is thus not an exceptional case but is in accordance with 
presumptions of secularisation theory. With the collapse of the traditional religious 
monopolies and the emergence of religious diversity, religion has to be marketed 
(Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Finke and Stark1988; Stark and Iannaccone 1996). This 
marketing of religion has contributed to the downfall of religiosity in most Northern 
American and European societies. The influence of modernity has contributed to 
religious decline as well. 
The ideas people hold with regard to the relation between the transcendental 
and profane realm changed as the societies in which they lived made the transition into 
the modern era (Lenski and Nolan 1998; Smart 1998). In the process of modernization, 
more activist images of God and the transcendental arose. Diverse ideas emerged, 
some were religious with a renewed tone and others had a secular signature. The 
hallmark of all these ideas was that they were convinced that human destiny is largely 
subject to human control. The consciousness rose that people are capable to shape their 
own future, independent of God (Lenski and Nolan 1998; Berger 1967). It is in the 
light of modern culture that both secularisation theory and religious market theory are 
to prove their value. In modern times traditional forms of religious involvement may 
alter and new varieties are likely to arise. If old ones alter and new forms arise, 
presumptions of secularisation theory and religious market theory should hold for 
these forms as well.  
One limitation of both secularisation and religious market theory is their focus 
on either demand or supply. Free-market economics show that sale is not so much 
subject of either supply or demand but fluctuations in balances between those two 
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(Sheffrin 2003). To religious market theory, religious demand is fixed. Therefore it 
concentrates only on religious supply to explain variation in religious involvement 
(Stark 1997; Stark and Finke 2000). However, throughout this study empirical 
evidence shows that religious demand is subject to change. Secularisation theory does 
presume that religious demand varies depending on the degree of religious diversity. 
In spite of this, it is largely unable to explain rises in religious involvement without 
shifting its focus outside the religious market (e.g. Bruce 2003; Stark and Iannaccone 
1996). An additional challenge for secularisation theory would be to predict under 
which circumstances the process of religious decline slows down and stabilises. 
Besides the influence of the marketing of religion there are other forces at work 
as well. It became clear in several chapters that modernity negatively influences 
religiosity. Modernity has deeply altered the way individuals look and interpret the 
world. It may be interesting to examine developments in religions and their adherents 
that are better equipped to incorporate these views in their doctrines. 
This study has shown that relationships on lower and higher levels of analyses 
may not always match. For example, chapter 5 revealed that at the level of parishes, 
Catholic involvement is higher in more secularized settings, whereas between societies 
increased secularity is associated with a decline in Catholic attendance. Future 
research should pay attention to this: associations on a lower unit of analysis do not 
always correspond to relationships at a higher unit of analysis. Next to this, attention 
should be paid to religious markets on a level that is relevant to the individual as well 
as that local religious homogeneity may result in religious heterogeneity on a society 
level.   
It was beyond the scope of this study to take all the various religious heritages 
and societies around the globe into account. However, this study showed religious 
diversity affects religious involvement differently according to the religious 
background against which this process unfolds (chapter 2 and 3). In non-Western 
societies the relationship between diversity and involvement might be different in 
strength than in Western societies. An equally interesting question is if and to what 
extent modernity corrodes religiosity in non-Western societies.  
Lastly, this study was limited to Europe and the United States. As these 
societies venture deeper into the late modern era it is likely that religious involvement 
will continue to decline. It is not likely that the downfall of traditional systems of 
belief can be fully counterbalanced by religious heterodox and more idiosyncratic 
outlooks. Nevertheless, to examine in which way and to what extent religion 
influences daily life in Western societies remains interesting and relevant. The aims 
people set in their lives, and the way they pursue these goals depends to a large extent 
on their beliefs. These beliefs are quite likely to bear some religious signature or find 
their origin in some religious tradition present in the religious market.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1: Dependent variables, datasets, and nations included in analyses of previous research.   
 Dep. variable Dataset Nations 
Iannaccone % Attending 
weekly 
ISV 1981-1983 Societies more than 80% Catholic were 
omitted. Societies analyzed: USA, Canada, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, New 
Zealand, W. Germany, Britain, Sweden, 
Norway, Finland, Denmark 
Chaves & 
Cann 
 
% Attending 
weekly 
ISV 1981-1983 USA, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Australia, New Zealand, W. Germany, 
Britain, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, 
Ireland, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Austria, 
France 
Chaves, 
Schraeder & 
Sprindys 
Hajj Rate for 
Muslims per 
100,000  
ISV 1981-1983 USA, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Australia, New Zealand, W. Germany, 
Britain, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, 
Ireland, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Austria, 
France 
Barro & 
McCleary 
 
Monthly church 
attendance per 
nation 
WVS 1981-
1995,  
ISSP 1990-
1998, 
Gallup 1999 
Cameroon, Ghana, S. Africa, Canada, 
Dominican Rep., Mexico, United States, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Bangladesh, China, 
Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, S. Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, W. Germany, 
Greece, Hungary,  Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom,  Australia, New Zealand, Bulgaria, 
Czech Rep., Estonia, Latvia, Romania, 
Russia, Slovak Rep., Slovenia 
Norris & 
Inglehart 
Mean frequency 
of attendance  
WVS 1981-
2001 
 
Most likely to be (Western) Europe, 
Northern America, Australia, and some other 
societies 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables in the analysis 
 Range Mean St. deviation 
Society level variables:a    
 Degree of religious deregulation  65 – 95 80.93 8.88 
 History of religious deregulation (in years) 0 – 205.40  56.31 65.65 
 HDI 0.71 – 0.93  0.87 0.06 
     Source: EVS & WVS ’81, ‘90, ’00, ‘06. 
a = Means and standard deviations are calculated              
 averages  over all 26 societies.   
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Appendix B 
 
Table 1: Cronbach’s alpha per country per wave. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Traditionally Catholic societies     
     Belgium 0.77 0.77 0.79 
     France 0.77 0.79 0.80 
     Ireland 0.66 0.60 0.67 
     Italy 0.81 0.82 0.79 
     Spain 0.79 0.79 0.82 
    
Traditionally Protestant societies    
     Canada 0.69 0.73 0.74 
     Denmark 0.76 0.67 0.70 
     Iceland 0.68 0.63 0.65 
     Sweden 0.78 0.77 0.74 
    
Traditionally mixed societies    
     West Germany 0.77 0.78 0.80 
     Netherlands 0.82 0.79 0.76 
     United Kingdom  0.78 0.80 0.85 
    
     United States of America 0.64 0.71 0.73 
Overall α   0.81 
                 Source: EVS & WVS ‘81, ‘90, ‘00. 
 
Table 2: Estimated Eta’s between Christian beliefs and  
Christian belonging (Church attendance) per country.  
 Observed Eta  
in 1981 
Observed Eta  
in 1990 
Observed Eta  
in  2000 
Traditional Catholic societies     
     Belgium .556 .551 .533 
     France .514 .597 .466 
     Ireland .523 .438 .432 
     Italy .578 .654 .511 
     Spain .633 .594 .547 
    
Traditional Protestant societies    
     Canada .435 .430 .396 
     Denmark .520 .464 .406 
     Iceland .316 .252 .236 
     Sweden .540 .547 .466 
    
Traditional mixed societies    
     West Germany .635 .628 .584 
     Netherlands .659 .629 .590 
     United Kingdom  .506 .479 .404 
    
     United States of America .329 .382 .416 
              Source: EVS & WVS ’81, ‘90, ‘00. 
  
The distribution of the church attendance measure (per-year scale) is indeed positively skewed for 
many countries, which might result in non-linear relationships between Christian beliefs and 
belonging (i.e. church attendance). As a consequence, the Pearson correlation coefficients (cf. Table 5) 
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could be a serious underestimation of the real relationship between Christian beliefs and church 
attendance. To check whether skewness is a serious problem, we computed for each country and wave 
the Eta coefficient (we assume Christian beliefs to be metric). This coefficient reflects the maximum 
strength of the relationship between Christian belief and belonging. Skewness and type of scale have 
no influence on the height of this coefficient. We included Table I in which you will find all Eta-
coefficients. Next, we compared each observed Pearson correlation coefficient and Eta counterpart and 
found only little differences. From this we concluded that it is warranted to present the widely used 
and easy to compute Pearson correlation coefficient instead of Eta’s. We included information about 
these analyses in this chapter (cf note 14).           
Figure 1: Observed and expected correlations between believing and belonging for Table 5. 
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Table 3: Traditional Christian beliefs and attendance (belonging), in percentages, per country per 
wave. For convenience of comparison the traditional Christian beliefs scale was merged into three 
categories. 
 
Belgium. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  33.0 6.7 6.8 46.5 38.1 4.8 6.1 48.9 38.7 6.6 6.7 52.0 
once a year 2.2 0.8 0.8 3.9 2.1 0.5 0.4 3.1 3.3 1.3 0.7 5.4 
on holy days 2.5 2.2 2.5 7.2 6.1 4.0 3.1 13.2 7.8 4.2 4.4 16.3 
once a month 2.5 1.2 4.3 8.0 3.1 2.0 2.9 7.9 2.9 1.9 3.7 8.5 
once a week 4.7 4.9 20.5 30.1 3.9 4.8 12.7 21.3 2.6 3.0 8.0 13.6 
more than once a 
week 0.3 0.3 3.7 4.3 0.7 0.6 4.3 5.6 0.1 0.5 3.7 4.3 
 45.2 16.1 38.7 100 53.9 16.7 29.4 100 55.4 17.4 27.2 100 
 
France. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  35.2 8.4 9.0 52.5 47.2 7.4 6.4 61.0 49.6 8.7 11.2 69.4 
once a year 2.5 1.3 1.3 5.2 4.1 1.4 1.6 7.0 3.0 1.1 1.9 6.0 
on holy days 6.3 4.2 7.0 17.5 5.8 3.8 5.6 15.2 5.2 2.4 5.6 13.2 
once a month 1.2 2.4 5.4 9.0 0.9 1.6 4.4 6.9 0.5 1.5 2.3 4.3 
once a week 0.4 2.7 11.0 14.2 0.4 1.2 7.0 8.6 0.2 0.8 4.3 5.3 
more than once a 
week 0.1 0.3 1.2 1.6 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.2 0.2 0.3 1.2 1.7 
 45.5 19.3 34.9 100 58.4 15.4 26.2 100 58.7 14.8 26.5 100 
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Ireland. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  3.0 0.4 1.7 5.1 2.4 0.5 1.6 4.6 2.5 1.2 5.0 8.7 
once a year 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.3 0.1 0.2 0.9 1.2 1.3 0.9 2.1 4.3 
on holy days 0.4 0.6 1.9 2.8 1.0 1.5 2.8 5.3 1.8 1.6 6.9 10.3 
once a month 0.5 1.4 3.3 5.2 0.5 0.9 4.9 6.3 0.7 1.7 6.5 9.0 
once a week 1.8 4.3 51.1 57.1 2.4 5.2 51.4 59.0 2.0 2.8 45.4 50.2 
more than once a 
week 0.2 0.7 27.7 28.6 0.4 1.1 22.1 23.6 0.2 0.4 16.9 17.5 
 6.2 7.7 86.1 100 6.9 9.5 83.7 100 8.6 8.6 82.8 100 
 
Italy. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  21.1 2.8 3.7 27.6 15.3 2.5 1.9 19.7 9.5 3.2 3.3 16.1 
once a year 2.9 1.2 0.9 5.1 2.1 0.9 1.3 4.4 1.9 0.6 1.3 3.8 
on holy days 8.1 3.2 7.6 18.9 8.8 3.8 7.8 20.3 6.7 5.3 12.3 24.3 
once a month 3.5 3.5 6.9 13.9 2.4 2.2 8.0 12.7 2.3 2.6 8.2 13.1 
once a week 3.3 3.9 19.7 26.9 2.0 3.9 25.0 30.9 2.7 4.2 24.3 31.3 
more than once a 
week 0.4 0.5 6.6 7.5 0.3 0.7 11.0 12.1 0.4 0.9 10.3 11.5 
 39.3 15.2 45.5 100 30.9 14.0 55.1 100 23.5 16.8 59.7 100 
 
Spain. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  19.5 5.9 5.6 31.0 28.5 4.9 7.2 40.7 28.3 5.5 9.4 43.2 
once a year 1.9 1.1 1.2 4.2 1.5 0.8 1.4 3.7 1.5 1.2 1.9 4.6 
on holy days 3.1 2.6 3.1 8.8 5.2 3.3 6.3 14.8 5.2 2.5 6.4 14.2 
once a month 2.1 2.3 7.6 11.9 1.5 2.0 5.6 9.1 2.3 1.8 7.2 11.2 
once a week 2.1 3.9 26.0 32.0 2.1 3.0 17.2 22.3 1.9 2.1 14.7 18.7 
more than once a 
week 0.2 0.8 11.2 12.2 0.3 0.5 8.6 9.5 0.2 0.7 7.1 8.0 
 28.2 16.6 54.6 100 39.2 14.6 46.2 100 39.4 13.9 46.7 100 
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Canada. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  10.2 5.8 14.6 30.6 15.0 4.9 14.4 34.3 10.7 5.2 17.8 33.7 
once a year 2.0 1.7 5.2 9.0 1.7 1.3 5.2 8.3 1.8 1.5 7.1 10.3 
on holy days 2.4 3.1 7.6 13.1 2.4 2.9 10.9 16.2 1.6 2.9 12.1 16.6 
once a month 1.3 2.1 10.8 14.2 1.0 2.2 9.3 12.5 1.0 1.2 8.1 10.3 
once a week 0.5 2.4 21.7 24.6 0.8 1.9 18.8 21.5 0.5 1.0 19.9 21.5 
more than once a 
week 0.2 0.2 8.2 8.6 0.2 0.7 6.3 7.2 0.0 0.7 6.9 7.6 
 16.6 15.3 68.1 100 21.2 13.8 65.0 100 15.7 12.4 72.0 100 
 
Denmark. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  52.0 3.6 4.2 59.8 45.9 6.1 5.1 57.0 40.3 7.0 4.3 51.6 
once a year 11.5 1.1 1.9 14.5 9.1 3.9 2.3 15.3 11.1 2.9 2.6 16.6 
on holy days 10.9 1.9 2.4 15.2 12.4 2.3 2.1 16.8 12.5 4.0 3.6 20.2 
once a month 2.3 0.8 4.3 7.3 2.3 1.7 4.3 8.3 3.6 2.5 2.9 9.0 
once a week 0.0 0.1 2.9 3.0 0.1 0.3 1.9 2.3 0.1 0.3 1.5 1.9 
more than once a 
week 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.87 
 76.7 7.5 15.8 100 69.9 14.2 15.8 100 67.7 16.8 15.5 100 
 
Iceland. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  16.9 9.9 20.3 47.2 13.5 11.4 19.1 43.9 16.3 8.0 19.3 43.6 
once a year 3.1 3.7 8.5 15.3 3.7 3.2 8.8 15.7 3.5 3.6 11.1 18.2 
on holy days 3.1 5.5 18.1 26.7 2.8 8.0 20.4 31.2 3.6 7.2 15.8 26.6 
once a month 0.3 1.0 6.8 8.1 1.1 0.9 5.2 7.3 0.4 1.9 6.7 9.0 
once a week 0.0 0.1 2.0 2.1 0.0 0.4 1.1 1.5 0.4 0.5 1.2 2.1 
more than once a 
week 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.4 
 23.4 20.2 56.4 100 21.1 23.9 55.0 100 24.2 21.6 54.2 100 
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Sweden. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  45.3 5.4 4.6 55.2 53.4 6.9 6.5 66.9 44.2 7.8 7.3 59.3 
once a year 10.1 3.6 4.2 17.9 6.7 1.8 1.7 10.1 11.9 3.8 5.1 20.7 
on holy days 8.0 2.0 3.1 13.0 5.8 1.5 4.1 11.4 4.1 3.0 3.8 10.9 
once a month 1.5 1.1 6.0 8.6 1.0 1.2 4.0 6.2 1.0 0.6 3.6 5.2 
once a week 0.3 0.0 2.6 2.9 0.3 0.1 3.1 3.5 0.2 0.1 3.1 3.5 
more than once a 
week 0.2 0.3 1.8 2.3 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.9 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 
 65.3 12.4 22.3 100 67.1 11.6 21.3 100 61.5 15.4 23.1 100 
 
West Germany. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  34.2 4.9 3.1 42.3 34.3 4.2 4.5 43.1 33.6 3.9 3.3 40.8 
once a year 6.6 1.9 1.4 9.9 5.4 1.7 0.9 8.0 4.8 1.1 1.5 7.4 
on holy days 5.6 4.4 2.9 12.8 6.6 3.9 4.1 14.5 10.9 3.3 5.0 19.2 
once a month 3.2 4.1 7.2 14.5 3.7 3.2 7.1 14.0 4.2 4.7 8.6 17.5 
once a week 1.8 2.1 12.4 16.2 0.7 2.4 13.5 16.6 2.7 2.8 7.9 13.3 
more than once a 
week 0.1 0.5 3.6 4.3 0.0 0.4 3.4 3.7 0.0 0.2 1.5 1.7 
 51.5 17.9 30.6 100 50.7 15.7 33.6 100 56.2 16.0 27.8 100 
 
Netherlands. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  36.3 4.1 5.5 45.9 39.8 5.0 4.7 49.4 42.1 8.7 7.3 58.1 
once a year 2.6 1.0 0.7 4.2 4.1 0.7 1.2 6.1 3.9 1.6 1.0 6.6 
on holy days 4.0 2.6 2.5 9.0 8.1 3.3 4.6 16.0 6.3 2.7 4.3 13.2 
once a month 3.3 2.9 6.8 13.0 2.6 2.4 4.8 9.8 2.3 2.1 5.8 10.2 
once a week 1.2 2.8 19.4 23.4 1.6 2.2 11.4 15.2 0.7 0.9 6.7 8.4 
more than once a 
week 0.4 0.2 3.7 4.3 0.0 0.2 3.2 3.5 0.1 0.2 3.1 3.5 
 47.9 13.6 38.5 100 56.1 13.9 30.0 100 55.5 16.2 28.3 100 
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United Kingdom. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  21.4 8.8 18.6 48.8 25.7 6.8 17.1 49.6 31.9 6.1 23.8 61.8 
once a year 2.3 1.0 3.7 7.0 2.1 1.6 4.1 7.8 2.0 1.2 3.6 6.8 
on holy days 1.7 1.9 5.6 9.1 2.7 1.7 6.2 10.6 3.6 1.2 6.4 11.2 
once a month 0.9 0.8 8.5 10.2 0.9 1.3 8.6 10.8 0.5 0.3 4.1 4.9 
once a week 0.6 0.8 15.3 16.8 0.7 1.8 13.3 15.8 0.8 0.9 8.3 10.0 
more than once a 
week 0.0 0.1 8.0 8.1 0.1 0.3 4.9 5.3 0.0 0.2 5.2 5.3 
 26.9 13.4 59.7 100 32.3 13.5 54.2 100 38.7 9.9 51.4 100 
 
United States of America. 
 1981 1990 2000 
Christian beliefs 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  
             
Attendance              
never  3.4 2.4 14.7 20.4 5.1 2.8 15.8 23.7 5.3 2.5 12.9 20.7 
once a year 0.5 0.6 5.1 6.2 0.7 0.5 5.2 6.3 0.6 0.8 6.8 8.2 
on holy days 0.7 0.8 8.4 9.8 0.9 1.0 5.6 7.5 0.3 1.0 7.8 9.1 
once a month 0.6 1.3 15.7 17.6 0.8 1.4 12.5 14.8 0.1 1.3 13.2 14.6 
once a week 0.4 1.1 29.6 31.0 0.7 1.3 30.2 32.1 0.8 0.3 31.5 32.5 
more than once a 
week 0.1 0.5 14.4 14.9 0.0 0.5 15.1 15.5 0.0 0.4 14.5 14.9 
 5.5 6.7 87.9 100 8.2 7.4 84.4 100 7.1 6.2 86.6 100 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 1: Correlations between measures of religious diversity.   
 2 3 
1. Different religious doctrines -  
2. Total number of congregations (log) 0.734*** - 
3. Herfindahl index 0.291*** 0.091*** 
*** = sign p<.01 (two-tailed).                  Source: Glenmary 2000. 
N= 3140  
 
Table 2: OLS regression beta estimates on membership per 1000 people  
             (cf Table 3, models 3 and 4). 
 Model 3 Model 4 
- Religious doctrines 0.288 0.269 
- Total number of congregations 0.161 0.161 
- Median household income  -0.045 
N= 3140             Source: Glenmary 2000 & US Census 2000. 
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Figure 1: Leading denominations per county in 2000. 
 
                    Source: Glenmary 2000. 
  157 
Figure 2: Religious membership per county, as a percentage of all residents. 
 
                          Source: Glenmary 2000. 
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Appendix D 
 
Table 1: Hierarchical linear regression models for percentage of attending  
 Catholics (counting weekend 1in 2003). 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  1.036 *** 12.580*** 10.529*** 11.628*** 11.357*** 
      
Parish-year level:      
- Internal diversity       
    - Quantity of services      0.409**   0.676***   0.793*** 
    - Quality (variety) of services      
           - No other service offered   (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
           - At least one other service    -0.653     -0.643  -0.824* 
      
Parish level:      
- External diversity      
    - Non-Catholic diversity      
           - No other  (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
           - One other faith   -1.280*   -1.269*  -1.722* 
           - More than one other faith  -1.396**   -1.314* -2.317*** 
    - Catholic diversity      
           - No other  (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
           - At least one other Cath. faith  -2.157***  -2.675***  -1.913** 
      
Municipality level:      
    - Percentage secular       0.124*** 
    - Urbanization      -0.867** 
      
Variance components:      
    Parish level variance 10.070***   8.945*** 10.057***   8.360***  5.477** 
    Municipality level variance 94.568*** 93.563*** 94.219*** 93.226*** 93.937*** 
*** = sign p<0.01 (one-tailed).    Source: KASKI 2003, 2004 & NIPO 2000. 
  ** = sign p<0.05 (one-tailed). 
    * = sign p<0.10 (one-tailed). 
N1= 1062, N2= 390. 
The main analyses distinguished 3 levels. However, as there 
is only one year in these models the lowest level is the parish-level. 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
Summary in Dutch 
 
 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 – Inleiding en de algemene onderzoeksvraag 
Vanaf de 16e eeuw hebben technologische, economische en filosofische 
ontwikkelingen, naast stijgende onderwijsniveaus invloed uitgeoefend op de 
Christelijke tradities van het Westen. De opkomst van nieuwe religies en seculiere 
ideeën daagden de bestaande tradities uit. De reformatie leidde tot nieuwe 
denominaties, nu bekend als het Protestantisme. De Contrareformatie hervormde het 
Katholicisme en de wetenschap, voortkomend uit Protestantse stromingen, benaderde 
de wereld op een rationeel-empirische wijze.  
 Naast deze ontwikkelingen ontstonden er voortdurend afsplitsingen van de 
Christelijke tradities, wat religie verder fragmenteerde. De successen van 
technologische ontwikkelingen verbeterde de communicatie tussen mensen en 
culturen. Het gevolg was dat religieuze overtuigingen op een veel snellere en grote 
schaal werden uitgewisseld. Deze ongekende uitwisseling van ideeën droeg, en draagt 
bij aan een toenemende religieuze diversiteit. Kortom, toen de Westerse 
samenlevingen en haar inwoners de overgang maakten naar het moderne tijdperk, 
werden ze in religieus opzicht meer divers.   
 Een ander kenmerk van het moderne tijdperk is dat de West Europese en Noord 
Amerikaanse samenlevingen consumptiemaatschappijen werden. De keuzes die 
mensen in deze tijd kunnen maken zijn enorm. Het idee van keuze is ook 
doorgedrongen op het gebied van religie. In de consumptiegerichte samenlevingen van 
het Westen wordt verondersteld dat religie steeds meer een individuele keuze 
geworden is. Religieuze affiliatie wordt in steeds mindere mate bepaald door traditie 
of gewoonte dan dat in vroegere tijden het geval was.    
 Door deze veranderingen in het religieuze domein beargumenteren sommige 
sociologen dat er een religieuze markt ontstaan is. Religie is een markt geworden met 
de bijbehorende principes en mechanismen van de markteconomie (Berger 1967; 
Finke en Stark 1988). Door de nieuwe situatie die ontstaan is kan kerklidmaatschap 
niet langer opgelegd worden door sociale dwang. Religie moet aan de mensen 
‘verkocht’ worden. De geestelijkheid moeten hun religieuze producten verkopen aan 
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consumenten. In een religieuze markt met diverse aanbieders domineert de logica van 
de marktwerking.  
Het is waarschijnlijk dat het ontstaan van een religieus diverse markt gevolgen 
heeft voor individuen. Deze studie probeert variaties en trends in religieuze participatie 
te verklaren door verschillen in religieuze diversiteit in Europa en Noord Amerika. 
Daarbij wordt ook rekening gehouden met individuele, denominationele en 
maatschappelijke kenmerken.  De algemene onderzoeksvraag luidt daarom als volgt: 
In welke mate leidt religieuze diversiteit tot hogere of lagere niveaus van religieuze 
participatie.  
 
Naast het beschrijven van veranderingen in religiositeit proberen we voornamelijk te 
verklaren waarom veranderingen in religiositeit plaatsvinden. In deze studie gebruiken 
we twee theorieën om de relatie tussen religieuze diversiteit en religieuze participatie 
te verklaren: de seculariseringstheorie en de religieuze markttheorie.  
De seculariseringstheorie voorspelt dat door de toenemende religieuze 
diversiteit, samenlevingen en haar inwoners in toenemende mate seculier zullen 
worden (Berger 1967; Bruce 2002; Martin 1978; Wilson 1966). Deze theorie 
veronderstelt dat het naast elkaar bestaan van verschillende religieuze tradities de 
plausibiliteit van religie ondergraaft. Deze afname in plausibiliteit is wat toenemende 
secularisatie teweegbrengt. In een religieus diverse omgeving is het voor iedere 
denominatie veel moeilijker om aanspraak te maken op de absolute waarheid van hun 
doctrines. Daarnaast kunnen mensen, als zij in aanraking komen met diverse en soms 
tegenstrijdige religieuze doctrines, ook kiezen om  niet (langer) religieus te zijn. 
Echter, de voorspelling van de seculariseringstheorie werd niet altijd bevestigd. In 
enkele Westerse samenlevingen, Amerika in het bijzonder, is er veel religieuze 
diversiteit en ook een hoge mate van religiositeit. Volgens sommige onderzoekers 
groeien sommige meer strikte denominaties zelfs (Davie 2002; Finke 1992; 
Iannaccone 1994). 
Door deze ongerijmdheid vond een tweede theorie opgang: de religieuze 
markttheorie. De religieuze markttheorie is gebaseerd op economische principes en 
richt zich op het aanbod van de religieuze markt. Het religieuze aanbod is die kant van 
de markt waar de verschillende denominaties hun ‘product’ verkopen. Dit is een 
belangrijk verschil met de seculariseringstheorie, die zich richt op de vraagkant van de 
religieuze markt.  De kern van de religieuze markttheorie is de aanname dat mensen 
religieus van aard zijn maar dat ze verschillende behoeftes aan religie hebben (Finke 
and Stark 1988; Stark 1997; Stark and Finke 2000). Als er diverse religies op de markt 
zijn, dan zullen individuen een denominatie kiezen die het best bij hun behoeftes 
aansluiten. Dit leidt ertoe dat denominaties zullen wedijveren met elkaar en zich zullen 
specialiseren om zo goed mogelijk aan de vraag te voldoen (Stark and Finke 2000). 
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Volgens de religieuze markttheorie leidt religieuze diversiteit tot een heropleving van 
religieuze participatie door middel van keuze en competitie. Een neergang in 
participatie zou niet zozeer een gevolg zijn een afnemende vraag maar van een slecht 
religieus aanbod. 
Kortom, de seculariseringstheorie en de religieuze markttheorie maken 
tegenovergestelde voorspellingen wat betreft de invloed van religieuze diversiteit op 
religieuze betrokkenheid. De seculariseringstheorie vestigt de aandacht op het 
individu. Die door de toegenomen religieuze diversiteit minder zou zijn gaan 
participeren. De religieuze markttheorie richt zich op de aanbodkant van de markt. 
Door de gestegen diversiteit en wedijver zouden mensen meer gaan zouden 
participeren. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 – Religie en deregulatie van de markt 
Deregulatie van de religieuze markt wordt als een voorwaarde beschouwd voor het 
ontstaan van religieuze diversiteit. Zowel de seculariseringstheorie als de religieuze 
markttheorie veronderstellen dit. Daarbij kent religieuze deregulatie twee aspecten. 
Enerzijds, de vrijheid van godsdienst voor individuen. Anderzijds, de vrijheid voor 
religieuze tradities om zich ongehinderd te vestigen in de markt.  
 Religieuze deregulatie zou participatie beïnvloeden via religieuze diversiteit. 
Echter, het is problematisch om religieuze diversiteit te meten omdat de 
meetinstrumenten theoretisch en methodologisch mank zijn.  Daarom wordt het totale 
effect van deregulatie op religieuze participatie bestudeerd.  
 In een religieuze markt zouden aan de wensen van individuen het best worden 
voldaan wanneer er zo weinig mogelijk regulatie zou zijn. De religieuze markttheorie 
veronderstelt dat mensen verschillende religieuze behoeftes hebben. De markt 
functioneert daarom pas optimaal als er een hoge mate van religieuze diversiteit 
aanwezig is. Als de markt vrijer is en daardoor meer divers wordt dan zal participatie 
uiteindelijk stijgen. Desalniettemin stelt de religieuze markttheorie dat zelfs als 
deregulatie heeft plaatsgevonden, participatie niet noodzakelijkerwijs hoeft toe te 
nemen. Want deregulatie kent mogelijke tegenslagen en problemen. Daarom zou er 
een tijdskloof zijn tussen deregulatie en toenemende participatie. Echter, aanhangers 
van de religieuze markttheorie geven niet aan hoe groot de vertraging is tussen 
deregulatie en toenemende participatie (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Daarom 
onderzoeken we in dit hoofdstuk of er verschillen zijn tussen en binnen samenlevingen 
met betrekking tot de duur van deregulatie en de mate van participatie. Daarnaast 
kijken we of er verschillen tussen landen zijn met betrekking tot de hoogte van 
deregulatie. Dit leidt tot de onderzoeksvraag: In welke mate heeft de hoogte en de duur 
van deregulatie een positieve invloed op individuele religieuze participatie binnen en 
tussen Europese en Noord Amerikaanse samenlevingen tussen 1981 en 2006? Om 
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deze vraag te beantwoorden worden 26 landen vergeleken aan de hand van de 
European and World Value Surveys uit 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000 en 2006. Deze data 
word aangevuld door gegevens uit de Religious Freedom Archives. Onder religieuze 
participatie wordt kerkgang bedoeld, waar ook tempel- en moskeebezoek onder vallen. 
De bevindingen laten zien dat tussen samenlevingen een langere historie van 
religieuze deregulatie niet resulteert in meer participatie. Daarnaast werd er een 
positieve invloed gevonden van het niveau van deregulatie op de kans dat individuen 
een kerk bezoeken. Hoewel, deze invloed wordt volledig teniet gedaan door de sterke 
degeneratieve invloed van moderniteit. Naast verschillen tussen landen zijn ook trends 
binnen landen onderzocht. Daaruit blijkt dat naarmate de periode van deregulatie 
binnen een samenleving langer is, de kans dat individuen een kerk bezoeken afneemt. 
Als mensen zich bewust zijn van hun religieuze vrijheid dan is het waarschijnlijk dat 
mensen ervoor kiezen om niet kerks te zijn. Competitie in de religieuze markt 
depriveert alle religieuze tradities van hun vanzelfsprekende geloofwaardigheid wat 
een afname van de kerkgang teweegbrengt. Dit verklaart ook waarom de kerkgang in 
samenlevingen met een langere historie van religieuze deregulatie meer kerks zijn dan 
samenlevingen die pas recentelijk hun markten dereguleerden.   
 
Hoofdstuk 3 – Gaat kerkgang nog samen met geloof? 
De slogan ‘geloven zonder behoren’ staat in dit hoofdstuk centraal. Deze slogan staat 
voor de verschuiving in religiositeit die in vele Westerse samenlevingen plaats zou 
vinden. Mensen zouden niet langer meer tot een bepaalde denominatie behoren maar 
zouden er nog wel religieuze ideeën op na houden (Davie 1990a, 1990b, 1994, 2002). 
Religie is steeds meer een privé-aangelegenheid geworden. Dit zou geresulteerd 
hebben in een kloof tussen geloven en het behoren tot een bepaalde denominatie. 
Kortom, er wordt veronderstelt dat in Westerse samenlevingen een groeiend aantal 
mensen nog wel religieuze ideeën heeft maar geen formele bindingen meer heeft met 
een religie. 
 Dit hoofdstuk plaatst de geïsoleerde slogan ‘geloven zonder behoren’ onder een 
groter overkoepelend probleem: in welke mate religieuze diversiteit religieuze 
participatie beïnvloedt. De slogan ‘geloven zonder behoren’ wordt ingebed onder 
zowel de seculariseringstheorie als de religieuze markttheorie. Er wordt daarbij 
uitsluitend gekeken naar Christelijke geloofsopvattingen en kerkgang. Want een 
vergelijking met kerkgang en elke om het even welke geloofsopvatting is een 
oneerlijke vergelijking.  
 Doordat de slogan theoretisch ingebed wordt, wordt het aannemelijk om te 
verwachten dat het niveau van religieuze participatie (d.w.z. geloven en behoren) 
verschilt tussen landen. De sterkte van de samenhang tussen geloven en behoren is 
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waarschijnlijk ook anders als de religieuze achtergrond van een samenleving varieert. 
De samenhang tussen geloven en behoren in een land met een lage mate van religieuze 
diversiteit is misschien anders dan de samenhang in een land met veel religieuze 
diversiteit. Hoewel de religieuze achtergrond van een land een vrij grove indicator is 
voor diversiteit, is het zinvol om religieuze achtergrond in beschouwing te nemen. 
Want zowel de seculariseringstheorie als de religieuze markttheorie veronderstellen 
dat de religieuze achtergrond van een land er toe doet (Martin 1978; Stark and 
Iannaccone 1994; Wilson 1982). 
Volgens de verwachting van de seculariseringstheorie zijn geloven en behoren 
sterk aan elkaar gerelateerd. Het ene kan niet zonder het andere. Een afname in 
geloofsopvattingen zal automatisch ook tot een afname leiden van behoren, en 
andersom. Daarbij komt dat deze theorie voorspelt dat door toenemende religieuze 
diversiteit, religiositeit zal afnemen. Als gevolg daarvan zal de samenhang tussen 
geloven en behoren door de tijd heen ongeveer even sterk blijven omdat beide in min 
of meer gelijk tempo zullen afnemen. Echter, het zou ook kunnen dat de samenhang 
tussen geloven en behoren sterker wordt als mensen die al opgehouden waren te 
behoren ook ophouden te geloven (er blijft dan enkel een kern van fanatieke gelovigen 
over omdat de marginale kerkgangers verdwijnen).  
In tegenstelling tot deze verwachtingen staan de verwachtingen van de 
religieuze markttheorie. Deze theorie veronderstelt dat geloven onafhankelijk is van 
behoren. Een afname van behoren impliceert dus niet automatisch een afname in 
geloofsopvattingen. Volgens aanhangers van deze theorie zijn geloofsopvattingen 
wijdverspreid en niet homogeen (Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000). 
Gegeven de vermeende afname in kerkgang in het merendeel van de Westerse 
samenlevingen zou de samenhang tussen geloven en behoren door de tijd heen moeten 
afnemen. Deze veronderstelde groeiende kloof tussen geloofsopvattingen en kerkgang 
zou gekeerd kunnen worden door religieuze diversiteit. Om de verschillende religieuze 
behoeftes van individuen te bevredigen is er een religieus diverse markt nodig. Alleen 
als de religieuze markt divers is, vinden de verschillende religieuze behoeftes 
aansluiting bij bijbehorende religieuze praxis. Daarom wordt veronderstelt dat in 
samenlevingen met een religieus diverse markt, geloven en behoren wijdverspreider is 
dan in samenlevingen met een minder diverse religieuze markt.  Overeenkomstig zal 
ook de samenhang tussen geloven en behoren in landen met een hogere mate van 
religieuze diversiteit sterker zijn.  
Door het analyseren van cross-sectionele data van 13 Westerse samenlevingen 
tussen 1981 en 2000 worden er antwoorden geformuleerd op de volgende 
onderzoeksvragen: Hoe zien de trends er uit van Christelijke geloofsopvattingen en 
kerkgang? Wat is de trend in de samenhang geloven en behoren? En, in welke mate 
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beïnvloedt religieuze diversiteit de samenhang tussen geloven en behoren in West 
Europa en Noord Amerika tussen 1981 en 2000? 
De bevindingen laten zien dat zowel Christelijke geloofsopvattingen als 
kerkgang afnemen in de meeste samenlevingen met een Katholieke en religieus 
gemixte achtergrond. In enkele samenlevingen met een Protestantse achtergrond 
winnen enkele geloofsopvattingen aan populariteit. Verder is er in zijn algemeenheid 
geen groeiende kloof waar te nemen tussen Christelijk geloven en behoren. De lichte 
afname in de samenhang tussen geloofsopvattingen en kerkgang, die in enkele 
samenlevingen geconstateerd is, komt doordat kerkgang sneller afneemt dan de 
geloofsopvattingen. Daarnaast is de sterkte van de samenhang tussen geloven en 
behoren verschillend naar gelang de religieuze achtergrond van een land. Over het 
algemeen is de samenhang in samenlevingen met een Katholieke achtergrond het 
sterkst en het zwakst in samenlevingen met een Protestantse achtergrond. In de 
Verenigde Staten, het meest religieus diverse land, is de samenhang tussen 
geloofsopvattingen en kerkgang relatief laag. Kennelijk gaat er relatief groot gedeelte 
van de bevolking die wel gelooft niet naar de kerk. Dit is opmerkelijk, omdat er een 
groot religieus aanbod is.  
 
Hoofdstuk 4 – Diversiteit en kerklidmaatschap in Amerika  
De seculariseringstheorie kent een paar problemen. Een van die problemen is dat 
ondanks een hoge mate van religieuze diversiteit de bevolking in de Verenigde Staten 
relatief erg religieus is. Echter, voor de religieuze markttheorie is Amerika het 
voorbeeld van een goede marktwerking van religie. Juist omdat de religieuze markt zo 
divers is, is er een hoge mate van religiositeit. Daarom wordt in dit hoofdstuk de 
relatie tussen religieuze diversiteit en kerklidmaatschap in de Verenigde Staten nader 
onderzocht. 
 Er wordt onderzocht of er in de Verenigde Staten echt sprake is van een 
religieus diverse markt en daarmee een uitzondering is op de verwachtingen van de 
seculariseringstheorie. Of dat de voorspelling van de seculariseringstheorie toch 
opgaat. Het laatste zou het geval zijn als er sprake zou zijn van een vertekend beeld 
van de religieuze markt. Uitkomsten op het niveau van een land hoeven niet altijd 
overeen te komen met relaties op het lokale of individuele niveau. Zo zou de hoge 
mate van religiositeit ook veroorzaakt kunnen worden door lokale religieuze 
monopolies, die regionaal van elkaar verschillen.  De onderzoeksvraag van dit 
hoofdstuk luidt daarom: Hoe en in welke mate beïnvloedt religieuze diversiteit 
religieuze participatie in de counties van de Verenigde Staten? 
 Om een gedetailleerder antwoord te geven op deze vraag is religieuze 
diversiteit is opgedeeld in twee verschillende aspecten: het aantal verschillende 
religieuze doctrines (religies) en het aantal congregaties (gemeenschappen). Deze twee 
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vormen van diversiteit werden gemeten op het lokale niveau, dat wil zeggen de 
counties. De reden hiervoor is dat het waarschijnlijker is dat een persoon beïnvloed 
wordt door de religieuze markt in zijn omgeving dan dat hij beïnvloed wordt door de 
religieuze markt van de Verenigde staten in zijn geheel.  
 Het meten van religieuze diversiteit kent vele problemen. Zo is er een grote 
afhankelijkheid tussen maten van diversiteit en religiositeit. Dit komt doordat zowel 
diversiteit en religiositeit op individueel niveau gemeten worden. Hierdoor is 
religieuze diversiteit een verhulde vorm van religiositeit. Dit maakt de analyses 
onbruikbaar omdat de geschatte effecten kunstmatig zijn. Daarnaast is religieuze 
diversiteit geen kenmerk dat geaggregeerd kan worden op basis van kenmerken van 
individuen. Religieuze diversiteit is een kenmerk van de markt; het aanbod wat er aan 
religie ‘te koop’ is. Deze problemen hebben we proberen te ondervangen.  
 Uit de bevindingen op basis van 3140 counties blijkt dat de relatie tussen 
diversiteit en kerklidmaatschap in de Verenigde Staten niet-lineair is. In counties waar 
de markt bestaat uit een of twee verschillende religies (meestal Protestantse of 
Evangelische doctrine) is het aantal kerkleden per 1000 inwoners relatief laag. 
Kerklidmaatschap per 1000 inwoners is het hoogst in counties waar er een religieus 
oligopolie is, bestaande uit het Protestantse, Evangelische en Katholieke geloof. Als er 
veel ‘exotische’ religies in de markt aanwezig zijn, is het aantal kerkleden per 1000 
inwoners het laagst. Wanneer er meer congregaties in een county zijn, des te hoger is 
het aantal kerkleden per 1000 inwoners. Echter, dit effect maakt de corrosieve invloed 
van veel verschillende religieuze doctrines in de lokale religieuze markt niet geheel 
ongedaan.  
  Al met al blijkt de voorspelling van de seculariseringstheorie dat diversiteit, in 
de zin van verschillende religies, leidt tot minder religiositeit ook op te gaan voor de 
Verenigde Staten. De afnemende geloofwaardigheid van religie wordt in beperkte 
mate gecompenseerd door sterkte in aantal van congregaties. Zodoende blijkt ook de 
voorspelling van de religieuze markttheorie enige waarde te hebben. Het is dus 
belangrijk om genuanceerder naar religieuze diversiteit te kijken. Het is te cru om te 
veronderstellen dat religieuze diversiteit altijd en overal leidt tot een afname van 
religiositeit. In de Verenigde Staten is lidmaatschap in religieuze oligopolie, hoger dan 
in religieuze monopolies.  
 
Hoofdstuk 5 – Katholieken in Nederland 
Na de Verenigde Staten onderzoeken we een land aan het andere eind van het 
spectrum. Nederland, een samenleving met relatief weinig religieuze participatie. 
 Aanvankelijk was de religieuze markttheorie bedoeld om de religieuze situatie 
in de Verenigde Staten te verklaren. Echter, de theorie werd uitgebreid om verschillen 
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in religiositeit tussen landen en haar inwoners te verklaren. Deze poging om 
wereldwijd verklaringen te bieden voor veranderingen in religiositeit heeft voor een 
aantal anomalieën gezorgd. Een daar van is een problematische incongruentie ten 
aanzien van katholieke monopolies, die ook van toepassing in op Nederland. Dit maakt 
Nederland een interessant geval om nader te onderzoeken. 
 De eerste anomalie heeft betrekking op de bevinding van voorgaand onderzoek 
dat in samenlevingen met een Katholieke monopolie er een hogere mate van religieuze 
participatie is dan in het religieus diverse Nederland. De tweede anomalie betreft het 
relatief hoge niveau van participatie van mensen in Katholieke monopolies in het 
algemeen. Volgens de verwachting van de religieuze markttheorie zou de religieuze 
participatie in landen met een religieus monopolie  laag moeten zijn, met weinig tot 
geen verschillen tussen landen met een monopolie. Dit blijkt niet het geval te zijn. Dit 
is problematisch voor de religieuze markttheorie omdat het niet in overeenstemming is 
met de assumptie dat religieuze diversiteit religieuze participatie bevordert. De 
kerkgang van katholieken in Nederland is lager dan de kerkgang van katholieken in de 
Katholieke monopolies van België en Oostenrijk. Daarnaast is er nog specifieke 
bevinding met betrekking tot Nederland, die eveneens problematisch is voor de 
religieuze markttheorie. In Nederland is er in vergelijking met andere landen ondanks 
een relatief hoge religieuze diversiteit een relatief lage religiositeit. Het hoge 
percentage buitenkerkelijken zou er op kunnen wijzen dat in Nederland denominaties 
niet alleen met elkaar concurreren maar ook met seculiere alternatieven. Competitie 
hoeft zich niet te beperken tot de religieuze markt. Bijvoorbeeld, seculiere instellingen 
bieden ook onderwijs, ziekenzorg en geven voedsel aan de armen.  
 Om aan deze anomalieën het hoofd te bieden is de religieuze markttheorie met 
aanpassingen gekomen. Deze aanpassingen betreffen verschuivingen in vormen van 
religieuze participatie en in de vorm van religieuze diversiteit. De eerste aanpassing is 
dat verondersteld wordt dat religieuze monopolies altijd populairder lijken dan dat ze 
in werkelijkheid zijn. Hoge niveaus van kerklidmaatschap en geloofsopvattingen 
geven een vertekend beeld in monopolistische markten. Lidmaatschap kan 
afgedwongen worden en verondersteld wordt dat individuen er altijd bepaalde 
geloofsopvattingen op na houden (Stark and Iannaccone 1994).  
De tweede aanpassing stelt dat de relatief hoge religiositeit in Katholieke 
monopolies toe te schrijven is aan de interne diversiteit van de Rooms Katholieke 
kerk.  In dit hoofdstuk onderzoeken we of deze aanpassingen hout snijden. Naast 
diverse vormen van externe religieuze diversiteit worden ook verschillende vormen 
van interne religieuze diversiteit in beschouwing genomen – het aantal diensten en de 
soort dienst. Ook wordt onderzocht in hoeverre denominaties moeten concurreren met 
seculiere alternatieven. In Nederland kunnen mensen namelijk kiezen of ze zich wel of 
geen religie willen aanmeten. De onderzoekvraag luidt daarom: In welke mate en 
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onder welke omstandigheden beïnvloedt religieuze diversiteit de religieuze participatie 
van Rooms Katholieken in parochies in de hedendaagse Nederlandse samenleving? 
Uit de bevindingen op basis van 1062 parochies in 2003 en 2004 blijkt dat 
religieuze diversiteit een negatieve invloed heeft op de religieuze participatie (dat 
betekent in dit hoofdstuk kerkgang) van Rooms Katholieken in parochies. De 
aanwezigheid van andere niet Rooms Katholieke denominaties, andere religies, en het 
aanbieden van meer verschillende soorten diensten leiden allemaal tot een afname van 
de kerkgang. Echter,  des te hoger het aantal diensten, des te hoger de kerkgang in de 
parochies. Ook blijkt dat in een meer seculiere omgeving de kerkgang onder Rooms 
Katholieken hoger is.  
Het blijkt dus dat de aanpassingen van de religieuze markttheorie die een 
oplossing zouden moeten zijn voor de Katholieke anomalie niet houdbaar zijn voor 
Nederland. De veronderstelling dat monopolies altijd populairder lijken dan dat ze zijn 
gaat niet op in Nederland. Gebieden in Nederland die een religieus monopolie kennen, 
zijn religieuzer dan gebieden met meer religieuze diversiteit. De positieve invloed die 
interne diversiteit hou hebben op religieuze participatie is niet gevonden. De relatief 
hoge religiositeit in Katholieke monopolies is niet toe te schrijven aan de interne 
diversiteit van de Rooms Katholieke kerk. Het tegendeel is waar, meer interne 
diversiteit zorgt voor een daling in de kerkgang onder Rooms Katholieken in 
Nederland. Echter, het aanbieden van diensten meerdere keren per dag geeft gelovigen 
een grotere kans om diensten bij te wonen. Ze kunnen dan op een tijdstip naar de kerk 
gaan die het best in hun dagelijkse routine past.  Het lijkt er echter op dat in de 
hedendaagse Nederlandse samenleving mensen eerder keizen voor een seculier 
alternatief temidden van een divers religieus aanbod.  
 
Hoofdstuk 6 – Het antwoord op de algemene onderzoeksvraag 
Met de overgang naar de moderniteit werden de West Europese en Noord 
Amerikaanse landen religieus meer divers. Dit veranderde de religiositeit in deze 
samenlevingen. Van een homogeen religieus baldakijn was geen sprake meer. In deze 
nieuw ontstane situatie, waar meerdere religies naast elkaar bestaan, werd religie een 
marketing aangelegenheid (Berger 1967; Martin 1978; Stark and Finke 2000). Deze 
marktwerking dwingt religies tot competitie met elkaar, om inspanningen te leveren 
om nieuwe aanhangers te werven en leden te behouden. In de afgelopen decennia is 
religieuze participatie in West Europa en Noord Amerika over het algemeen 
afgenomen. Alle grote Christelijke tradities zagen hun ledenaantallen teruglopen. Wat 
was de oorzaak van deze afname? Een afname in religieuze plausibiliteit of een 
disbalans tussen vraag en aanbod? In deze studie zijn de seculariseringstheorie en de 
religieuze markttheorie gebuikt om te verklaren in hoeverre religieuze diversiteit leidt 
tot meer of minder religieuze participatie. De seculariseringstheorie doet dat door te 
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wijzen op rivaliserende plausibiliteitstructuren. De religieuze markttheorie kijkt naar 
het vermogen van de religieuze markt om in de veronderstelde inherent religieuze 
behoeftes van de mensen te voorzien. 
 In de voorgaande hoofdstukken is ingegaan op de invloed van het dereguleren 
van de religieuze markt en verschillende vormen van religieuze diversiteit op 
religieuze participatie in West Europese en Noord Amerikaanse landen. Religieuze 
participatie is uitgesplitst naar geloofsopvattingen, lidmaatschap en kerkbezoek. 
Daaruit zijn een aantal interessante bevindingen gekomen.  
 Het dereguleren van de religieuze markten in West Europa en Noord Amerika 
zorgde ervoor dat nieuwe religies zich konden vestigen en nieuwe afsplitsingen 
konden ontstaan. Als gevolg daarvan werden religieuze markten meer divers. De 
religieuze markten hebben een ruim aanbod en er is geen groeiende kloof tussen 
geloven en behoren. Echter, door de instroom van nieuwe religieuze tradities is 
religieuze participatie afgenomen. In regio’s waar een nog een religieus monopolie is, 
ondanks een bredere religieus meer diverse of meer seculiere context is de participatie 
nog relatief hoog.  
 Kortom, op de algemene onderzoeksvraag in welke mate leidt religieuze 
diversiteit tot hogere of lagere niveaus van religieuze participatie, kan worden 
geantwoord dat religieuze diversiteit leidt in de meeste gevallen tot een afname van 
religieuze participatie.  De afnemende participatie in West Europa en Noord Amerika 
is niet het gevolg van een disbalans tussen vraag en aanbod maar aan afnemende 
religieuze plausibiliteit. Zelfs in de Verenigde Staten, het meest religieuze land in het 
Westen, is er sprake van een afname wanneer een groot aantal religies met elkaar 
wedijveren om volgelingen. Over het algemeen geldt dat als mensen in aanraking 
komen met meerdere religies, religieuze participatie waarschijnlijk gaat afnemen.  
 Naast deze in het algemeen negatieve invloed van religieuze diversiteit blijkt 
modernisering een zeer sterke negatieve invloed te hebben op religieuze participatie. 
In de enkele gevallen waar religieuze diversiteit, participatie lijkt te bevorderen is het 
passender om te concluderen dat dit slechts de afname tempert die door modernisering 
veroorzaakt wordt. 
De seculariseringstheorie blijkt beter in staat om de veranderingen in 
religiositeit te verklaren dan de religieuze markttheorie. Daarnaast doet de 
seculariseringstheorie ook uitspraken over ander factoren die buiten de markteconomie 
liggen, zoals modernisering, die religiositeit kunnen beïnvloeden. De religieuze 
markttheorie beperkt zich tot factoren binnen het domein van de marktwerking liggen. 
Dat betekend echter niet dat er geen beperkingen aan de seculariseringstheorie zitten. 
Zo heeft deze theorie moeite om verklaringen aan te dragen voor stijgingen in 
religiositeit als deze niet het gevolg zijn van religieuze diversiteit en modernisering. 
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Daarnaast zou er aandacht besteed kunnen worden naar in welke mate de verhouding 
tussen aanbod en vraag religiositeit beïnvloedt.  
Uit deze studie is gebleken dat naast de marktwerking van religie ook andere 
factoren een rol spelen op religiositeit. De ideeën die mensen er op na houden over het 
sacrale en het profane is door de moderniteit sterk veranderd. Moderniteit heeft een 
sterke corrosieve invloed op religiositeit. Meer activistische wereldbeelden zijn 
ontstaan en hebben aan populariteit gewonnen.  
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